"The Road to War in Serbia is the first serious attempt by scholars from the former Yugoslavia to systematically explore the roots of the conflict and the ideology and propaganda that incited Serbian people to war. Based on years of research, the authors-all eminent scholars of their respective fields, who have lived through these social conflicts-highlight key issues which have date remained unknown or which have been previously neglected." "The issues dealt with include the institutional frameworks of ethnicity and nationalism; the input of the church, science, literature and sports; specific catalysts of the conflict, and the role of the political actors, students, the ruling party and the media." "The Road to War in Serbia will help to understand why and how the violent option of settling disputes and conflicts on the territory of Yugoslavia is being accepted."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved

The 1941 Axis invasion of Yugoslavia initially left the German occupiers with a pacified Serbian heartland willing to cooperate in return for relatively mild treatment. Soon, however, the outbreak of resistance shattered Serbia's seeming tranquility, turning the country into a battlefield and an area of bitter civil war. Deftly merging political and social history, Serbia under the Swastika looks at the interactions between Germany's occupation policies, the various forces of resistance and collaboration, and the civilian population. Alexander Prusin reveals a German occupying force at war with itself. Pragmatists intent on maintaining a sedate Serbia increasingly gave way to Nazified agencies obsessed with implementing the expansionist racial vision of the Third Reich. As Prusin shows, the increasing reliance on terror catalyzed conflict between the nationalist Chetniks, communist Partisans, and the collaborationist government. Prusin unwraps the winding system of expediency that at times led the factions to support one-another against the Germans--even as they fought a ferocious internecine civil war to determine the future of Yugoslavia.

After eleven weeks of bombing in the spring of 1999, the United States and NATO ultimately won the war in Kosovo. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, enabling an international military and political presence to take charge in the region. But was this war inevitable or was it the product of failed western diplomacy prior to the conflict? And once it became necessary to use force, did NATO adopt a sound strategy to achieve its aims of stabilizing Kosovo? In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, U.S. and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by forcing 1.5 million Albanians from their home and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them. In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win. The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O'Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case.

NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT--OVERSTOCK SALE -- Significantly reduced list price while supplies last The sudden disintegration of Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1995 led to a series of violent armed ethnic conflicts that resulted in the deaths of more than a quarter-million civilians and almost 1.5 million refugees. Although NATO forces were able to end these conflicts and bring stability to most of the region, a brief flare-up occurred in 1998-99 in the autonomous province of Kosovo, which was part of Serbia. After a sustained bombing campaign against the Serbian aggressors, the United States Army entered the troubled province and eventually enforced a tenuous peace between the Kosovars and Serbs. This brief study chronicles the origins of U.S. involvement and the peace enforcement operation that followed through 2005. Military leaders, peace negotiators, military science, AP high school global studies students, and international relations students may find this resource helpful for research papers. Historians, especially military historians and political scientists may also be interested in this work. Related products: Yugoslavia From "National Communism" to National Collapse: US Intelligence Community Estimative Products on Yugoslavia, 1948-1990 (Book and CD-ROM) is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/041-015-00252-0 Other products produced by the U.S. Army, Center of Military History can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/1061 "

The architect of the Dayton peace accords recounts the perilous diplomatic negotiations that finally brought peace to Bosnia.