Contributors draw on a wide array of new material, from recently opened archival sources to literature and film, and meld approaches from diplomatic history to development studies to explain the choices India made and to frame the decisions by its policymakers. Together, the essays demonstrate how India became a powerful symbol of decolonization and an advocate of non-alignment, disarmament and global governance as it stood between the United States and the Soviet Union, actively fostering dialogue and attempting to forge friendships without entering into formal alliances. Sweeping in its scope yet nuanced in its analysis, this is the authoritative account of India and the Cold War.

Papers presented at a two-day interactive dialogue organized by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

India was the Soviet Union's most important trading partner among the less developed countries (LDCs) and the largest recipient of Soviet aid to non-socialist LDCs. Similarly the Soviet Union is one of India's largest trade partners. In this 1991 book, Santosh Mehrotra presents a comprehensive study of this trading relationship and the transfer of technology from the Soviet Union. He begins by outlining Indian economic strategy since the 1950s and the role of Soviet and East European technical assistance. Part II examines Soviet technological transfer to India since 1955. The final chapters analyse Indo-Soviet trade in the 1970s and 1980s, covering payment arrangements and bilateral trading. The book is an exhaustive analysis of economic relations between an industrialised planned economy and a developing market economy. It will therefore become essential reading for students and specialists of development economics and international relations as well as for government and institutional economists in international trade and finance.

The author assesses the balance of costs and benefits to the USSR of its considerable economic and military involvement with India; considers the effects of changing domestic, regional and global conditions and looks at the effects on the West. This book should be of interest to students of politics and international relations.

Focusing on the two tumultuous decades framed by Indian independence in 1947 and the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, The Cold War on the Periphery explores the evolution of American policy toward the subcontinent. McMahon analyzes the motivations behind America's pursuit of Pakistan and India as strategic Cold War prizes. He also examines the profound consequences—for U.S. regional and global foreign policy and for South Asian stability—of America's complex political, military, and economic commitments on the subcontinent. McMahon argues that the Pakistani-American alliance, consummated in 1954, was a monumental strategic blunder. Secured primarily to bolster the defense perimeter in the Middle East, the alliance increased Indo-Pakistani hostility, undermined regional stability, and led India to seek closer ties with the Soviet Union. Through his examination of the volatile region across four presidencies, McMahon reveals the American strategic vision to have been "surprinsgly ill defined, inconsistent, and even contradictory" because of its exaggerated anxiety about the Soviet threat and America's failure to incorporate the interests and concerns of developing nations into foreign policy. The Cold War on the Periphery addresses fundamental questions about the global reach of postwar American foreign policy. Why, McMahon asks, did areas possessing few of the essential prerequisites of economic-military power become objects of intense concern for the United States? How did the national security interests of the United States become so expansive that they extended far beyond the industrial core nations of Western Europe and East Asia to embrace nations on the Third World periphery? And what combination of economic, political, and ideological variables best explain the motives that led the United States to seek friends and allies in virtually every corner of the planet? McMahon's lucid analysis of Indo-Pakistani-Americna relations powerfully reveals how U.S. policy was driven, as he puts it, "by a series of amorphous—and largely illusory—military, strategic, and psychological fears" about American vulnerability that not only wasted American resources but also plunged South Asia into the vortex of the Cold War.

Here is the history of the disintegration of the Russian Empire, and the emergence of a multinational Communist state. Pipes tells how the Communists exploited the new nationalism of the peoples of the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Volga-Ural area—first to seize power and then to expand into the borderlands.