A forensic investigation of the Battle of Savo Island where in August of 1942 Japanese strike forces snuck up on heavily guarded allied cruisers and destroyed four ships, sinking two of them. Loxton, wounded during the battle, exposes some of the myths surrounding this monumental defeat through an examination of American, Japanese, and Australian records, concluding with a "verdict" that cuts through naval misinformation and explains how such an event could have occurred. The writing conveys the single minded passion which the author follows to discover the truth of a military defeat which, because of his involvement, became a life obsession. Includes maps, diagrams, and illustrations. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

The Shame Of Savo explores the personalities and events associated with the disastrous night of 9 August 1942 when a Japanese cruiser force surprised an Allied fleet off Savo Island.

Here is a sideways look at World War II in the Pacific, which gives an exciting view of how the Japanese could have won. Expert military historians examine what would have happened if, for example if the Japanese had conquered India and knocked Britain out of the Pacific War; More...or if Japanese landings in Australia had severed the strategic link between the US and its Southwest Pacific base. The authors, writing as if these world-changing events had really happened, project realistic possibilities based on the true capabilities and circumstances of the forces involved. Rising Sun Victorious is essential and stimulating reading for anyone interested in how chances of history affected the outcome of World War II. Scenarios include: Pearl Harbor: Irredeemable Defeat, by Frank Shirer; The Coral Sea Runs Purple: The Japanese Codes are Cracked, by James Arnold; Nagumo's Luck: The Japanese Find The US Navy First at Midway, by Rick Lindsey; Australian Conquest, by John H. Gill; Guadalcanal Evacuation, by John Burtt; and Victory Rides the Wind: The Kamikaze Prevents Defeat at Kyushu, by Dennis Giangreco.

The Elusive Enemy explores the evolution of U.S. intelligence concerning the combat capabilities of the Imperial Japanese Navy and its air arm during the interwar period and the Pacific War. Ford contends that the US Navy could not accurately determine the fighting efficiency of Japan’s forces until it engaged them in actual battle conditions over an extended period. As the conflict progressed, the Americans were able to rely on a growing array of intelligence material, including POWs, captured documents, and specimens of captured enemy weapons. These sources often revealed valuable information on the characteristics of Japanese equipment, as well as some of the ideas and doctrines which governed how they carried out their operations. First-hand observations of the Japanese navy’s performance in battle were the most frequently used source of intelligence which enabled the US Navy to develop a more informed assessment of its opponent. Ship crews, along with US aviators, were tasked to collect information by making a thorough observation of how the Japanese fought. Action reports described how the Imperial fleet demonstrated a number of weaknesses, the most important of which was a shortage of modern equipment and, after 1942, diminished air power. Yet, he demonstrates how the Japanese remained a resilient enemy who could be defeated only when the Americans deployed sufficient equipment and used it in an appropriate manner. The Office of Naval Intelligence, as well as the intelligence services operating in the Pacific theater, thus had to assess a wide array of conflicting characteristics, and provide a balanced evaluation concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the Imperial navy. At the same time, a large part of the intelligence analysis was undertaken by commanders in the Pacific Fleet. Naval personnel and aircrews assessed the information gained through encounters with the enemy so that they could develop a set of methods whereby US forces were able defeat the Japanese without incurring excessive casualties and losses. The intelligence services, in turn, played an important role in disseminating the information on the most efficient tactics and weapons that could be used to defeat the Imperial Fleet. The Elusive Enemy aims to explain how American perceptions concerning the Japanese navy evolved during the conflict, with a particular focus on the role of intelligence. It also seeks to introduce a new perspective on the question as to why the U.S. Navy carried out its campaigns during the Pacific War in the manner that it did.

In the early hours of August 9, 1942, a Japanese force of five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and one destroyer under the command of the wily, audacious, and courageous Japanese admiral, Gunichi Mikawa, slammed into a surprised allied cruiser screen under the command of a British admiral, Victor Crutchley. This intimidating force achieved surprise despite the fact that it had been spotted eleven times on the seventh and eighth. It first struck the Southern Force, consisting of two destroyers and two heavy cruisers, under the command of Captain Howard D. Bode, who doubled as the commander of the heavy cruiser, Chicago. Dispatching Bode's force in a matter of minutes, Mikawa then circled Savo Island and turned his Long Lance torpedoes and eight-inch guns on the Northern Force under the command of Captain Frederick Riefkohl. In about thirty minutes, one Australian heavy cruiser, the Canberra, and three American heavy cruisers, the Quincy, Astoria, and the Vincennes began their watery trek to the bottom of Ironbottom Sound, a uniquely prophetic name. The Chicago would be the only heavy cruiser to survive that morning. There were errors aplenty on the part of admirals in the vicinity. In addition to command, reconnaissance, and communication errors in the planning, Admiral Fletcher withdrew the Air Support Force on the eve of the eighth. Admiral Turner, responsible for the planning of the operation, failed to heed the warnings and called a conference as a result of Fletcher's actions. Admiral Crutchley, who also failed to heed the warnings, attended the conference with one-third of the strength of the Southern Force, the Australian heavy cruiser, Australia. Despite the errors of admirals, a single captain was censured in the Hepburn Report, the Navy's investigation. That captain was Howard D. Bode. This book is a story concerning that captain.

This biography of one of World War II’s great military leaders is a “rich tribute to a staunch American naval hero” (WWII Quarterly). John S. “Slew” McCain was an old-school sailor. Wiry, profane, a cusser, and a gambler, he reminded more than one observer of Popeye. He was also a pioneer in the hard-hitting naval tactics that brought Imperial Japan to its knees. McCain graduated from Annapolis in 1906 and served aboard an armored cruiser in World War I. Perceiving the future of naval warfare, he earned his aviation wings in 1936, and by 1939, McCain was commander of the aircraft carrier USS Ranger. He was thus well-placed to play a leading role in America’s cut-and-thrust war with the Japanese across the broad expanses of the Pacific. In 1942, he was made commander of all land-based aircraft during the campaign for Guadalcanal. Though he took his share of blame for the disaster at Savo Island, he counterattacked with every means at his disposal, to the point of commandeering the planes of the crippled carriers Enterprise and Saratoga to reinforce US strength on Henderson Field. By the time the US returned to the Philippines, McCain was leading a fast carrier task force under William “Bull” Halsey. When asked what he thought about his carrier commander, Halsey replied, “Not much more than my right arm.” McCain’s carrier group would destroy thousands of enemy planes and hundreds of ships with aggressive swarming tactics. Four days after Japan officially surrendered, McCain died in his bed. His name has lived on, however, through his son, who became commander of US naval forces in the Pacific, and his grandson, John S. McCain III, carrier pilot, Vietnam POW, and United States Senator. Drawing upon a wealth of primary sources, including information provided by the McCain family, as well as an expert grasp of the titanic battles waged by the US armed forces in the Pacific, Alton Keith Gilbert has provided the fullest account of the Admiral John McCain’s life yet written.