‘Lloyd George at War, 1916–1918’ refutes the traditional view that Lloyd George was the person most responsible for winning the Great War. Cassar’s careful analysis shows that while his work on the home front was on the whole good, he was an abysmal failure as a strategist and nearly cost Britain the war.

Germany's invasion of France in August 1914 represented a threat to the great power status of both Britain and France. The countries had no history of co-operation, yet the entente they had created in 1904 proceeded by trial and error, via recriminations, to win a war of unprecedented scale and ferocity. Elizabeth Greenhalgh examines the huge problem of finding a suitable command relationship in the field and in the two capitals. She details the civil-military relations on each side, the political and military relations between the two powers, the maritime and industrial collaboration that were indispensable to an industrialised war effort and the Allied prosecution of war on the western front. Although it was not until 1918 that many of the war-winning expedients were adopted, Dr Greenhalgh shows that victory was ultimately achieved because of, rather than in spite of, coalition.

One of three volumes in honour of the teaching and scholarship of the late Michael I. Handel, this book details the universal logic of strategy and the ability of liberal-democratic governments to address this logic rationally. Treating war as an extension of politics, the diverse contributors (drawn from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Israel) explore the difficulties in matching strategy to policy, especially in free societies.

David Lloyd George left a profound political legacy, despite being described by the wife of his successor, Herbert Asquith, as a 'gambler without foresight'. He is, of course, best known as the Prime Minister who led Britain to victory in World War I, but his contribution to domestic politics was similarly impressive. As Chancellor of the Exchequer he introduced pensions and national insurance against sickness and unemployment, while as Prime Minister he extended democracy by giving votes to women. Yet Lloyd George was compromised by his flaws as a human being. Vain, cruel, capricious and dishonest, at times his notoriously corrupt nature threatened to damage the British political system. Providing a unique new perspective on one of the most phenomenally-talented - but also one of the most phenomenally-flawed - of British Prime Ministers, this book will be essential reading for anyone interested in modern British politics and history.

David Lloyd George is widely regarded as one of the most effective British prime ministers of the twentieth century. A dynamic speaker and committed social reformer, he led Britain successfully through the devastation of World War I and had a powerful impact on international politics. In the post-war peace treaties, he sought a just, rather than a vengeful, settlement for the defeated powers in an attempt to preserve a peaceful international order. Whilst Lloyd George's achievements were undoubtedly substantial, his political record was not entirely without blemish and, in his personal life, he was a fascinating and complex character. Renowned as a womaniser, after 1913 he retained two separate households - one with his wife and one with his mistress, his former private secretary. Based on extensive research, Travis L. Crosby provides a fresh appraisal of the life of one of Britain's most conflicted politicians.

Falling between the “War of Movement” in 1914 and the major attrition battles of 1916, 1915 was a critical year in the First World War. As France failed in ever-larger offensives to break through the German trenches, Britain shifted its strategy from defence of empire to total commitment to the continental war. In the second of three planned volumes, Roy Prete analyzes the political and military policies and strategies of Britain and France and their joint command relationship on the Western Front in 1915. The opposing strategies of the two governments proved to be the main determinant in the sometimes ragged relations between the French commander-in-chief, Joseph Joffre, and his British counterpart, Sir John French, as they sought to drive the German army out of France and to aid their hard-pressed Russian ally. With an impressive marshalling of evidence, Strategy and Command demonstrates that the increased British commitment to the continental war, manifested in sending Kitchener’s New Armies to France in 1915, was largely due to the disastrous situation of the Russian army on the Eastern Front and the perceived weakness of the French government. Based on extensive research in French and British political and military archives, this new in-depth study of Anglo-French military relations on the Western Front in 1915 fills a major gap in the unfolding drama of the First World War.