The theory of natural monopoly has been substantially transformed in previous years. Ina clear and straightforward style, Dr. Sharkey gives an integrated presentation of the modern approach to this subject. Although the book is mainly conceptual in nature, the final chapter on natural monopoly in the telecommunications industry shows the practical applications of the theory. After an historical survey of natural monopoly, there follows a chapter stating and explaining the main results as well as giving a preliminary overview of the rest of the book, where concepts such as the subadditivity of costs, optimal pricing, sustainability, and destructive competition are presented. The essence of the subject is presented in a manner accessible to the general reader, though the book also provides a synthesis of the subject suitable for advanced students.

Optimal Regulation addresses the central issue of regulatory economics - how toregulate firms in a way that induces them to produce and price "optimally." It synthesizes the majorfindings of an extensive theoretical literature on what constitutes optimality in various situationsand which regulatory mechanisms can be used to achieve it. It is the first text to provide aunified, modern, and nontechnical treatment of the field.The book includes models for regulatingoptimal output, tariffs, and surplus subsidy schemes, and presents all of the material graphically,with clear explanations of often highly technical topics.Kenneth E. Train is Associate AdjunctProfessor in the Department of Economics and Graduate School of Public Policy at the University ofCalifornia, Berkeley. He is also Principal of the firm Cambridge Systematics.Topics include: Thecost structure of natural monopoly (economies of scale and scope). Characterization of firstandsecond-best optimality. Surplus subsidy schemes for attaining first-best optimality. Ramsey pricesand the Vogelsang-Finsinger mechanism for attaining them. Time-ofuse (TOU) prices and Riordan'smechanisms for attaining the optimal TOU prices' Multipart and self-selecting tariffs, and Sibley'smethod for using self-selecting tariffs to achieve optimality. The Averch-Johnson model of howrate-of-return regulation induces inefficiencies. Analysis of regulation based on the firm's returnon Output, costs, or sales. Price-cap regulation. Regulatory treatment of uncertainty and its impacton the firm's behavior. Methods of attaining optimality without direct regulation (contestability,auctioning the monopoly franchise.)

Through three case studies, this book investigates whether digital industries are naturally monopolistic and evaluates policy approaches to market power.

Considered the cutting edge of microeconomic theory in the 1970s, natural monopoly research remains an active and fertile field. Policy makers and regulators have begun to implement entry and pricing policies that are based on theoretical and empirical analyses. This book develops a comprehensive framework for analyzing natural monopoly. The authors first present a historical overview of regulatory economics, followed by analyses of optimal pricing and investment for single- and multiproduct natural monopolies. Topics covered include cost and demand structures, efficiency impacts of linear and multipart pricing, peak-load pricing, capacity determination, and the sustainability of natural monopolies. After a survey and analysis of natural monopoly regulation in practice, the links between technological change and regulation are identified. The book concludes with a discussion of the alternatives to traditional regulation, including public ownership, franchise schemes, quality regulation, and new incentive systems. Throughout the book, issues from the telecommunications and energy industries are used to illustrate key points. Its integrated framework will make it useful to academic economists, regulatory analysts, business researchers, and advanced students of public utility economics.

In Defense of Monopoly offers an unconventional but empirically grounded argument in favor of market monopolies. Authors McKenzie and Lee claim that conventional, static models exaggerate the harm done by real-world monopolies, and they show why some degree of monopoly presence is necessary to maximize the improvement of human welfare over time. Inspired by Joseph Schumpeter's suggestion that market imperfections can drive an economy's long-term progress, In Defense of Monopoly defies conventional assumptions to show readers why an economic system's failure to efficiently allocate its resources is actually a necessary precondition for maximizing the system's long-term performance: the perfectly fluid, competitive economy idealized by most economists is decidedly inferior to one characterized by market entry and exit restrictions or costs. An economy is not a board game in which players compete for a limited number of properties, nor is it much like the kind of blackboard games that economists use to develop their monopoly models. As McKenzie and Lee demonstrate, the creation of goods and services in the real world requires not only competition but the prospect of gains beyond a normal competitive rate of return.

Packed with case studies and practical real-world examples, Electricity Marginal Cost Pricing Principles allows regulators, engineers and energy economists to choose the pricing model that best fits their individual market. Written by an author with 13 years of practical experience, the book begins with a clear and rigorous explanation of the theory of efficient pricing and how it impacts investor-owned, publicly-owned, and cooperatively-owned utilities using tried and true methods such as multiple-output, functional form, and multiproduct cost models. The author then moves on to include self-contained chapters on applying estimating cost models, including a cubic cost specification and policy implications while supplying actual data and examples to allow regulators, energy economists, and engineers to get a feel for the methods with which efficient prices are derived in today's challenging electricity market. - A guide to cost issues surrounding the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity - Clearly explains cost models which can yield the marginal cost of supplying electricity to end-users - Real-world examples that are practical, meaningful, and easy to understand - Explans the policy implications of each example - Provide suggestions to aid in the formation of the optimal market price