Why did election monitoring become an international norm? Why do pseudo-democrats—undemocratic leaders who present themselves as democratic—invite international observers, even when they are likely to be caught manipulating elections? Is election observation an effective tool of democracy promotion, or is it simply a way to legitimize electoral autocracies? In The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma, Susan D. Hyde explains international election monitoring with a new theory of international norm formation. Hyde argues that election observation was initiated by states seeking international support. International benefits tied to democracy give some governments an incentive to signal their commitment to democratization without having to give up power. Invitations to nonpartisan foreigners to monitor elections, and avoiding their criticism, became a widely recognized and imitated signal of a government's purported commitment to democratic elections.Hyde draws on cross-national data on the global spread of election observation between 1960 and 2006, detailed descriptions of the characteristics of countries that do and do not invite observers, and evidence of three ways that election monitoring is costly to pseudo-democrats: micro-level experimental tests from elections in Armenia and Indonesia showing that observers can deter election-day fraud and otherwise improve the quality of elections; illustrative cases demonstrating that international benefits are contingent on democracy in countries like Haiti, Peru, Togo, and Zimbabwe; and qualitative evidence documenting the escalating game of strategic manipulation among pseudo-democrats, international monitors, and pro-democracy forces.

The key to the impact of international election support is credibility; credible elections are less likely to turn violent. So argues Inken von Borzyskowski in The Credibility Challenge, in which she provides an explanation of why and when election support can increase or reduce violence. Von Borzyskowski answers four major questions: Under what circumstances can election support influence election violence? How can election support shape the incentives of domestic actors to engage in or abstain from violence? Does support help reduce violence or increase it? And, which type of support—observation or technical assistance—is better in each instance? The Credibility Challenge pulls broad quantitative evidence and qualitative observations from Guyana, Liberia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Bangladesh to respond to these questions. Von Borzyskowski finds that international democracy aid matters for election credibility and violence; outside observers can exacerbate postelection violence if they cast doubt on election credibility; and technical assistance helps build electoral institutions, improves election credibility, and reduces violence. Her results advance research and policy on peacebuilding and democracy promotion in new and surprising ways.

In The Democratic Soul, Aaron L. Herold argues that liberal democracy's current crisis—of extreme polarization, rising populism, and disillusionment with political institutions—must be understood as the culmination of a deeper dissatisfaction with the liberal Enlightenment. Major elements of both the Left and the Right now reject the Enlightenment's emphasis on rights as theoretically unfounded and morally undesirable and have sought to recover a contrasting politics of obligation. But this has re-opened questions about the relationship between politics and religion long thought settled. To address our situation, Herold examines the political thought of Spinoza and Tocqueville, two authors united in support of liberal democracy but with differing assessments of the Enlightenment. Through an original reading of Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise, Herold uncovers the theological foundation of liberal democracy: a comprehensive moral teaching rehabilitating human self-interest, denigrating "devotion" as a relic of "superstition," and cultivating a pride in living, acting, and thinking for oneself. In his political vision, Spinoza articulates our highest hopes for liberalism, for he is confident such an outlook will produce both intellectual flourishing and a paradoxical recovery of community. But Spinoza's project contains tensions which continue to trouble democracy today. As Herold shows via a new interpretation of Tocqueville's Democracy in America, the dissatisfactions now destabilizing democracy can be traced to the Enlightenment's failure to find a place for religious longings whose existence it largely denied. In particular, Tocqueville described a natural human desire for a kind of happiness found, at least partly, in self-sacrifice. Because modernity weakens religion precisely as it makes democracy stronger than liberalism, it permits this desire to find new and dangerous outlets. Tocqueville thus sought to design a "new political science" which could rectify this problem and which therefore remains indispensable today in recovering the moderation lacking in contemporary politics.

here ofexchange, and borrowing in debates between these disciplines, all the more so, as we shall see a little further on, as the analysis of the Central and East European transformations has also contributed to introduce into political science and sociology theoretical systematizations first formulated in economics. In addition to this opening up to the objects and theories of economics, the pseudo-"dilemma" ofsimultaneity produced, by a kind of feedback, another series of effects on transitology and the related research domains. Contrary to most expectations and predictions in the wake ofthe 1989 upheavals - affirmations that the "dilemmas", "problems" or "challenges" of the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe ought to have been dealt with and resolved one after the other in sequence, in the manner of the more or less idealized trajectories of Great Britain or Spain (trajectories significantly enough promoted, far beyond the circles of scholars, as a "model" of transition), and above all, contrary to the assumption that superposing a radical economic transformation upon a transition to democracy would make the whole edifice thoroughly unworkable, unstable or dangerous - it must be stated clearly out that the two processes, in their "simultaneity", are not necessarily incompatible. This is one of the main findings stressed upon in several chapters of this book.

Non Aboriginal material, excerpt from his book An American dilemma, (1944); 1964; 75-80.

Based on a detailed study of 35 cases in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and post-communist Eurasia, this book explores the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes between 1990 and 2008. It finds that where social, economic, and technocratic ties to the West were extensive, as in Eastern Europe and the Americas, the external cost of abuse led incumbents to cede power rather than crack down, which led to democratization. Where ties to the West were limited, external democratizing pressure was weaker and countries rarely democratized. In these cases, regime outcomes hinged on the character of state and ruling party organizations. Where incumbents possessed developed and cohesive coercive party structures, they could thwart opposition challenges, and competitive authoritarian regimes survived; where incumbents lacked such organizational tools, regimes were unstable but rarely democratized.

What would happen if we could stroll through the revolutionary history of the 20th century and, without any fear of the possible responses, ask the main protagonists - from Lenin to Che Guevara, from Alexandra Kollontai to Ulrike Meinhof - seemingly naïve questions about love? Although all important political and social changes of the 20th century included heated debates on the role of love, it seems that in the 21st century of new technologies of the self (Grindr, Tinder, online dating, etc.) we are faced with a hyperinflation of sex, not love. By going back to the sexual revolution of the October Revolution and its subsequent repression, to Che's dilemma between love and revolutionary commitment and to the period of '68 (from communes to terrorism) and its commodification in late capitalism, the Croatian philosopher Srecko Horvat gives a possible answer to the question of why it is that the most radical revolutionaries like Lenin or Che were scared of the radicality of love. What is so radical about a seemingly conservative notion of love and why is it anything but conservative? This short book is a modest contribution to the current upheavals around the world - from Tahrir to Taksim, from Occupy Wall Street to Hong Kong, from Athens to Sarajevo - in which the question of love is curiously, surprisingly, absent.