This paper presents an historical account of the operations of United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) special operations units in the French campaign of 1944. The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it is intended to be a brief history of the creation, development and combat record of these units. Second, it is intended for use as an example of the utility and effectiveness of air force special operations in high intensity conventional warfare. The narrative basically begins in early 1943, as the Western Allies began making plans for the cross-Channel invasion of Normandy. At the request of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the USAAF commands in the United Kingdom and North Africa secretly organized a small number of special operations squadrons for use in covert operations over France. Their overall mission was to provide specialized airlift for clandestine warfare activities intended to support the conventional ground forces during the critical days and weeks immediately after D-Day. From October 1943 through September 1944, these squadrons flew thousands of clandestine missions, parachuting guerrilla warfare teams and intelligence agents deep behind German lines, dropping weapons, ammunition, explosives and other supplies to French resistance fighters, and extracting teams from enemy territory. The USAAF squadrons, operating in conjunction with similar British squadrons, enabled American and British special forces and French irregular units to operate with great effectiveness in the vulnerable rear areas behind German lines.

For four decades after World War II, U.S. Special Operations Forces—including Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs, Air Force special operations aircrews and Special Tactics Group—suffered from mistrust and inadequate funding from the military services. They were nearly eliminated from the active force following the Vietnam War. But in the past fifteen years, special operations forces have risen from the ashes of the failed 1980 rescue of American hostages in Iran to become one of the most frequently deployed elements of the U.S. military. They are now adequately funded, better-equipped, and well-trained. Special operations forces are often the nation's first military response when faced with a crisis in today's uncertain and unstable international security environment. What caused this dramatic turnaround? As this book shows, it was a long way from congressional outrage at TV images of burned bodies of U.S. servicemen in the Iranian desert to the establishment of a special operations force of nearly 45,000 active and reserve personnel. The drama of how this happened sheds light on how public policy is made and implemented. It illustrates the complex interaction between internal forces within the special operations community, as well as between the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. The implementation of legislation establishing a special operations capability is seen to rebuild and protect these forces to an extent never imagined by the early "quiet professionals." While offering insights into how the U.S. government makes policy, Susan Marquis also offers a revealing look at the special operations community, including their storied past, extreme training, and recent operational experience that continues to forge their distinctive organizational mission and culture. She describes the decade-long struggle to rebuild special operations forces, resulting in new SOF organizations with independence that is unique among U.S. militar

With the development of the “long war,” the U.S. military’s focus has shifted dramatically from its traditional emphasis on conventional operations to irregular and indirect approaches to safeguard America’s vital interests. One of the least understood aspects of Irregular Warfare is Unconventional Warfare (UW), which includes operations conducted through, with or by indigenous forces and provides the U.S. with an indirect means of accomplishing its objectives. This thesis examines the current ability of Special Operations Forces to conduct UW with air support, specifically air support provided by Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). This thesis examines the questions—Does AFSOC currently have airpower assets with the capability to support UW operations with mobility, resupply, and fires? Three case studies were used to examine airpowers role in UW: Allied support to the French resistance in WWII, United States support to the Hmong during the conflict in Laos and a hypothetical scenario using AFSOC’s current capabilities. The three case studies were examined using the evaluation criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and unity of effort. The analysis found that AFSOC could currently support UW operations, but effectiveness would be limited by a number of factors.

A fascinating history of the most secretive and unsung branch of the US military’s Special Forces, from World War II through Desert Storm Very little is known about USAF Special Operations—yet their exploits have been as daring and their achievements as remarkable as anything accomplished by their brother warriors. Since World War II, these ultra-secretive “air commandos” have routinely performed the near-impossible, undertaking missions that typically carry them across enemy lines. From secretly inserting covert operatives into North Korea and participating in clandestine CIA operations in Vietnam and Cambodia to providing air support for partisans in Nazi-occupied France and rescuing dozens of downed fliers trapped deep in enemy territory, these courageous airmen have done the jobs that no one else could do, often in the most technologically advanced war machinery the Air Force has at its disposal. Sometimes called “ravens” or “carpetbaggers,” the air commandos have a history that has long been buried beneath layers of official cover stories, rumors, and deceptions—until now. An expert in military affairs, Orr Kelly has already written what many believe to be the definitive history of the US Navy SEALs (Brave Men, Dark Waters). Now, he turns his attention to this unsung branch of the military’s Special Forces, relating a true story of courage, skill, and commitment that spans decades. With uncompromising honesty, he explores both the triumphs (Project 9 in Burma) and the disasters (the failed rescue of hostages in Iran) of these incomparable heroes of the sky, who have never sought recognition or glory.

The challenges facing General Dwight Eisenhower before the Invasion of Normandy were not merely military but political as well. He knew that to liberate France, and to hold it, the Allies needed local help, which would necessitate coordinating with the highly independent French resistance groups known collectively as the maquis. The Allies' objective was to push the Germans out of France. The French objective, on the other hand, was a France free of all foreign armies, including the Allies. President Roosevelt refused to give full support to Charles de Gaulle, whom he mistrusted, and declined to supply the timing, location, and other key details of Operation Overlord to his Free French government. Eisenhower's hands were tied. He needed to involve the French, but without simultaneously involving them in operational planning. Into this atmosphere of tension and confusion jumped teams consisting of three officers each -- one from the British Special Operations Bureau, one from the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, one from the Free French Bureau Central de Renseignement -- as well as a radioman from any one of the three nations. Known as the Jedburghs, their primary purpose was to serve as liaisons to the maquis, working to arm, train, and equip them. They were to incite guerilla warfare. Benjamin Jones' Eisenhower's Guerrillas is the first book to show in detail how the Jedburghs -- whose heroism and exploits have been widely celebrated -- and the maquis worked together. Underscoring the critical and often overlooked role that irregular warfare played in Allied operations on the Continent, it tells the story of the battle for and liberation of France and the complexities that threatened to undermine the operation before it even began.

This volume provides a collection of insightful essays on all phases of the Iraq War: both US-led major combat operations to defeat the Ba’athist regime as well as efforts to reconstruct the country and defeat the insurgency. Written by leading scholars on the Iraq War, many of whom have practical first-hand experience of the war, the book includes a Conclusion by leading US strategic thinker Eliot Cohen. This is the first work on the Iraq War to incorporate an understanding of the Iraqi side of the war, based on a systematic analysis of captured Iraqi archives. War in Iraq will be of great interest to students of the Iraq War, small wars and insurgencies, international security and strategic studies in general.

"The purpose of this paper is to determine to what extent and how the Joint Force Commander (JFC) should control support from space forces. Current Air Force doctrine, as delineated in Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, identifies the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) as being responsible for both air and space for the theater. This statement follows the Air Force notion that air and space are an indivisible medium of warfare. On the other hand, Joint Pub 3-14 states the Operations Directorate, J-3, on the supported commander's (the JFC's) staff functions in this role. To examine this issue of in-theater control of space forces more closely, this study is divided into five chapters. Following the Introduction, Chapter 2 looks into how space forces were planned for and employed during Desert Storm. This chapter discusses who was in-charge and what planning processes were used. In Chapter 3, lessons and initiatives to improve planning and employment of support from space forces are discussed. Chapter 4 explores the possible need to have one individual in-theater clearly identified as being responsible for directing space forces. Centralized control, similar to air, may have beneficial effects that allow joint commanders to take better advantage of space forces' full potential. The study concludes by offering recommendations."--Abstract.