This 1991 volume examines the financing of industry by banks and the banks' credit intermediation in industrial economies.

The financial history of interwar Europe was dominated by catastrophic episodes of hyper-inflation, dramatic exchange rate crises, massive and destabilizing movements of gold and capital, and extensive banking failures. In their attempt to restore and sustain the gold standard as the basis of the international monetary system, many countries were compelled to resort to deflationary fiscal and monetary policies of exceptional severity. The policies thus adopted in the 1920s were a major cause of the Great Depression of 1929-33; and this in turn exerted a powerful influence on the subsequent political and economic history of the 1930s. This collection of essays is the work of an international network of economic historians from Europe and the United States convened by the European Science Foundation. It brings together, in an accessible style, current knowledge and understanding of the nature and effects of these developments in banking, currency, and finance in the interwar period. The topics are examined at three levels. In Part I a substantial introductory survey of the central issues over the entire period is followed by special studies of the banking crises, the global capital flows, and the interrelationship of economic and political policies, with each of these themes considered in an international perspective. Part II is devoted to illuminating comparative analyses of the financial and exchange policies of pairs of countries; France and Italy, Britain and Germany, Sweden and Finland, and Belgium and France. In Part III the essays move to the level of individual countries and each contributor explores topics such as the form and efficacy of official banking and monetary policies, the role of the central bank, movements in the money supply and prices, the relationship between the banks and the industrial sector, changes in exchange rates and foreign capital investment. The volume covers all the major countries, and also makes available the results of recent research on banking and finance in smaller countries, such as Spain, Austria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Bulgaria, and Ireland. The questions addressed by this book, and the temes and patterns it reveals, are relevant both to economic and political historians of the years between the two world wars, and to those interested in contemporary banking and financial problems.

The Deutsche Bank, Germany's largest financial institution, played an important role in the expropriation of Jewish-owned enterprises during the Nazi dictatorship, both in the existing territories of Germany, and in the area seized by the German army during World War II. In this 2001 book Harold James uses new and previously unavailable materials, many from the bank's own archives, to examine policies which led to the eventual genocide of European Jews. How far did the realization of the vicious and destructive Nazi ideology depend on the acquiescence, the complicity, and the cupidity of existing economic institutions, and individuals? In response to the traditional view that business co-operation with the Nazi regime was motivated by profit, this book closely examines the behaviour of the bank and its individuals to suggest other motivations. No comparable study exists of a single company's involvement in the economic persecution of the Jews in Nazi Germany.

This unique volume offers a definitive new history of European economies at war from 1914 to 1918. It studies how European economies mobilised for war, how existing economic institutions stood up under the strain, how economic development influenced outcomes and how wartime experience influenced post-war economic growth. Leading international experts provide the first systematic comparison of economies at war between 1914 and 1918 based on the best available data for Britain, Germany, France, Russia, the USA, Italy, Turkey, Austria-Hungary and the Netherlands. The editors' overview draws some stark lessons about the role of economic development, the importance of markets and the damage done by nationalism and protectionism. A companion volume to the acclaimed The Economics of World War II, this is a major contribution to our understanding of total war.

"Go details through institutional analysis how major financial institutions (including banks and insurance companies), industries, and the U.S. government behaved and linked with each other during the Great Depression and Inter-War period. Drawing on data that has not been widely used since the late thirties - including congressional hearings, financial data, and government reports concerning economic concentration in the Depression Era - Go presents a general picture of American finance capital on the eve of World War Two. He details the emergence of important new financial-industrial powers in 1920's that challenged the Wall Street's established order on the eve of Great Depression, the response of the Wall Street's finance capital to the challenge, and its renewed dominance as well as the growing community of interests between finance and industry under the Depression. He also points out the role of Wall Street's finance capital in financing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) in 1932, the New Deal, and the emerging war economy. With its coverage of primary sources, this book will interest researchers and advanced undergraduate students taking American history, political science, and institutional economics"--

Occasional paper [no.] 20 : April 1944.