Approaching Atlanta in July of 1864, William Tecumseh Sherman knew he was facing the most important campaign of his career. Lacking the troops and the desire to mount a long siege of the city, Sherman was eager for a quick, decisive victory. A change of tactics was in order. He decided to call on the cavalry. Over the next seven weeks, Sherman's horsemen -- under the command of Generals Rousseau, Garrard, Stoneman, McCook, and Kilpatrick -- destroyed supplies and tore up miles of railroad track in an attempt to isolate the city. This book tells the story of those raids. After initial successes, the cavalrymen found themselves caught up in a series of daring and deadly engagements, including a failed attempt to push south to liberate the prisoners at the infamous prison camp at Andersonville. Through exhaustive research, David Evans has been able to recreate a vivid, captivating, and meticulously detailed image of the day-by-day life of the Union horse soldier. Based largely upon previously unpublished materials, Sherman's Horsemen provides the definitive account of this hitherto neglected aspect of the American Civil War.

This study is a historical analysis of the effectiveness of Union cavalry during the Atlanta Campaign of the American Civil War. In a campaign noted for the highly skilled maneuver conducted by General William Tecumseh Sherman, the effective employment of the cavalry was essential. The Union cavalry had the missions of providing security to the flanks of the army and protecting the supply lines by guarding the railroad and by striking against the Confederate cavalry. Later in the campaign, the Union leadership introduced the task of destroying Confederate railroads as a cavalry mission. The Union cavalry failed to perform these missions adequately. First, this work investigates the tradition of the Union cavalry and the state of Sherman’s cavalry at the beginning of the campaign. Secondly, an analysis of the cavalry operations breaks the use of cavalry into three phases and focuses on the various missions which were attempted. Finally, the study addresses the lessons learned and what the applicability is for modern operations. This study concludes that although the Union cavalry was well manned and well equipped, improper employment and deficient senior leadership caused it to play an unsuccessful and detrimental part in the overall campaign.

The famed fighting force of Union General William T. Sherman was plagued by a lack of first-rate cavalry--mostly because of Sherman's belief, after some bad experiences, that the cavalry was largely a waste of good horses. The man Grant sent to change Sherman's mind was James Harrison Wilson, a bright, ambitious, and outspoken young officer with a penchant for organization. Wilson proved the perfect man for the job, transforming a collection of independent regiments and brigades into a fiercely effective mounted unit. Wilson's Cavalry, as it came to be known, played a major role in thwarting Confederate General Hood's 1864 invasion of Tennessee, then moved south for the celebrated capture of Selma, Montgomery, and Columbus. Despite such success, it is this book that is the first overall history of the Cavalry Corps. In addition to meticulous description of military actions, the book affords particular attention to Wilson's outstanding achievement in creating an infrastructure for his corps, even as he covered the Federal flanks in the withdrawal to Franklin and Nashville.

Of all the states in the Confederacy, Tennessee was the most sectionally divided. East Tennesseans opposed secession at the ballot box in 1861, petitioned unsuccessfully for separate statehood, resisted the Confederate government, enlisted in Union militias, elected U.S. congressmen, and fled as refugees into Kentucky. These refugees formed Tennessee's first Union cavalry regiments during early 1862, followed shortly thereafter by others organized in Union-occupied Middle and West Tennessee. In Homegrown Yankees, the first book-length study of Union cavalry from a Confederate state, James Alex Baggett tells the remarkable story of Tennessee's loyal mounted regiments. Fourteen mounted regiments that fought primarily within the boundaries of the state and eight local units made up Tennessee's Union cavalry. Young, nonslaveholding farmers who opposed secession, the Confederacy, and the war -- from isolated villages east of Knoxville, the Cumberland Mountains, or the Tennessee River counties in the west -- filled the ranks. Most Tennesseans denounced these local bluecoats as renegades, turncoats, and Tories; accused them of betraying their people, their section, and their race; and held them in greater contempt than soldiers from the North. Though these homegrown Yankees participated in many battles -- including those in the Stones River, Tullahoma, Chickamauga, East Tennessee, Nashville, and Atlanta campaigns -- their story provides rare insights into what occurred between the battles. For them, military action primarily meant almost endless skirmishing with partisans, guerrillas, and bushwackers, as well as with the Rebel raiders of John Hunt Morgan, Joseph Wheeler, and Nathan Bedford Forrest, who frequently recruited and supplied themselves from behind enemy lines. Tennessee's Union cavalry scouted and foraged the countryside, guarded outposts and railroads, acted as couriers, supported the flanks of infantry, and raided the enemy. On occasion, especially during the Nashville campaign, they provided rapid pursuit of Confederate forces. They also helped protect fellow unionists from an aggressive pro-Confederate insurgency after 1862. Baggett vividly describes the deprivation, sickness, and loneliness of cavalrymen living on the war's periphery and traces how circumstances beyond their control -- such as terrain, transport, equipage, weaponry, public sentiment, and military policy -- affected their lives. He also explores their well-earned reputation for plundering -- misdeeds motivated by revenge, resentment, a lack of discipline, and the hard-war policy of the Union army. In the never-before-told story of these cavalrymen, Homegrown Yankees offers new insights into an unexplored facet of southern Unionism and provides an exciting new perspective on the Civil War in Tennessee.

The battle of Resaca, Georgia, in May 1864, represents a series of firsts: the first major battle of the Atlanta Campaign, the first occasion in Georgia in 1864 of Confederate and Federal armies in their entirety facing one another across a field of battle, and the first major encounter between Joseph E. Johnston and William T. Sherman as army field commanders.The two-day battle of Resaca proved to be an experience that would cause Sherman to alter the patterns of strategy and tactics in the campaign that followed. Disappointed by McPherson's lack of aggressiveness on two occasions, and Hooker's bungled attack on Hood's Corps on May 15, Sherman abandoned General Grant's injunction to go after Johnston's army and break it up. Instead, he reversed the original sequence of the plan by turning to the strategy of maneuver. Sherman's resulting famous flanking maneuvers eventually led to his capturing Atlanta in September.The first book-length treatment of this important battle, The Battle of Resaca is a necessary addition for civil war historians and libraries.

With this volume Stephen Z. Starr brings to a triumphant conclusion his prize-winning trilogy on the history of the Union cavalry.The War in the West provides accounts of the cavalry's role in the Vicksburg Campaign, the conquest of central Tennessee, Sherman's Atlanta Campaign, the March to the Sea, and the campaign of the Carolinas. Starr never neglects the numerous difficulties the cavalry faced: equipment shortages, inadequate weapons, unsuitable organization, and inept use of the cavalry by many members of the Union high command. And he never ignores the cavalry's own contributions to its failures. He convincingly demonstrates that in the end, in the battle of Nashville and in the Selma Campaign, the Union cavalry proved enormously effective. With this final volume Starr's objective remains "the portrayal of the life and campaigns of the Union cavalry as they were experienced and fought by its troopers and officers."

This book is a historical analysis of the effectiveness of Union cavalry during the Atlanta Campaign of the American Civil War. In a campaign noted for the highly skilled maneuver conducted by General William Tecumseh Sherman, the effective employment of the cavalry was essential. The Union cavalry had the missions of providing security to the flanks of the army and protecting the supply lines by guarding the railroad and by striking against the Confederate cavalry. Later in the campaign, the Union leadership introduced the task of destroying Confederate railroads as a cavalry mission. The Union cavalry failed to perform these missions adequately. First, this work investigates the tradition of the Union cavalry and the state of Sherman's cavalry at the beginning of the campaign. Secondly, an analysis of the cavalry operations breaks the use of cavalry into three phases and focuses on the various missions which were attempted. Finally, the study addresses the lessons learned and what the applicability is for modern operations. This study concludes that although the Union cavalry was well manned and well equipped, improper employment and deficient senior leadership caused it to play an unsuccessful and detrimental -part in the overall campaign.