Using a wide array of recently declassified archival materials in the United States and Western Europe, this collection offers new insights into the changing dynamics of transatlantic relations during the era of détente (1969-1980). Whereas prior studies of this decade have focused on the end of the Vietnam War or U.S.-Soviet relations, this volume reveals why bitter conflicts developed between the U.S. and its European allies, and how, contrary to conventional wisdom, European integration evolved less as a consequence of Washington's support than as a result of America's relative decline and growing U.S.-European discord. Taking into account the developments in various bilateral and multilateral settings, such as the European Community, the Helsinki process, and the G-7 summits, the contributions show that a common alliance strategy has always been a difficult undertaking, often the result of bitter confrontation and painful compromises. With clear overtones to more recent disputes, this collection demonstrates there was never a "golden age" of transatlantic harmony.

At a crucial point in the twentieth century, as Nazi Germany prepared for war, negotiations between Britain, France, and the Soviet Union became the last chance to halt Hitler’s aggression. Incredibly, the French and British governments dallied, talks failed, and in August 1939 the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact with Germany. Michael Carley’s gripping account of these negotiations is not a pretty story. It is about the failures of appeasement and collective security in Europe. It is about moral depravity and blindness, about villains and cowards, and about heroes who stood against the intellectual and popular tides of their time. Some died for their beliefs, others labored in obscurity and have been nearly forgotten. In 1939 they sought to make the Grand Alliance that never was between France, Britain, and the Soviet Union. This story of their efforts is background to the wartime alliance created in 1941 without France but with the United States in order to defeat a demonic enemy. 1939 is based upon Mr. Carley’s longtime research on the period, including work in French, British, and newly opened Soviet archives. He challenges prevailing interpretations of the origins of World War II by situating 1939 at the end of the early cold war between the Soviet Union, France, and Britain, and by showing how anti-communism was the major cause of the failure to form an alliance against Hitler. 1939 was published on September 1, the sixtieth anniversary of the Nazi invasion of Poland and the start of the war.

In the first English-language survey of Argentine-U.S. relations to appear in more than a decade, David M. K. Sheinin challenges the accepted view that confrontation has been the characteristic state of affairs between the two countries. Sheinin draws on both Spanish- and English-language sources in the United States, Argentina, Canada, and Great Britain to provide a broad perspective on the two centuries of shared U.S.-Argentine history with fresh focus in particular on cultural ties, nuclear politics in the cold war era, the politics of human rights, and Argentina's exit in 1991 from the nonaligned movement. From the perspectives of both countries, Sheinin discusses such topics as Pan-Americanism, petroleum, communism and fascism, and foreign debt. Although the general trajectory of the two countries' relationship has been one of cooperative interaction based on generally strong and improving commercial and financial ties, shared strategic interests, and vital cultural contacts, Sheinin also emphasizes episodes of strained ties. These include the Cuban Revolution, the Dirty War of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the Falklands/Malvinas War. In his epilogue, Sheinin examines Argentina's monetary crash of December 2001, when the United States-in a major policy shift-refused to come to Argentina's rescue.

This study provides an analysis of the role the United States alliance with Nationalist China played in US strategy to contain first the Sino-Soviet alliance and then China during the 1950s and 1960s.

A co-publication with the Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, D. C.

Sayle's book is a remarkably well-documented history of the NATO alliance. This is a worthwhile addition to the growing literature on NATO and a foundation for understanding its current challenges and prospects.― Choice Born from necessity, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has always seemed on the verge of collapse. Even now, some seventy years after its inception, some consider its foundation uncertain and its structure weak. At this moment of incipient strategic crisis, Timothy A. Sayle offers a sweeping history of the most critical alliance in the post-World War II era. In Enduring Alliance, Sayle recounts how the western European powers, along with the United States and Canada, developed a treaty to prevent encroachments by the Soviet Union and to serve as a first defense in any future military conflict. As the growing and unruly hodgepodge of countries, councils, commands, and committees inflated NATO during the Cold War, Sayle shows that the work of executive leaders, high-level diplomats, and institutional functionaries within NATO kept the alliance alive and strong in the face of changing administrations, various crises, and the flux of geopolitical maneuverings. Resilience and flexibility have been the true hallmarks of NATO. As Enduring Alliance deftly shows, the history of NATO is organized around the balance of power, preponderant military forces, and plans for nuclear war. But it is also the history riven by generational change, the introduction of new approaches to conceiving international affairs, and the difficulty of diplomacy for democracies. As NATO celebrates its seventieth anniversary, the alliance once again faces challenges to its very existence even as it maintains its place firmly at the center of western hemisphere and global affairs.