Based on new archival research in many countries, this volume broadens the context of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Its primary focus is on relations between China and Vietnam in the mid-twentieth century; but the book also deals with China's relations with Cambodia, U.S. dealings with both China and Vietnam, French attitudes toward Vietnam and China, and Soviet views of Vietnam and China. Contributors from seven countries range from senior scholars and officials with decades of experience to young academics just finishing their dissertations. The general impact of this work is to internationalize the history of the Vietnam War, going well beyond the long-standing focus on the role of the United States.

Examines international context in which North Vietnamese leaders pursued the war & American intervention ended, taking readers from marshy swamps of the Mekong Delta to corridors of power in Hanoi & the Nixon White House; from peace negotiations in Paris to high-level meetings in Beijing & Moscow, all to reveal peace never had a chance in Vietnam.

Existing studies of the Vietnam War have been written mostly from an American perspective, using western sources, and viewing the conflict through western eyes. This book, based on extensive original research, including Vietnamese, Chinese and former Soviet sources, tells the story of the war from the Tet offensive in 1968 up to the reunification of Vietnam in April 1975. Overall, it provides an important corrective to the predominantly US-centric narratives of the war by placing the Vietnamese communists centre-stage in the story. It is a sequel to the author's Routledge Curzon book The Vietnam War From the Other Side, which covers the period 1962-68.

Although the Chinese and the Vietnamese were Cold War allies in wars against the French and the Americans, their alliance collapsed and they ultimately fought a war against each other in 1979. More than thirty years later the fundamental cause of the alliance's termination remains contested among historians, international relations theorists, and Asian studies specialists. Nicholas Khoo brings fresh perspective to this debate. Using Chinese-language materials released since the end of the Cold War, Khoo revises existing explanations for the termination of China's alliance with Vietnam, arguing that Vietnamese cooperation with China's Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union, was the necessary and sufficient cause for the alliance's termination. He finds alternative explanations to be less persuasive. These emphasize nonmaterial causes, such as ideology and culture, or reference issues within the Sino-Vietnamese relationship, such as land and border disputes, Vietnam's treatment of its ethnic Chinese minority, and Vietnam's attempt to establish a sphere of influence over Cambodia and Laos. Khoo also adds to the debate over the relevance of realist theory in interpreting China's international behavior during both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. While others see China as a social state driven by nonmaterial processes, Khoo makes the case for viewing China as a quintessential neorealist state. From this perspective, the focus of neorealist theory on security threats from materially stronger powers explains China's foreign policy not only toward the Soviet Union but also in relation to its Vietnamese allies.

When costly efforts to cement a strategic partnership with the Soviet Union failed, the combined political pressure of economic crisis at home and imminent external threats posed by a Sino-Cambodian alliance compelled Hanoi to reverse course. Moving away from the Marxist-Leninist ideology that had prevailed during the last decade of the Cold War era, the Vietnamese government implemented broad doi moi ("renovation") reforms intended to create a peaceful regional environment for the country's integration into the global economy. In contrast to earlier studies, Path traces the moving target of these changing policy priorities, providing a vital addition to existing scholarship on asymmetric wartime decision-making and alliance formation among small states. The result uncovers how this critical period had lasting implications for the ways Vietnam continues to conduct itself on the global stage.

In an act of totally unnecessary and wanton destruction, British forces in China during the Second Opium War (1856-1860) looted and destroyed much of the Old Imperial Summer Palace (Yuanmingyuan) including three imperial gardens and hundreds of halls, pavilions, and temples stock full of ancient artwork, antiquities, and literary works. More than a hundred years later, President Xi Jinping (2013- ) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) proclaimed the “rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation with the economic and especially military power to prevent any such recurrence of “national humiliation.” Though not yet a superpower equal in global stature to the United States, the PRC is undoubtedly poised to become the equal if not the superior power in the Asia-Pacific region expanding its territorial claims in the South China Sea and asserting undisputed economic dominance. With government, business, and academic leaders debating how regional and global powers should respond to a rising China. Historical Dictionary of Chinese Foreign Affairs contains a chronology, an introduction, a glossary, appendixes, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has over 300 cross-referenced entries on major events, national institutions, foreign nations, and personages impacting Chinese foreign affairs along with the many institutions of the post-World War II international order that the PRC has engaged especially since the 1970s. This book is an excellent resource for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about Chinese foreign affairs.