In this book a rigorous, systematic, mathematical analysis is presented for oligopoly with multi-product firms in static as well as dynamic frameworks in the light of recent developments in theories of games, oligopoly and industrial organization. The general results derived in this book on oligopoly with multi-product firms contain, as special cases, all previous results on oligopoly with single product as well as oligopoly with product differentiation and single product firms. A constructive nu- merical method is given for finding the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, which may be extremely valuable to those who are interested in numerical analysis of the effects of various industrial policies. A sequential adjustment process is also formulated for finding the equilibrium. Dynamic adjustment processes have two versions, one with a discrete time scale and the other with a continuous time scale. The stability of the equilibrium is thoroughly investigated utilizing powerful mathematical results from the stability and linear algebra literature. The methodology developed for analyzing stability proves to be useful for dynamic analysis of economic models.

This book outlines the core concept of the theory of mixed oligopoly and presents recent results that have arisen in a mixed oligopolistic market. The wave of privatization since the 1980s has taken the development of the theory of mixed oligopoly in several directions. Although the main concern of the theory of mixed oligopoly focuses on the effect of regime change—especially privatization of a public firm—on social welfare, existing studies have not considered the difference in economic environments. With drastic changes in economic environments along with economic development in recent years, the domestic and foreign markets have become more and more integrated, firms have become concerned about corporate social responsibility, and governments or politicians have had various interests and preferences. Against that background, this book revisits the question of how privatization affects social welfare by incorporating regional and international interdependency and investigates how firms’ activities for corporate social responsibility, governments’ preferences, and political economic situations affect the market circumstance in a mixed oligopoly. The dynamic aspect of privatization is also investigated.

The separation between ownership and control has become common practice over the last century, in most medium and large firms across the world. Throughout the twentieth century, the theory of the firm and the theory of industrial organization developed parallel and complementary views on managerial firms. This book offers a comprehensive exposition of this debate. In its survey of strategic delegation in oligopoly games, An Economic Theory of Managerial Firms is able to offer a reinterpretation of a range of standard results in the light of the fact that the control of firms is generally not in the hand of its owners. The theoretical models are supported by a wealth of real-world examples, in order to provide a study of strategic delegation that is far more in-depth than has previously been found in the literature on industrial organization. In this volume, analysis is extended in several directions to cover applications concerning the role of: managerial firms in mixed market; collusion and mergers; divisionalization and vertical relations; technical progress; product differentiation; international trade; environmental issues; and the intertemporal growth of firms. This book is of great interest to those who study industrial economics, organizational studies and industrial studies.

This edited book presents recent developments and state-of-the-art review in various areas of mathematical programming and game theory. It is a peer-reviewed research monograph under the ISI Platinum Jubilee Series on Statistical Science and Interdisciplinary Research. This volume provides a panoramic view of theory and the applications of the methods of mathematical programming to problems in statistics, finance, games and electrical networks. It also provides an important as well as timely overview of research trends and focuses on the exciting areas like support vector machines, bilevel programming, interior point method for convex quadratic programming, cooperative games, non-cooperative games and stochastic games. Researchers, professionals and advanced graduates will find the book an essential resource for current work in mathematical programming, game theory and their applications. Sample Chapter(s). Foreword (45 KB). Chapter 1: Mathematical Programming and its Applications in Finance (177 KB). Contents: Mathematical Programming and Its Applications in Finance (L C Thomas); Anti-Stalling Pivot Rule for Linear Programs with Totally Unimodular Coefficient Matrix (S N Kabadi & A P Punnen); A New Practically Efficient Interior Point Method for Convex Quadratic Programming (K G Murty); A General Framework for the Analysis of Sets of Constraints (R Caron & T Traynor), Tolerance-Based Algorithms for the Traveling Salesman Problem (D Ghosh et al.); On the Membership Problem of the Pedigree Polytope (T S Arthanari); Exact Algorithms for a One-Defective Vertex Colouring Problem (N Achuthan et al.); Complementarity Problem Involving a Vertical Block Matrix and Its Solution Using Neural Network Model (S K Neogy et al.); Fuzzy Twin Support Vector Machines for Pattern Classification (R Khemchandani et al.); An Overview of the Minimum Sum of Absolute Errors Regression (S C Narula & J F Wellington); Hedging Against the Market with No Short Selling (S A Clark & C Srinivasan); Mathematical Programming and Electrical Network Analysis II: Computational Linear Algebra Through Network Analysis (H Narayanan); Dynamic Optimal Control Policy in Price and Quality for High Technology Product (A K Bardhan & U Chanda); Forecasting for Supply Chain and Portfolio Management (K G Murty); Variational Analysis in Bilevel Programming (S Dempe et al.); Game Engineering (R J Aumann); Games of Connectivity (P Dubey & R Garg); A Robust Feedback Nash Equilibrium in a Climate Change Policy Game (M Hennlock); De Facto Delegation and Proposer Rules (H Imai & K Yonezaki); The Bargaining Set in Effectivity Function (D Razafimahatolotra); Dynamic Oligopoly as a Mixed Large Game OCo Toy Market (A Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel); On Some Classes of Balanced Games (R B Bapat); Market Equilibrium for Combinatorial Auctions and the Matching Core of Nonnegative TU Games (S Lahiri); Continuity, Manifolds, and Arrow''s Social Choice Problem (K Saukkonen); On a Mixture Class of Stochastic Games with Ordered Field Property (S K Neogy). Readership: Researchers, professionals and advanced students in mathematical programming, game theory, management sciences and computational mathematics.

Applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. The text relates classic contributions to the field of modern game theory and discusses basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, paying particular attention to developments in the theory of supermodular games.