Hartman's revolutionary book introduces formal orderly thinking into value theory. It identifies three basic kinds of value, intrinsic goods (e.g., people as ends in themselves), extrinsic goods (e.g., things and actions as means to ends), and systemic goods (conceptual values). All good things share a common formal or structural pattern: they fulfill the ideal standards or "concepts" that we apply to them. Thus, this theory is called "formal axiology." Some values are richer in good-making property-fulfillment than others, so some desirable things are better than others and form patterned hierarchies of value. How we value is just as important as what we value, and evaluations, like values, share structures or formal patterns, as this book demonstrates. Hartman locates all of this solidly within the framework of historical value theory, but he moves successfully and creatively beyond philosophical tradition and toward the creation of a new value science.

Hartman's revolutionary book introduces formal orderly thinking into value theory. It identifies three basic kinds of value, intrinsic goods (e.g., people as ends in themselves), extrinsic goods (e.g., things and actions as means to ends), and systemic goods (conceptual values). All good things share a common formal or structural pattern: they fulfill the ideal standards or "concepts" that we apply to them. Thus, this theory is called "formal axiology." Some values are richer in good-making property-fulfillment than others, so some desirable things are better than others and form patterned hierarchies of value. How we value is just as important as what we value, and evaluations, like values, share structures or formal patterns, as this book demonstrates. Hartman locates all of this solidly within the framework of historical value theory, but he moves successfully and creatively beyond philosophical tradition and toward the creation of a new value science.

Formal Axiology and Its Critics consists of two parts, both of which present criticisms of the formal theory of values developed by Robert S. Hartman, replies to these criticisms, plus a short introduction to formal axiology. Part I consists of articles published or made public during the lifetime of Hartman to which he personally replied. It contains previously published replies to Hector Neri Castañeda, William Eckhardt, and Robert S. Brumbaugh, and previously unpublished replies to Charles Hartshorne, Rem B. Edwards, Robert E. Carter, G.R. Grice, Nicholas Rescher, Robert W. Mueller, Gordon Welty, Pete Gunter, and George K. Plochmann in an unfinished but now completed article on which Hartman was working at the time of his death in 1973. Part II consists of articles presented at recent annual meetings of the R.S. Hartman Institute for Formal and Applied Axiology that continue to criticize and further develop Hartman's formal axiology. An article by Rem B. Edwards raises serious unanswered questions about formal axiology and ethics. Another by Frank G. Forrest shows how the formal value calculus based on set theory might answer these questions, and an article by Mark A. Moore points out weaknesses in the Hartman/Forrest value calculus and develops an alternative calculus based upon the mathematics of quantum mechanics. While recognizing that unsolved problems remain, the book intends to make the theoretical foundations and future promise of formal axiology much more secure. Open Access funding for this volume has been provided by the Robert S. Hartman Institute.

Robert S. Hartman died an untimely death in 1973. Since then, many of his friends, colleagues, and former students have worked diligently on his formal theory of value and have made important advances in developing both the theory itself and practical applications of it. Those familiar with his work are convinced that he made extraordinary advances in theoretical and applied axiology. Bob Hartman saw the Form of the Good. He laid the foundations for a science of values, still being developed. This book is written by members of the Robert S. Hartman Institute to acquaint others better with his achievements and to forge ahead where he left many problems unresolved. Robert Schirokauer escaped from Nazi Germany in 1933 on a false passport that read "Robert Hartman." He kept the name but later added the "S." He became a prominent and highly innovative philosopher who dedicated his life to resolving problems about human values, as expressed in his own words: "I thought to myself, if evil can be organized so efficiently [by the Nazis] why cannot good? Is there any reason for efficiency to be monopolized by the forces for evil in the world? Why have good people in history never seemed to have had as much power as bad people? I decided I would try to find out why and devote my life to doing something about it."

The annual Conferences on Value Inquiry bring together philosophers, scientists and humanists to discuss the many facets of the problem of value in the experience of the individual and in contemporary society. One of the criteria in choosing papers for the Conference is the ability to stimulate discussion and clarification. The papers in the present volumes show deep concern with the problems and responsibilities in making choices of value.