Although the United States plays a leading role in the development of technology, particularly that used by militaries around the world, the U.S. military nonetheless continues to find itself struggling against lower-tech foes that conduct warfare on a different scale. Emerging technology is indeed available and is regularly employed in American counterinsurgency efforts; however, since it is also constantly in flux, strategies for its use must continually evolve to ensure that available resources are put to best use against disparate enemies. Counterinsurgency operations are inherently political conflicts, and in The Role and Limitations of Technology in U.S. Counterinsurgency Warfare, Richard W. Rubright addresses the limits of constraints of technology in enhancing American military capability. Analyzing the confines and self-imposed restrictions on the use of technology as well as current military doctrine, he develops a new rubric for guiding the military in modern warfare. Drawing on textual analysis, personal interviews with international military professionals, and firsthand experience on the ground in Iraq, this book is the first to address the role of technology in counterinsurgency operations within operational, tactical, and strategic contexts.

This thesis addresses the possibility of a growing role of technology in US counterinsurgency operations. Counterinsurgency, like any other form of warfare, is dependent on the technical capabilities of the actors involved. However, asymmetry between host nation forces and insurgents is far more integral to counterinsurgency operations. As such the US military has the potential to leverage its technical superiority to lftter conduct counterinsurgency operation while applying sound strategy. The thesis shows that reliance on technology alone will not ensure success in military intervention; however, it will play a central theme in the United States' ability to use violence effectively as an element of strategy in dealing with organizations such as AI- Qaeda while protecting civilians. The US military is capable of flexibility and it possesses an ability to operate with strategic objectives in mind. The challenges for the United States in confronting non- state actors in a counterinsurgency effort will be grappled with on the battlefield, within the national media, and throughout the halls of power in Washington, D.C. This thesis identifies the technical trends by which policy makers may be able to better prepare for US counterinsurgency operations. Historical examples help to outline how technology will further the US military's capability to pursue policy objectives by means of military intervention. However, the thesis shows that the utility of technology will be limited by the ability of military officers and policy makers to appropriately tailor technical abilities to sound strategic practice. The conclusion of this thesis is that technology will provide many elements to support US military power and will provide invaluable capabilities for engaging and defeating insurgents, but must be combined with a strategic awareness to ensure political success. Specifically, an operationally offensive tactically defensive conventional concept can be applied to counterinsurgency warfare if the technical capabilities of the US military are appropriately directed.

This two-volume history of counterinsurgency covers all the major and many of the lesser known examples of this widespread and enduring form of conflict, addressing the various measures employed in the attempt to overcome the insurgency and examining the individuals and organizations responsible for everything from counterterrorism to infrastructure building. How and when should counterinsurgency be pursued as insurgency is growing in frequency and, conversely, while conventional warfare continues to decline as a means by which political rivals seek to impose their will upon each other? What lessons from the past should today's policymakers, strategists, military leaders, and soldiers in the field keep in mind while facing off against 21st-century insurgents? This two-volume set offers a comprehensive history of modern counterinsurgency, covering the key examples of this widespread and enduring form of conflict. It identifies the political, military, social, and economic measures employed in attempting to overcome insurgency, examining the work of the individuals and organizations involved, demonstrating how success and failure dictated change from established policy, and carefully analyzing the results. Readers will gain valuable insight from the detailed assessments of the history of counterinsurgency that demonstrate which strategies have succeeded and which have failed—and why. After an introductory essay on the subject, each chapter provides historical background to the insurgency being addressed before focusing on the specific policies pursued and actions taken by the counterinsurgency force. Each section also provides an assessment of those operations, including in most cases an analysis of lessons learned and, where appropriate, their relevance to counterinsurgency operations today. The set's coverage spans modern counterinsurgencies from Europe to Asia to Africa since 1900 and includes the ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan today. Its wide, international approach to the subject makes the set a prime resource for readers seeking specific information on a particular conflict or a better understanding of the general theories and practices of counterinsurgency.

How nonstate military strategies overturn traditional perspectives on warfare Since September 11th, 2001, armed nonstate actors have received increased attention and discussion from scholars, policymakers, and the military. Underlying debates about nonstate warfare and how it should be countered is one crucial assumption: that state and nonstate actors fight very differently. In Nonstate Warfare, Stephen Biddle upturns this distinction, arguing that there is actually nothing intrinsic separating state or nonstate military behavior. Through an in-depth look at nonstate military conduct, Biddle shows that many nonstate armies now fight more "conventionally" than many state armies, and that the internal politics of nonstate actors—their institutional maturity and wartime stakes rather than their material weapons or equipment—determines tactics and strategies. Biddle frames nonstate and state methods along a continuum, spanning Fabian-style irregular warfare to Napoleonic-style warfare involving massed armies, and he presents a systematic theory to explain any given nonstate actor’s position on this spectrum. Showing that most warfare for at least a century has kept to the blended middle of the spectrum, Biddle argues that material and tribal culture explanations for nonstate warfare methods do not adequately explain observed patterns of warmaking. Investigating a range of historical examples from Lebanon and Iraq to Somalia, Croatia, and the Vietcong, Biddle demonstrates that viewing state and nonstate warfighting as mutually exclusive can lead to errors in policy and scholarship. A comprehensive account of combat methods and military rationale, Nonstate Warfare offers a new understanding for wartime military behavior.

“It covers, chapter by chapter the anti-air battle in wars from Yom Kippur (1973) onwards . . . a readable, well researched and well-presented book.” —Army Rumour Service (ARRSE) Anti-aircraft artillery truly came into prominence during the Second World War, shooting down more aircraft than any other weapon and seriously affecting the conduct of air operations. Development continued into the Cold War, resulting in the extensive introduction of surface-to-air missiles, or SAMs. Though the first combat success of such weapons was during the Vietnam War, when a Soviet-designed S-75 Dvina missile shot down a USAF F-4C Phantom on 24 July 1965, it was the Yom Kippur War of 1973 which brought surface-to-air missiles to the center stage. During this short but bitter conflict, Egyptian and Syrian air defenses shot down nearly fifty Israeli aircraft in the first three days alone—almost a fourth of Israel’s entire combat aircraft fleet. In all, Israel lost 104 aircraft during the war and, for the first time, more aircraft were lost to SAMs than any other cause. The age of surface-to-air missiles had dawned. In this unique examination, the author details the development of not just surface-to-air missiles, but all anti-aircraft artillery, since 1972. The part that such equipment played in all of the major conflicts since then is explored, including the Soviet Afghan War, the Falklands War, in which Rapier was deployed, the conflict in Lebanon, Kosovo and Bosnia, the Gulf War, Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 1993. The investigation is brought right up to date by a study of the weapons, tactics and engagements seen in the conflicts in Syria and Yemen.

While the involvement of the United States in counterinsurgency has a long history, it had faded in importance in the years following the end of the Cold War. When American forces first confronted it in Iraq, they were not fully prepared. Since then, the U.S. military and other government agencies have expended much effort to refine their counterinsurgency capabilities. But have they done enough?

Militaries with state-of-the-art information technology sometimes bog down in confusing conflicts. To understand why, it is important to understand the micro-foundations of military power in the information age, and this is exactly what Jon R. Lindsay's Information Technology and Military Power gives us. As Lindsay shows, digital systems now mediate almost every effort to gather, store, display, analyze, and communicate information in military organizations. He highlights how personnel now struggle with their own information systems as much as with the enemy. Throughout this foray into networked technology in military operations, we see how information practice—the ways in which practitioners use technology in actual operations—shapes the effectiveness of military performance. The quality of information practice depends on the interaction between strategic problems and organizational solutions. Information Technology and Military Power explores information practice through a series of detailed historical cases and ethnographic studies of military organizations at war. Lindsay explains why the US military, despite all its technological advantages, has struggled for so long in unconventional conflicts against weaker adversaries. This same perspective suggests that the US retains important advantages against advanced competitors like China that are less prepared to cope with the complexity of information systems in wartime. Lindsay argues convincingly that a better understanding of how personnel actually use technology can inform the design of command and control, improve the net assessment of military power, and promote reforms to improve military performance. Warfighting problems and technical solutions keep on changing, but information practice is always stuck in between.