In his Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique, Adolf Grunbaum claimed that the arguments supporting psychoanalytic hypotheses are both logically invalid and unsound. They are invalid because they violate the cannons of inductive elimination, and unsound because the clinical data is contaminated by the suggestive influence of the analyst.In a spirited defence of psychoanalysis, the author asserts that Grunbaum's argument over suggestibility is not supported by textual evidence and gives her own formulation of Freud's argument to show how the problem of suggestibility can be dealt with. To counter the charge of the invalidity of the repression argument, the author addresses the two specific objections of Grunbaum: first, that repression can be a maintaining rather than an originating cause of neurotic symptoms, and, second, that by eliminating rival candidates it is possible to formulate a valid argument for repression aetiology. This book is a must-read for all those interested in the stature and reputation of psychoanalysis in the scientific world.

The normal approach to the study of the foundations of psychoanalysis is to focus on Sigmund Freud's classical texts. In this book, however, the author approaches the issue from the perspective of the foundations of behavioural sciences in general. He studies the nature of psychological terms and explanations, and the relation between neuroscience and psychology. Due to the wide perspective, the author is able to create a fresh view to the stubborn debate concerning the scientific status of psychoanalysis. The author shows that both advocates and critics of psychoanalysis have a tendency to misconstrue the nature of psychoanalytic theorizing, and thus have had unrealistic expectations of psychoanalytic explanations. The book tries to differentiate between those aspects of psychoanalysis which should be considered scientific, and those aspects of psychotherapies in general which should not come into the scientific category. This books will be found to be a valuable contribution to the field of psychoanalytic studies.

This study is a philosophical critique of the foundations of Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis. As such, it also takes cognizance of his claim that psychoanalysis has the credentials of a natural science. It shows that the reasoning on which Freud rested the major hypotheses of his edifice was fundamentally flawed, even if the probity of the clinical observations he adduced were not in question. Moreover, far from deserving to be taken at face value, clinical data from the psychoanalytic treatment setting are themselves epistemically quite suspect.

This book records one of the few times in the United States that a distinguished group of psychoanalysts met with an equally distinguished group of philosophers of science in a free, critical interchange of view on the scientific status of the field.

The perennial interest in psychoanalysis shows no signs of abating and the longevity of psychoanalytic theory is seen in the varied extensions and elaborations of Freudian thinking in the fields of neuroscience and cognitive theory. Nevertheless, the scientific standing of psychoanalysis has long been questioned and developments in the fields of the philosophy of science and psychology require a fresh assessment of the scientific standing of psychoanalysis. While there are a range of views on the topic of whether psychoanalysis is in fact scientific, any satisfactory approach to understanding mind and behaviour requires an approach that is at once both philosophic and scientific. Accordingly, to even approach the question regarding the scientific nature of psychoanalysis, a foundation comprising a sophisticated conceptual and philosophical framework is required. This volume represents the junction where philosophy, science, and psychoanalysis meet and presents arguments critical and supportive of the scientific standing of psychoanalysis.