The old saw, "Gennany is the heart of Europe, Saxony the heart of Germany," Treitschke derided as that "favorite, self congratulatory phrase" parroted by reactionary Saxons. His ridicule is understandable. He was born a Saxon, yet adored Prussia, which forced his native kingdom into the Kaiserreich. Historians of this century, also loyal in a sense to the German Empire, have dismissed internal affairs of the federal states as parochial. Thus Saxony, though wracked by political agitation more severe than in any other German state during the last two decades of the Wilhelmian era, has been generally looked upon as peripheral to the great national issues of the day. Solid as Treitschke's grounds may in his time have been for scoffing at the anachronism of Saxon particularism, recent history has shown that Saxony was after all the heart of Gennany in more than the geographic sense. It was by far the most Lutheran region of Gennany and was often called the "model land" of Liberalism, a way of life not to be confused with liberal democracy in the M usterliindle, Baden, or in the Kingdom of Wiirttemberg. In Land Sachsen the small independent entre preneur did not vanish from the scene during the industrial boom of 1871-g0 as he did in Rhineland-Westphalia.

The old saw, "Gennany is the heart of Europe, Saxony the heart of Germany," Treitschke derided as that "favorite, self congratulatory phrase" parroted by reactionary Saxons. His ridicule is understandable. He was born a Saxon, yet adored Prussia, which forced his native kingdom into the Kaiserreich. Historians of this century, also loyal in a sense to the German Empire, have dismissed internal affairs of the federal states as parochial. Thus Saxony, though wracked by political agitation more severe than in any other German state during the last two decades of the Wilhelmian era, has been generally looked upon as peripheral to the great national issues of the day. Solid as Treitschke's grounds may in his time have been for scoffing at the anachronism of Saxon particularism, recent history has shown that Saxony was after all the heart of Gennany in more than the geographic sense. It was by far the most Lutheran region of Gennany and was often called the "model land" of Liberalism, a way of life not to be confused with liberal democracy in the M usterliindle, Baden, or in the Kingdom of Wiirttemberg. In Land Sachsen the small independent entre preneur did not vanish from the scene during the industrial boom of 1871-g0 as he did in Rhineland-Westphalia.

'Red Saxony' reappraises Germany's prospects for democratic governance from the mid-19th century to the collapse of the Second Reich, asking: how was Germany governed in the era of Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II? How did fear of revolution push liberal and conservative parties together? How did Germany's leaders see their nation's future?

Red Saxony throws new light on the reciprocal relationship between political modernization and authoritarianism in Germany over the span of six decades. Election battles were fought so fiercely in Imperial Germany because they reflected two kinds of democratization. Social democratization could not be stopped, but political democratization was opposed by many members of the German bourgeoisie. Frightened by the electoral success of the Social Democrats after 1871, anti-democrats deployed many strategies that flew in the face of electoral fairness. They battled socialists, liberals, and Jews at election time, but they also strove to rewrite the electoral rules of the game. Using a regional lens to rethink older assumptions about Germany's changing political culture, this volume focuses as much on contemporary Germans' perceptions of electoral fairness as on their experiences of voting. It devotes special attention to various semi-democratic voting systems whereby a general and equal suffrage (for the Reichstag) was combined with limited and unequal ones for local and regional parliaments. For the first time, democratization at all three tiers of governance and their reciprocal effects are considered together. Although the bourgeois face of German authoritarianism was nowhere more evident than in the Kingdom of Saxony, Red Saxony illustrates how other Germans grew to fear the spectre of democracy. Certainly twists and turns lay ahead, yet that fear made it easier for Hitler and the Nazis to win elections in the 1920s and to entomb German democracy in 1933.

Herrigel challenges the Chandlerian, Gerschenkronian, and Schumpetarian approaches to Germany's economic history.