Against the backdrop of the new globalized hate speech dynamics, the nature and scope of States' obligations pursuant to international human rights law on prohibiting incitement to hatred have taken on increased importance and have become a controversial issue within multilateral human rights diplomacy. Key questions being posed in the on-going debates over how best to respond to the new wave of hatred include whether the international legal norm against incitement to hatred, as it currently stands, is suitable to address the contemporary challenges of this phenomenon. Alternatively, does it need to be developed further? This book traces the journey of this norm in three analytical domains; its emergence, relevant supranational jurisprudence, and the recent standard-setting attempts within the UN. The book argues that five internal features of the norm had a strong influence on its difficult path within international human rights law.

Provides an explanatory framework for the challenges facing the development of the international norm prohibiting hate speech.

This book conceptualizes the 'prohibition of advocacy of religious hatred' from the perspectives of international and comparative law.

The contributors to this volume consider whether it is possible to establish carefully tailored hate speech policies that are cognizant of the varying traditions, histories and values of different countries. Throughout, there is a strong comparative emphasis, with examples (and authors) drawn from around the world. All the authors explore whether or when different cultural and historical settings justify different substantive rules given that such cultural relativism can be used to justify content-based restrictions and so endanger freedom of expression. Essays address the following questions, among others: is hate speech in fact so dangerous or harmful to vulnerable minorities or communities as to justify a lower standard of constitutional protection? What harms and benefits accrue from laws that criminalize hate speech in particular contexts? Are there circumstances in which everyone would agree that hate speech should be criminally punished? What lessons can be learned from international case law?

Against the backdrop of the new globalized hate speech dynamics, the nature and scope of States' obligations pursuant to international human rights law on prohibiting incitement to hatred have taken on increased importance and have become a controversial issue within multilateral human rights diplomacy. Key questions being posed in the on-going debates over how best to respond to the new wave of hatred include whether the international legal norm against incitement to hatred, as it currently stands, is suitable to address the contemporary challenges of this phenomenon. Alternatively, does it need to be developed further? This book traces the journey of this norm in three analytical domains; its emergence, relevant supranational jurisprudence, and the recent standard-setting attempts within the UN. The book argues that five internal features of the norm had a strong influence on its difficult path within international human rights law.

In authoritarian states, the discourse on freedom of speech, conducted by those opposed to non-democratic governments, focuses on the core aspects of this freedom: on a right to criticize the government, a right to advocate theories arid ideologies contrary to government-imposed orthodoxy, a right to demand institutional reforms, changes in politics, resignation of the incompetent and the corrupt from positions of authority. The claims for freedom of speech focus on those exercises of freedom that are most fundamental and most beneficial to citizens - and which are denied to them by the government. But in a by-and large democratic polity, where these fundamental benefits of freedom of speech are generally enjoyed by the citizens, the public and scholarly discourse on freedom of speech hovers about the peripheries of that freedom; the focus is on its outer boundaries rather than at the central territory of freedom of speech. Those borderline cases, in which people who are otherwise genuinely committed to the core aspects of freedom of speech may sincerely disagree, include pornography, racist hate speech and religious bigoted expressions, defamation of politicians and of private persons, contempt of court, incitement to violence, disclosure of military or commercial secrets, advertising of merchandise such as alcohol or cigarettes or of services and entertainment such as gambling and prostitution.

Hate speech law can be found throughout the world. But it is also the subject of numerous principled arguments, both for and against. These principles invoke a host of morally relevant features (e.g., liberty, health, autonomy, security, non-subordination, the absence of oppression, human dignity, the discovery of truth, the acquisition of knowledge, self-realization, human excellence, civic dignity, cultural diversity and choice, recognition of cultural identity, intercultural dialogue, participation in democratic self-government, being subject only to legitimate rule) and practical considerations (e.g., efficacy, the least restrictive alternative, chilling effects). The book develops and then critically examines these various principled arguments. It also attempts to de-homogenize hate speech law into different clusters of laws/regulations/codes that constrain uses of hate speech, so as to facilitate a more nuanced examination of the principled arguments. Finally, it argues that it is morally fitting for judicial and legislative judgments about the overall warrant of hate speech law to reflect principled compromise. Principled compromise is characterized not merely by compromise over matters of principled concern but also by compromise which is itself governed by ideals of moral duty or civic virtue (e.g., reciprocity, equality, and mutual respect). The Open Access version of this book, available at https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315714899, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.