The Russo-Japanese war saw the first defeat of a major European imperialist power by an Asian country. When Japanese and Russian expansionist interests collided over Manchuria and Korea, the Tsar assumed Japan would never dare to fight. However, after years of planning, Japan launched a surprise attack on the Russian Port Arthur, on the Liaoyang Peninsula in 1904 and the war that followed saw Japan win major battles against Russia. This book explains the background and outbreak of the war, then follows the course of the fighting at Yalu River, Sha-ho, and finally Mukden, the largest battle anywhere in the world before the First World War.

Despite the growing number of publications on the Russo-Japanese War, an abundance of questions and issues related to this topic remain unsolved, or call for a reexamination. This 30-chapter volume, the first in the two-volume project Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, provides a comprehensive reexamination of the origins of the conflict, the various dimensions of the nineteen-month conflagration, the legacy of the war, and its place in the history of the twentieth century. Such an enterprise is not only timely but unique. It has benefited from a multinational team of thirty-two scholars from twelve nations representing a broad disciplinary background. The majority of them focus on topics never researched before and without exception provide a novel and critical view of the war. This reexamination is, of course, facilitated by a century-long perspective as well as an impressive assortment of primary and secondary sources, many of them unexplored and, in a number of cases, unavailable earlier.

The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 has been seen as the turning point of the development of the modern world. Written by a specialist in Japanese diplomacy, this book has been described by the Times Higher Education Supplement as 'diplomatic history at its very best'.

Narrative history based on eyewitness accounts.

The Russo-Japanese War was fought in the waters of the Yellow Sea and the Straits of Tsushima that divide Japan from Korea, and in the mountains of Manchuria, borrowed without permission from China. It was the first war to be fought with modern weapons. The Japanese had fought the Chinese at sea in 1894 and had gained a foothold in Manchuria by taking control of Port Authur. In 1895, however, Japan was forced to abandon its claims by the Russian fleet's presence in the Straits of Tsushima. Tsar Nicholas had obtained a window to the East for his empire and Japan had been humiliated. Tensions between the two countries would rise inexorably over the next decade. Around the world, no one doubted that little Japan would be no match for the mighty armies of Tsar Nicholas II. Yet Russia was in an advanced state of decay, the government corrupt and its troops inept and demoralized. Japan, meanwhile, was emerging from centuries of feudal isolation and becoming an industrial power, led by zealous nationalist warlords keen to lead the Orient to victory over the oppressive West. From the opening surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Authur in 1904, the Japanese out-fought and out-thought the Russians. This is a definitive account of one of the pivotal conflicts of the twentieth century whose impact was felt around the world.

The Russo-Japanese conflict was recognized, in its time, as introducing a new era of warfare, involving millions of men and weapons of mass destruction. In the decade which elapsed after its end much was written about it. The First World War marked a second stage in the development of twentieth-century-style total war, and so overshadowed the Russo-Japanese War that little further study was made of the latter. Subsequent books on this subject were for popular readerships, and mainly recycled the knowledge and beliefs of the pre-1914 years. This book aims to present a short account of the war, stripped of the legends that successive journalists and authors have attached to it, and at the same time present new angles and interpretations based on hitherto unused Russian-language sources and on the specialized monographs of the few scholars working in this and related fields. While not claiming to be definitive, it does provide a fresh start for the study of this war, whose importance justifies a clear-headed examination, casting light on Russian military and naval tradition. The distinctive psychology of Russian generals and admirals is well illustrated in this book, and the conclusion that the former were for bureaucratic reasons happier in defense than offense, and that the latter thought in military rather than naval terms (regarding battleships as fortresses that, under pressure, they could surrender of demolish), has implications for the understanding of subsequent Russian and Soviet history. Among the incidental implications is that during this war the British and American press sank to such a voluntary and involuntary level of distortion that its performance in subsequent wars can only be regarded as an improvement. Here and there in the book explanations for subsequent Russian and Japanese behavior can be glimpsed; not the least of these is the circumstance that at the end of the war Russian generals and officials felt cheated of certain victory while exactly the same intense and long-term frustration gnawed at Japanese public opinion. It was really an unsatisfactory war for both sides, the innumerable dead winning nothing worth while; in this and many other ways the Russo-Japanese War was a dress rehearsal for the First World War.