Comparative Corporate Governance considers the effects of globalization on corporate governance issues and highlights how, despite these widespread consequences, predictions of legal convergence have not come true. By adopting a comparative legal approach, this book explores the disparity between convergence attempts and the persistence of local models of governance in the US, Europe and Asia.

The most comprehensive and interdisciplinary anthology of corporate law material available, this reader reflects the enormous changes that have occurred in business organization and legal scholarship since the hostile takeover was introduced in the 1980s. The second edition has both completely revised and expanded the material covered in the first edition. New and revised topics include capital markets, agency theory, behavioral economics, state competition for corporate charters, boards of directors, shareholder voting rights, executive compensation, activist investors, takeovers, securities regulation and comparative corporate governance.

This is the long-awaited second edition of this highly regarded comparative overview of corporate law. This edition has been comprehensively updated to reflect profound changes in corporate law. It now includes consideration of additional matters such as the highly topical issue of enforcement in corporate law, and explores the continued convergence of corporate law across jurisdictions. The authors start from the premise that corporate (or company) law across jurisdictions addresses the same three basic agency problems: (1) the opportunism of managers vis-à-vis shareholders; (2) the opportunism of controlling shareholders vis-à-vis minority shareholders; and (3) the opportunism of shareholders as a class vis-à-vis other corporate constituencies, such as corporate creditors and employees. Every jurisdiction must address these problems in a variety of contexts, framed by the corporation's internal dynamics and its interactions with the product, labor, capital, and takeover markets. The authors' central claim, however, is that corporate (or company) forms are fundamentally similar and that, to a surprising degree, jurisdictions pick from among the same handful of legal strategies to address the three basic agency issues. This book explains in detail how (and why) the principal European jurisdictions, Japan, and the United States sometimes select identical legal strategies to address a given corporate law problem, and sometimes make divergent choices. After an introductory discussion of agency issues and legal strategies, the book addresses the basic governance structure of the corporation, including the powers of the board of directors and the shareholders meeting. It proceeds to creditor protection measures, related-party transactions, and fundamental corporate actions such as mergers and charter amendments. Finally, it concludes with an examination of friendly acquisitions, hostile takeovers, and the regulation of the capital markets.

This book advances a real entity theory of company law, in which the company is a legal entity which acts autonomously in law, and company law establishes procedures facilitating autonomous organisational decision-making. The theory builds on the insight that organisations or firms are a social phenomenon outside of the law and that these are autonomous actors in their own right. They are more than the sum of the contributions of their participants and they act independently of the views and interests of their participants. This occurs because human beings change their behaviour when they act as members of a group or an organisation; in a group we tend to develop and conform to a shared standard, and when we act in organisations habits, routines, processes, and procedures form and a culture emerges. These take on a life of their own affecting the behaviour of the participants. Participants can affect organisational behaviour but this takes time and effort. Company law finds this phenomenon and supplies it with a structure supporting autonomous action by organisations. The real entity theory advanced in this book explains company law as it stands at a positive level. Legal personality overcomes the problems that organisations are social rather than brute facts and that there is no unique physical manifestation permanently associated with an organisation. The corporate constitution is not a contract - it is best characterised as an instrument adopted on a statutory basis through private action. Shareholders cannot limit the capacity of companies or the authority of the board to bind the company in contract and companies are liable in tort and crime. The statute creates roles for shareholders, directors, a company secretary, and auditors and so facilitates a process leading to organisational action. The law also integrates the interests of creditors and stakeholders.

Corporate law and corporate governance have been at the forefront of regulatory activities across the world for several decades now, and are subject to increasing public attention following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance provides the global framework necessary to understand the aims and methods of legal research in this field. Written by leading scholars from around the world, the Handbook contains a rich variety of chapters that provide a comparative and functional overview of corporate governance. It opens with the central theoretical approaches and methodologies in corporate law scholarship in Part I, before examining core substantive topics in corporate law, including shareholder rights, takeovers and restructuring, and minority rights in Part II. Part III focuses on new challenges in the field, including conflicts between Western and Asian corporate governance environments, the rise of foreign ownership, and emerging markets. Enforcement issues are covered in Part IV, and Part V takes a broader approach, examining those areas of law and finance that are interwoven with corporate governance, including insolvency, taxation, and securities law as well as financial regulation. The Handbook is a comprehensive, interdisciplinary resource placing corporate law and governance in its wider context, and is essential reading for scholars, practitioners, and policymakers in the field.