This essay aims to frame issues, develop oppositions, and provide insights for the Chairman, the services, and the next administrations in three areas: defense strategy, criteria for sizing conventional forces, and force structure for 2005-2010.

This essay is a product of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001 Working Group, a project of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Sponsored by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the working group is an independent, honest-broker effort intended to build intellectual capital for the upcoming QDR. More specifically, it aims to frame issues, develop options, and provide insights for the Chairman, the services, and the next administration in three areas: defense strategy, criteria for sizing conventional forces, and force structure for 2005-2010. One of the group's initial tasks was to assess the future security environment to the year 2025. This was pursued by surveying the available literature to identify areas of consensus and debate and by deepening knowledge of asymmetric threats to the United States both at home and abroad, given their potential appeal to likely adversaries in view of America's conventional military superiority. The essay that follows grew out of that latter effort and reflects a growing consensus that the issues posed by asymmetric threats should occupy a more prominent place in defense strategy and force planning. This essay makes a unique contribution to the growing literature on asymmetric threats by providing a conceptual framework for thinking about such threats, offering an approach to determining which threats should receive the greatest attention from defense planners, and suggesting concrete steps that the Nation should take to address them.

How can countries decide what kind of military forces they need, if threats are uncertain and history is full of strategic surprises? This is a question that is more pertinent than ever, as countries across the Asia-Pacific are faced with the military and economic rise of China. Uncertainty is inherent in defence planning, but different types of uncertainty mean that countries need to approach decisions about military force structure in different ways. This book examines four different basic frameworks for defence planning, and demonstrates how states can make decisions coherently about the structure and posture of their defence forces despite strategic uncertainty. It draws on case studies from the United States, Australian and New Zealand, each of which developed key concepts for their particular circumstances and risk perception in Asia. Success as well as failure in developing coherent defence planning frameworks holds lessons for the United States and other countries as they consider how best to structure their military forces for the uncertain challenges of the future.

In December 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced the Counterproliferation Initiative, a response to President Clinton's assertion that if we do not stem the proliferation of the world's deadliest weapons, no democracy can feel secure. This timely book brings together contributions from a wide range of experts to help readers understand how far the nation has come since then—and what still needs to happen. Insightful essays examine: arms control treaty programs; export control regimes; interdiction; diplomatic/economic/political persuasion and sanctions; deterrence; counterforce; active and passive defense; and consequence management. Many positive changes have occurred since 1993. Regime changes in Iraq and South Africa have removed some WMD proliferation threats. Saddam Hussein has been overthrown, and a new Iraq is beginning to emerge. South Africa's clandestine WMD program has apparently ended. Libya announced it has given up its efforts to have active WMD programs. The Taliban and al Qaeda have been routed in Afghanistan, probably delaying efforts to develop or buy WMD. Yet, states continue to develop and export WMD and/or their delivery systems. As many as 30 states are still believed to have either a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons program. Some have all three. India and Pakistan have acknowledged programs. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the scientist who directed the Pakistani A-bomb program, has admitted selling nuclear weapons designs, and nuclear enrichment equipment to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. His colleagues have held discussions with al Qaeda representatives. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, number two in the al Qaeda chain of command, claims that the terrorist organization has several suitcase A-bombs from the Former Soviet Union. It appears clear to many that Iran has a desire to develop nuclear weapons. Syria still has a chemical weapons program. North Korea's WMD profile has escalated. As Avoiding the Abyss so convincingly demonstrates, much has been accomplished since the Counterproliferation Initiative was launched-but much work still lies ahead. It is an important story for every American.