Eugene Goodheart examines the skeptic disposition that has informed advanced literary discourse over the past generation, arguing that the targets of deconstructive suspicion are fundamental humanistic values. "[This book] is a fair-minded, generous critique of the deconstructionist theories of Jacques Derrida, Paul de Man, and their followers. These writers have argued that language is so inherently slippery it can never express a speaker's intended meaning. The critic's role, in their view, is to explore the contradictions, subtexts, and metaphorical byways of works that may be most radically deceptive when they appear simple. Critics have castigated this language-centered skepticism as a form of nihilism geared to multiply numbingly similar readings of already familiar texts. Mr. Goodheart's objection is more subtle. He suggests that the philosophical orientation of deconstructive critics leads them to overemphasize the tricky propositional sense of words at the expense of the broader impact of literature--its power to wound, thrill, or transform us."--Morris Dickstein, The New York Times Book Review Originally published in 1991. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Eugene Goodheart's remarkably compact and penetrating analysis examines the skeptic disposition that has informed advanced literary discourse over the past generation. Originally published in 1985. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Anita Superson challenges the traditional picture of the skeptic who asks, "Why be moral?" While holding that the skeptic's position is important, she builds an argument against it by understanding it more deeply, and then shows what it would take to successfully defeat it. Superson argues that we must defeat not only the action skeptic, but the disposition skeptic, who denies that being morally disposed is rationally required, and the motive skeptic, who believes that merely going through the motions in acting morally is rationally permissible. We also have to address the amoralist, who is not moved by moral reasons he recognizes. Superson argues for expanding the skeptic's position from self-interest to privilege to include morally unjustified behavior targeting disenfranchised social groups, as well as revising the traditional expected utility model to exclude desires deformed by patriarchy as irrational. Lastly she argues that the challenge can be answered if it can be shown that it is, in an important way, inconsistent and therefore irrational to privilege oneself over others. The Moral Skeptic makes an important contribution to both metaethics/moral theory and feminist philosophy, and brings feminist thinking into the larger discussion of the skeptical challenge.

Explores what it was like to argue and to live as a practitioner of Pyrrhonist skepticism.

Anita Superson challenges the traditional picture of the skeptic who asks, "Why be moral?" While holding that the skeptic's position is important, she builds an argument against it by understanding it more deeply, and then shows what it would take to successfully defeat it. Superson argues that we must defeat not only the action skeptic, but the disposition skeptic, who denies that being morally disposed is rationally required, and the motive skeptic, who believes that merely going through the motions in acting morally is rationally permissible. We also have to address the amoralist, who is not moved by moral reasons he recognizes. Superson argues for expanding the skeptic's position from self-interest to privilege to include morally unjustified behavior targeting disenfranchised social groups, as well as revising the traditional expected utility model to exclude desires deformed by patriarchy as irrational. Lastly she argues that the challenge can be answered if it can be shown that it is, in an important way, inconsistent and therefore irrational to privilege oneself over others. The Moral Skeptic makes an important contribution to both metaethics/moral theory and feminist philosophy, and brings feminist thinking into the larger discussion of the skeptical challenge.

The rule-following debate, in its concern with the metaphysics and epistemology of linguistic meaning and mental content, goes to the heart of the most fundamental questions of contemporary philosophy of mind and language. This volume gathers together the most important contributions to the topic, including papers by Simon Blackburn, Paul Boghossian, Graeme Forbes, Warren Goldfarb, Paul Horwich, John McDowell, Colin McGinn, Ruth Millikan, Philip Pettit, George Wilson, Crispin Wright, and Jose Zalabardo. The debate has centred on Saul Kripke's reading of the rule-following sections in Wittgenstein and his consequent posing of a sceptical paradox that threatens our everyday notions of linguistic meaning and mental content. These essays are attempts to respond to this challenge and represent some of the most important work in contemporary theory of meaning. With an introductory essay and a comprehensive guide to further reading this book is an excellent resource for courses in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, Wittgenstein, and metaphysics, as well as for all philosophers, linguists, and cognitive scientists with interests in these areas.

The Skeptic's Oakeshott poses the thesis that Michael Oakeshott's political philosophy is best understood from the vantage point of his skepticism and his intellectual affinity to Hobbes, whose work he commented on extensively. Margaret Thatcher based much of her political philosophy on Oakeshott's theories, but Gerencser shows how she widely misinterpreted his work. He argues persuasively against those who understand Oakeshott in terms of the influence of British idealism. Instead, Gerencser argues that Oakeshott adopts and softens Hobbes' idea of consent as the basis of political authority. By insisting that political authority has its source in acknowledgement and recognition, Oakeshott's philosophy opens the doors to democratic politics. The book ends with persuasive criticisms of Oakeshott, especially for thinking that politics offers only two alternatives, either the legitimacy of authority is universally recognized or civil war and secession are the result. Gerencser argues for the necessity of conflict and the contestation of the legitimacy of authority. He uses examples from Oakeshott's own work to show that civil disobedience is not only integral to democratic politics, but is required by Oakeshott's own understanding of the political.