Selected by Choice Magazine as an Outstanding Academic Title Outstanding Academic Title, 1991, Choice Magazine Although building a space station has been an extraordinary challenge for America's scientists and engineers, the securing and sustaining of presidential approval, congressional support, and long-term funding for the project was an enormous task for bureaucrats. The Space Station Decision examines the history of this controversial initiative and illustrates how bureaucracy shapes public policy. Using primary documents and interviews, Howard E. McCurdy describes the events that led up to the 1984 decision to build a permanently occupied, international space station in low Earth orbit. As he follows the trail of the space station proposal through the labyrinth of White House policy review, McCurdy explains the evolution of the presidential budget review process, the breakup of the cabinet system, the proliferation of subcabinets and Executive Office interagency, the involvement of White House staff in framing issues for presidential review, and the role of bureaucracy in advancing administration legislation on Capitol Hill. Comparing the space station decision to earlier decisions to go to the moon and to build the space shuttle, McCurdy shows how public officials responsible for long-term science and technology policy maneuvered in a political system that demanded short-term flexibility.

Long before the NASA was the throes of planning for the Apollo voyages to the Moon, many people had seen the need for a vehicle that could access space routinely. The idea of a reusable space shuttle dates at least to the theoretical rocketplane studies of the 1930s, but by the 1950s it had become an integral part of a master plan for space exploration. The goal of efficient access to space in a heavy-lift booster prompted NASA's commitment to the space shuttle as the vehicle to continue human space flight. By the mid-1960s, NASA engineers concluded that the necessary technology was within reach to enable the creation of a reusable winged space vehicle that could haul scientific and applications satellites of all types into orbit for all users. President Richard M. Nixon approved the effort to build the shuttle in 1972 and the first orbital flight took place in 1981. Although the development program was risky, a talented group of scientists and engineers worked to create this unique space vehicle and their efforts were largely successful. Since 1981, the various orbiters -Atlantis, Columbia, Discovery, Endeavour, and Challenger (lost in 1986 during the only Space Shuttle accident)- have made early 100 flights into space. Through 1998, the space shuttle has carried more than 800 major scientific and technological payloads into orbit and its astronaut crews have conducted more than 50 extravehicular activities, including repairing satellites and the initial building of the International Space Station. The shuttle remains the only vehicle in the world with the dual ability to deliver and return large payloads to and from orbit, and is also the world's most reliable launch system. The design, now almost three decades old, is still state-of-the-art in many areas, including computerized flight control, airframe design, electrical power systems, thermal protection system, and main engines. This significant new study of the decision to build the space shuttle explains the shuttle's origin and early development. In addition to internal NASA discussions, this work details the debates in the late 1960s and early 1970s among policymakers in Congress, the Air Force, and the Office of Management and Budget over the roles and technical designs of the shuttle. Examining the interplay of these organizations with sometimes conflicting goals, the author not only explains how the world's premier space launch vehicle came into being, but also how politics can interact with science, technology, national security, and economics in national government.

This remarkable book gives a comprehensive account of the longest manned space mission of the time. It details for the first time the people involved and the crews assigned to operate the first space station Salyut. The book portrays the selection of the crews, dramatic flights and tragedy of Soyuz 11. Biographies of the Soyuz 11 cosmonauts are published for the first time in English. The book relates discussions between the key personnel, and investigates the causes of the tragedy. The book ends with memories of all those affected by the DOS program and the tragedy of Soyuz 11 and looks forward to a continuation of the historic mission of Salyut.

When Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980, limits on NASA funding and the lack of direction under the Nixon and Carter administrations had left the U.S. space program at a crossroads. In contrast to his predecessors, Reagan saw outer space as humanity’s final frontier and as an opportunity for global leadership. His optimism and belief in American exceptionalism guided a decade of U.S. activities in space, including bringing the space shuttle into operation, dealing with the 1986 Challenger accident and its aftermath, committing to a permanently crewed space station, encouraging private sector space efforts, and fostering international space partnerships with both U.S. allies and with the Soviet Union. Drawing from a trove of declassified primary source materials and oral history interviews, John M. Logsdon provides the first comprehensive account of Reagan’s civilian and commercial space policies during his eight years in the White House. Even as a fiscal conservative who was hesitant to increase NASA’s budget, Reagan’s enthusiasm for the space program made him perhaps the most pro-space president in American history.

Modern critical care is characterized by the collection of large volumes of data and the making of urgent patient care decisions. The two do not necessarily go together easily. For many years the hope has been that ICU data management systems could play a meaningful role in ICU decision support. These hopes now have a basis in fact, and this book details the history, methodology, current status, and future prospects for critical care decision support systems. By focusing on real and operational systems, the book demonstrates the importance of integrating data from diverse clinical data sources; the keys to implementing clinically usable systems; the pitfalls to avoid in implementation; and the development of effective evaluation methods.