Intriguing examination of works by Aristotle, Galileo, Newton, Pasteur, Einstein, Margaret Mead, and other scientists in terms of subjectivity and the Bayesian approach to statistical analysis. "An insightful work." — Choice. 2001 edition.

Ein Wiley-Klassiker über Bayes-Statistik, jetzt in durchgesehener und erweiterter Neuauflage! - Werk spiegelt die stürmische Entwicklung dieses Gebietes innerhalb der letzten Jahre wider - vollständige Darstellung der theoretischen Grundlagen - jetzt ergänzt durch unzählige Anwendungsbeispiele - die wichtigsten modernen Methoden (u. a. hierarchische Modellierung, linear-dynamische Modellierung, Metaanalyse, MCMC-Simulationen) - einzigartige Diskussion der Finetti-Transformierten und anderer Themen, über die man ansonsten nur spärliche Informationen findet - Lösungen zu den Übungsaufgaben sind enthalten

"Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach explains, in an accessible style, those elements of the probability calculus that are relevant to Bayesian methods, and argues that the probability calculus is best regarded as a species of logic." "Howson and Urbach contrast the Bayesian with the 'classical' view that was so influential in the last century, and demonstrate that familiar classical procedures for evaluating statistical hypotheses, such as significance tests, point estimation, confidence intervals, and other techniques, provide an utterly false basis for scientific inference. They also expose the well-known non-probabilistic philosophies of Popper, Lakatos, and Kuhn as similarly unscientific." "Scientific Reasoning shows how Bayesian theory, by contrast with these increasingly discredited approaches, provides a unified and highly satisfactory account of scientific method, an account which practicing scientists and all those interested in the sciences ought to master."--BOOK JACKET.

How should we reason in science? Jan Sprenger and Stephan Hartmann offer a refreshing take on classical topics in philosophy of science, using a single key concept to explain and to elucidate manifold aspects of scientific reasoning. They present good arguments and good inferences as being characterized by their effect on our rational degrees of belief. Refuting the view that there is no place for subjective attitudes in 'objective science', Sprenger and Hartmann explain the value of convincing evidence in terms of a cycle of variations on the theme of representing rational degrees of belief by means of subjective probabilities (and changing them by Bayesian conditionalization). In doing so, they integrate Bayesian inference—the leading theory of rationality in social science—with the practice of 21st century science. Bayesian Philosophy of Science thereby shows how modeling such attitudes improves our understanding of causes, explanations, confirming evidence, and scientific models in general. It combines a scientifically minded and mathematically sophisticated approach with conceptual analysis and attention to methodological problems of modern science, especially in statistical inference, and is therefore a valuable resource for philosophers and scientific practitioners.

This book grew out of previously published papers of mine composed over a period of years; they have been reworked (sometimes beyond recognition) so as to form a reasonably coherent whole. Part One treats of informative inference. I argue (Chapter 2) that the traditional principle of induction in its clearest formulation (that laws are confirmed by their positive cases) is clearly false. Other formulations in terms of the 'uniformity of nature' or the 'resemblance of the future to the past' seem to me hopelessly unclear. From a Bayesian point of view, 'learning from experience' goes by conditionalization (Bayes' rule). The traditional stum bling block for Bayesians has been to fmd objective probability inputs to conditionalize upon. Subjective Bayesians allow any probability inputs that do not violate the usual axioms of probability. Many subjectivists grant that this liberality seems prodigal but own themselves unable to think of additional constraints that might plausibly be imposed. To be sure, if we could agree on the correct probabilistic representation of 'ignorance' (or absence of pertinent data), then all probabilities obtained by applying Bayes' rule to an 'informationless' prior would be objective. But familiar contra dictions, like the Bertrand paradox, are thought to vitiate all attempts to objectify 'ignorance'. BuUding on the earlier work of Sir Harold Jeffreys, E. T. Jaynes, and the more recent work ofG. E. P. Box and G. E. Tiao, I have elected to bite this bullet. In Chapter 3, I develop and defend an objectivist Bayesian approach.

This book focuses on computational methods for large-scale statistical inverse problems and provides an introduction to statistical Bayesian and frequentist methodologies. Recent research advances for approximation methods are discussed, along with Kalman filtering methods and optimization-based approaches to solving inverse problems. The aim is to cross-fertilize the perspectives of researchers in the areas of data assimilation, statistics, large-scale optimization, applied and computational mathematics, high performance computing, and cutting-edge applications. The solution to large-scale inverse problems critically depends on methods to reduce computational cost. Recent research approaches tackle this challenge in a variety of different ways. Many of the computational frameworks highlighted in this book build upon state-of-the-art methods for simulation of the forward problem, such as, fast Partial Differential Equation (PDE) solvers, reduced-order models and emulators of the forward problem, stochastic spectral approximations, and ensemble-based approximations, as well as exploiting the machinery for large-scale deterministic optimization through adjoint and other sensitivity analysis methods. Key Features: Brings together the perspectives of researchers in areas of inverse problems and data assimilation. Assesses the current state-of-the-art and identify needs and opportunities for future research. Focuses on the computational methods used to analyze and simulate inverse problems. Written by leading experts of inverse problems and uncertainty quantification. Graduate students and researchers working in statistics, mathematics and engineering will benefit from this book.

The Equation of Knowledge: From Bayes' Rule to a Unified Philosophy of Science introduces readers to the Bayesian approach to science: teasing out the link between probability and knowledge. The author strives to make this book accessible to a very broad audience, suitable for professionals, students, and academics, as well as the enthusiastic amateur scientist/mathematician. This book also shows how Bayesianism sheds new light on nearly all areas of knowledge, from philosophy to mathematics, science and engineering, but also law, politics and everyday decision-making. Bayesian thinking is an important topic for research, which has seen dramatic progress in the recent years, and has a significant role to play in the understanding and development of AI and Machine Learning, among many other things. This book seeks to act as a tool for proselytising the benefits and limits of Bayesianism to a wider public. Features Presents the Bayesian approach as a unifying scientific method for a wide range of topics Suitable for a broad audience, including professionals, students, and academics Provides a more accessible, philosophical introduction to the subject that is offered elsewhere