Discusses the first Gulf War, the weapons inspections, and the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, all in an effort to protect the region and the world from weapons of mass destruction.

This authoritative account explores the facts that lie behind the Weapons of Mass Destruction programmes in Iraq. Graham Pearson shows how these programmes were gradually uncovered through the efforts of UN specialist exerts, then by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC and finally by the Iraq Survey Group. The book analyses why there was no stockpile of chemical or biological weapons to be found in Iraq. Finally, it examines the lessons for inspection, verification and non-proliferation in the chemical and biological weapons prohibition regimes.

This title is for everyone who wants to really understand what happened in the run-up to the declaration of war against Iraq, by the one unimpeachable witness.

In direct contrast to the popular phrase, "no weapons of mass destruction have been found," this text presented overwhelming evidence that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been found in Iraq. Chemical weapons, a biological warfare program, and key components of a nuclear weapons program were discovered by coalition forces as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Both mustard and nerve agents were used against U.S. troops in Iraq in 2003. Over 50 chemical munitions have been captured in Iraq since the 2003 invasion. In addition to the captured chemical munitions that could kill over 100,000 people, cyanide blocks and active cyanide production labs have been found in Iraq. As a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition forces discovered biological weapons feed stock in the home of a prominent Iraqi BW scientist to include the most toxic substance known to man. The feedstock when combined with growth media could be used to produce massive quantities of biological agents within weeks. An active production line for Bacillus subtilis was discovered in 2003 that Iraqi scientists confirmed could be converted to an anthrax production line in less than a week. In addition to the declared dual-use facilities that could be quickly converted to make biological weapons, coalition forces found numerous undeclared biological labs in the Baghdad area as well as mobile labs, some of which were buried with expensive equipment and documents on how to make anthrax inside. In spite of UN sanctions and inspections, Iraq managed to preserve key components of its nuclear program to include maintaining stockpiles of undeclared enriched uranium, maintaining uranium enrichment technology, and continuing research to develop a nuclear weapon. Nuclear material to include yellowcake and enriched uranium were found in Iraq after the 2003 invasion. As a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom, centrifuge parts and an ion implantation program to preserve EMIS technology both of which are used to enrich uranium were discovered in Iraq. This book will allow you to review the details of the types and quantities of Weapons of Mass Destruction Found in Iraq as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom. It includes pictures of U.S. troops capturing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 and details the weapons found to date.

This unique book is a compendium of eight outstanding reports from the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Center). The reports include: Part 1: Defining "Weapons of Mass Destruction" * Part 2: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: Looking Back, Looking Ahead * Part 3: International Partnerships to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction * Part 4: Can al Qaeda Be Deterred from Using Nuclear Weapons? * Part 5: Eliminating Adversary Weapons of Mass Destruction: What's at Stake? * Part 6: Iraq and After: Taking the Right Lessons for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction * Part 7: The Future Nuclear Landscape * Part 8: The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in 2030 The phrase "weapons of mass destruction, "for example, is an amorphous one, changing meaning according to the whims of the speaker. Raising the specter of WMD is more a way by which politicians assign blame or take a stand on seemingly objective moral standards than a way by which they assess a particular weapons system. Because many analysts find fault with existing definitions, they offer new definitions that differ in some radical way from those commonly accepted.8 Still others, believing that the traditional definitions for WMD are intellectually problematic, propose dropping the term altogether. Recognizing these disagreements, the 2004 British government review of Iraq WMD intelligence offered the following comment: There is a considerable and long-standing academic debate about the proper interpretation of the phrase "weapons of mass destruction." We have some sympathy with the view that, whatever its origin, the phrase and its accompanying abbreviation is now used so variously as to confuse rather than enlighten readers. In important ways, the world is at a nuclear crossroads. The complex and dynamic nuclear landscape presents us with challenges along at least four axes: regional nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism, great power nuclear relations, and the security implications of increased interest in nuclear energy. These problems are interrelated in ways that the national security community does not fully understand. Strategy and policy frameworks do not address them in sufficiently integrated fashion. New conceptual thinking is required to develop a more unified understanding of and approach to managing the risks and opportunities posed by these 21st-century nuclear challenges. Today, more than at any other time in the nuclear era, nuclear capacity and potential (knowledge, technology, and materials) are accessible to a growing number of actors with more ambitious goals. The result is a high degree of nuclear latency that challenges traditional thinking about nuclear threats. Whereas 30 or 40 years ago, only a handful of countries were assumed to know how to acquire nuclear weapons, as many as 35 or 40 nations currently are believed to be in the know, and many more could become so based on their participation in civilian nuclear energy programs.

Charles Duelfer is one of the most senior intelligence officers with on-the-ground experience to have worked in Iraq before, during, and after the Gulf War. His 2004 CIA report is widely renowned as the most authoritative account on how the world was led to believe that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction. But until now, Duelfer has never publicly shared his unrivaled expertise on just how the U.S.-Iraq relationship spiraled into a second war, and ultimately into chaos. Hide and Seek is his account -- based on unparalleled access to Iraqi leadership, the White House, and the CIA -- of the long and tragic unraveling of the U.S. relationship with Iraq. This book sees beyond the propaganda and deceits of both sides to tell the story of the miscalculations in assessing Iraq as a threat, why Saddam responded as he did to U.S. demands, and precisely how the U.S. implemented its decision to topple Saddam's regime. No one is better able than Duelfer to see inside the mindsets of the two administrations, with their mismatched priorities, wounded pride, and dangerous ability to bluff and counterbluff.