An essential new account of how anti-submarine warfare is conducted, with a focus on both historic and present-day operations. This new book shows how until 1944 U-boats operated as submersible torpedo craft which relied heavily on the surface for movement and charging their batteries. This pattern was repeated in WWII until Allied anti-submarine countermeasures had forced the Germans to modify their existing U-boats with the schnorkel. Countermeasures along also pushed the development of high-speed U-boats capable of continuously submerged operations. This study shows how these improved submarines became benchmark of the post-war Russian submarine challenge. Royal Navy doctrine was developed by professional anti-submarine officers, and based on the well-tried combination of defensive and offensive anti-submarine measures that had stood the press of time since 1917, notwithstanding considerable technological change. This consistent and holistic view of anti-submarine warfare has not been understood by most of the subsequent historians of these anti-submarine campaigns, and this book provides an essential and new insight into how Cold War, and indeed modern, anti-submarine warfare is conducted.

The Royal Navy's operations in World War II started on 3 September 1939 and continued until the surrender of Japan in August 1945 - there was no 'phoney war' at sea. The navy played a central role in the evacuation of the retreating British army at Dunkirk, and later orchestrated the sinking of Germany's mighty battleship and Hitler's pride, the Bismarck. Without the Royal Navy's attention to the defence of Britain's seaborne trade - especially in the struggle against German U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic - there would not have been food for the country, fuel for the RAF's operations or supplies to keep the army fighting in Europe, North Africa and the Far East. Yet the outstanding naval contribution to Britain's survival and eventual victory came at a heavy cost in terms of ships and to the men who had to face not just the violence of the enemy, but also the violence of the sea. This book argues that World War II was, effectively, a maritime war; it was the Royal Navy's war.

World War I is one of the iconic conflicts of the modern era. For many years the war at sea has been largely overlooked; yet, at the outbreak of that war, the British Government had expected and intended its military contribution to be largely naval. This was a war of ideologies fought by and for empires. Britain was not defending simply an island; it was defending a far flung empire. Without the navy such an undertaking would have been impossible. In many respects the Royal Navy fought along the longest 'front' of any fighting force of the Great War, and it acted as the leader of a large alliance of navies. The Royal Navy fought in the North and South Atlantic, in the North and South Pacific, its ships traversed the globe from Australia to England, and its presence extended the war to every continent except Antarctica. Because of the Royal Navy, Britain could finance and resource not only its own war effort, but that of its allies. Following the naval arms race in the early 20th century, both Britain and Germany were equipped with the latest naval technology, including revolutionary new vessels such as dreadnoughts and diesel-powered submarines. Although the Royal Navy's operations in World War I were global, a significant proportion of the fleet's strength was concentrated in the Grand Fleet, which confronted the German High Seas Fleet across the North Sea. At the Battle of Jutland in 1916 the Royal Navy, under the command of Admiral Jellicoe, fought an iconic, if inconclusive battle for control of shipping routes. The navy might not have been able to win the war, but, as Winston Churchill put it, she 'could lose it in an afternoon'. The Royal Navy was British power and prestige. 43,244 British navy personnel would lose their lives fighting on the seas in World War I. This book tells their story and places the Royal Navy back at the heart of the British war effort, showing that without the naval dimension the First World War would not have been a truly global conflict.

In the context of their war experience in the First World War, the changes and developments of the Executive branch of the Royal Navy between the world wars are examined and how these made them fit for the test of the Second World War are critically assessed.

Naval Warfare 1919–45 is a comprehensive history of the war at sea from the end of the Great War to the end of World War Two. Showing the bewildering nature and complexity of the war facing those charged with fighting it around the world, this book ranges far and wide: sweeping across all naval theatres and those powers performing major, as well as minor, roles within them. Armed with the latest material from an extensive set of sources, Malcolm H. Murfett has written an absorbing as well as a comprehensive reference work. He demonstrates that superior equipment and the best intelligence, ominous power and systematic planning, vast finance and suitable training are often simply not enough in themselves to guarantee the successful outcome of a particular encounter at sea. Sometimes the narrow difference between victory and defeat hinges on those infinite variables: the individual’s performance under acute pressure and sheer luck. Naval Warfare 1919–45 is an analytical and interpretive study which is an accessible and fascinating read both for students and for interested members of the general public.

An “indispensable” guide to the Royal Navy’s submarines through 1945, with numerous photos and original plans (The Naval Review). The Royal Navy didn’t invent the submarine—but in 1914, Britain had the largest submarine fleet in the world, and at the end of World War I it had some of the largest and most unusual of all submarines—whose origins and designs are all detailed in this book. During the First World War they virtually closed the Baltic to German iron ore traffic, and blocked supplies to the Turkish army at Gallipoli. They were a major element in the North Sea battles, and fought the U-boat menace. During World War II, US submarines were known for strangling Japan, but lesser known is the parallel battle by British submarines in the Mediterranean to strangle the German army in North Africa. Like their US counterparts, interwar British submarines were designed largely with the demands of a possible Pacific War, though that was not the war they fought. The author also shows how the demands of such a war, fought over vast distances, collided with interwar British Government attempts to limit costs. It says much about the ingenuity of British submarine designers that they met their requirements despite enormous pressure. The author shows how evolving strategic and tactical requirements and evolving technology produced successive types of design. British submariners contributed much to the development of anti-submarine tactics and technology, beginning with largely unknown efforts before World War I. Between the wars, they exploited the new technology of sonar (Asdic), and as a result pioneered submarine silencing, with important advantages to the US Navy as it observed the British. They also pioneered the vital postwar use of submarines as anti-submarine weapons, sinking a U-boat while both were submerged. Heavily illustrated with photos and original plans and incorporating much original analysis, this book is ideal for naval historians and enthusiasts. “Sure to become the standard reference for British submarine development for years to come” —Warship

The Battle of the Atlantic was the longest campaign of the Second World War. This volume highlights the scale and complexity of this bitterly contested campaign, one that encompassed far more than just attacks by German U-boats on Allied shipping. The team of leading scholars assembled in this study situates the German assault on seaborne trade within the wider Allied war effort and provides a new understanding of its place within the Second World War. Individual chapters offer original perspectives on a range of neglected or previously overlooked subjects: how Allied grand strategy shaped the war at sea; the choices facing Churchill and other Allied leaders and the tensions over the allocation of scarce resources between theaters; how the battle spread beyond the Atlantic Ocean in both military and economic terms; the management of Britain's merchant shipping repair yards; the defense of British coastal waters against German surface raiders; the contribution of air power to trade defense; antisubmarine escort training; the role of special intelligence; and the war against the U-boats in the Arctic and Pacific Oceans.