For the ordinary soldier, the non-commissioned officer and the junior officer—the large proportion of the lower strata in military organisations—the expectations of levels of responsibility and decision-making are rapidly increasing. In 1999, US Marine Corps General Charles C. Krulak addressed this in his essay ‘The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three-Block War’, which described the range of challenges likely to be faced by marines on the modern battlefield and where a range of operations (fighting, peace works and humanitarian assistance) might occur simultaneously within a very limited precinct (three blocks). The chapters in this book use the metaphor of the ‘strategic corporal’ to focus on the demands facing junior leaders in military operations in the twenty-first century, and what might be done to enhance their ability to respond to them. The circumstances in which these decisions are made need to be better understood, by soldiers and their critical onlookers, be they villagers on the scene, senior military or political leaders remote from the operation, or anti-war activists thousands of miles away. Being ‘strategic’ is not just about a soldier’s professional mastery. Increasingly it also means a genuine familiarity with legal and ethical issues, and an ability in low-intensity conflict to understand local culture and communicate with those in villages and neighbourhoods whose goodwill, or at least neutrality, are vital to ultimate success. In the non-war circumstances in which many Western militaries operate, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as well as peacekeeping operations, it means dealing with civil authorities in the distribution of aid or even the administration of justice if local institutions have broken down. Sometimes it involves negotiation and mediation. It may even mean having an understanding of the ways pervasive modern media works, and its potential to surveil—and sometimes derail—a mission. Sometimes it also means having a better understanding of the challenges that face the soldier’s own defence force: including the malign effects of bureaucratic inertia and the ‘outsourcing’ of key capabilities to private contractors. The book combines theoretical discussions with practical examples, but it is not—as so many books about future conflict are—a discussion of the technology of future war. Rather, it provides opportunities for specialists in a range of security-related fields to consider the issues and challenges of military leadership, the role of civilians and contractors, the importance of International Humanitarian Law, and even whether strategic gains can be made without the deployment of troops (‘strategic corporals’ or otherwise).

Of key findings -- Introduction: Shifting emphasis to the new status quo -- Dominant features of the new status quo -- Key demands on defense leaders, strategists, and operators in the new status quo -- Seven new perspectives for key defense actors operating in unconventional environments -- Four foundational roles for key defense actors -- Cultivating a new unconventional strategic competency in key defense actors -- Conclusion: Leading U.S. government transformation by example.

This book provides an interdisciplinary analysis of the future of US warfare, including its military practices and the domestic and global challenges it faces. The need to undertake a comprehensive analysis about the future of warfare for the US is more pressing today than ever before. New technologies and adversaries, both old and new, have the potential to revolutionize how wars are fought, and it is imperative that policy makers, military planners, and scholars engage with the latest analyses regarding these new threats and weapon systems. The primary aim of this book is to provide a clear and comprehensive depiction of the types of conflict that the United States is likely to become involved with in the future, as well as the methods of warfare that it may employ within these struggles. While a number of scholarly books have previously considered some of the potential features of US warfare in the future, many of these writings are either outdated or have limited their focus to just one or two of the main types of warfare that may occur and omitted consideration of the others. This book intends to remedy this deficiency in the literature. The volume consists of thematic chapters which address the key issues relevant to the future of US warfare, including cyber warfare, asymmetric conflicts, drone warfare, and nuclear strategy. Through the provision of a series of analyses by leading international academics, the volume provides an important interdisciplinary examination of the different areas of warfare that the United States is expected to use or encounter in the future. This book will be of great interest to students of US foreign policy, military studies, strategic studies and International Relations in general.

The single greatest national security question currently facing the U.S. National Command Authority is how best to counter violent extremism. The National Command Authority has four broad strategies through which it may employ military forces to counter violent extremism: counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, support to insurgency, and antiterrorism. The Long War is anticipated to continue for decades, perhaps generations. Thus, it is imperative to select the best strategy or strategies for employing military forces. Based on historical lessons in combating terrorism, the best strategy is efficient and sustainable and avoids overreacting, acting incompetently, or appearing to be either over reactive or incompetent. Counterinsurgency is neither efficient nor sustainable from a military, economic, or political perspective. It is a high risk strategy because it is a large, highly visible undertaking through which the United States may easily overreact, act incompetently, or be perceived as overreacting or being incompetent. Counterterrorism, support to insurgency, and antiterrorism are each both efficient and sustainable from a military and economic perspective. These three strategies each have inherent political concerns, hazards, or constraints. However it is considerably less likely that the United States will overreact, behave incompetently, or be perceived as overreacting or being incompetent through engaging in one or more of these three strategies than by engaging in counterinsurgency. Support to insurgencies is economically and militarily efficient and sustainable, but it carries substantial political risks. Thus, an overall strategy combining counterterrorism and antiterrorism is the best means of employing military forces to counter violent extremism.

Contemporary security governance often relies on markets and networks to link public agencies to non-governmental actors. This book explores the rise, nature, and future of these new forms of security governance across various domestic, transnational, and international settings. The chapters reveal similarities and differences in the way security governance operates in various policy settings. The contributors argue that the similarities generally arise because policy elites, at various levels of governance, have come to believe that security depends on building resilience and communities through various joined-up arrangements, networks, and partnerships. Differences nonetheless persist because civil servants, street level bureaucrats, voluntary sector actors, and citizens all draw on diverse traditions to interpret, and at times resist, the joined-up security being promoted by these policy elites. This book therefore decentres security governance, showing how all kinds of local traditions influence the way it works in different settings. It pays particular attention to the meanings, cultures, and ideologies by which policy actors encounter, interpret, and evaluate security dilemmas. This book was originally published as a special issue in Global Crime.

There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. There are not more than five primary colors, yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen. There are not more than five cardinal tastes, yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted. ― Sun Tzu, The Art of War Contents: A Preliminary Investigation into Dynamic Measurement and Implicit Affect in Assessing Cross Cultural Competence A Proposed Developmental Sequence for Cross-Cultural Competence Training in the DoD Assessing Alternative Approaches to the Development of a DEOMI Cross Cultural Inventory Behavioral Framework for Effective Intercultural Interactions Cross-Cultural Competence (3C) and Diversity Management Support Cross-Cultural Competence and Strain in the Military: The Role of Emotion Regulation and Optimism Cross-Cultural Competence What Roles Does It Play Within the Military? Cultural Heritage: Education Assessment Executive Summary Developing and Managing 3C Finding Value in Human Relations Foundation for Diversity Training: Competency Model and Learning Objectives Issues in Diversity Management Leadership in Cross-Cultural Contexts One Size Does Not Fit All, 3C Training and Development Symposium Regulatory Fit and Equal Opportunity/Diversity: Implication for DEOMI Relating Values to Military Styles, Force, Protection and Operational Goals The A Validation Study of the Defense Language Office Framework for Cultural Competence and an Evaluation of Available Assessment Instruments The Development of the CCCI The Effects of Personality Dissimilarity on Mission Readiness The Role of Affect in Cross-Cultural Competence Transformational Leadership Role of Diversity Climate When Diversity Training Isn't Enough