It would be a bulky and intricate volume indeed that treated adequately of the problem of two truths in Buddhism and Vedanta: the present volume is slim and unpretentious. Not the less incisive, for that, it is hoped, but certainly neither systematic nor complete, and this in several senses. Not all schools of Buddhism are dealt with: Theravada, Indian Y ogacara, and the Logicians are missing among the Indian schools and there is no refer ence to Chinese and Japanese Buddhism. The Vedanta discussed is only Advaita (non-dualist), and that virtually limited to Sankara. Nor does the volume as a whole take up the problem of two truths thematically, though each paper raises the philosophical questions its author.thinks appropriate. The title 'The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedanta' prom ises more than the book itself contains. The reason for this is given in the prefatory 'Note': each chapter is a paper read and discussed at a working conference. All the papers from the conference are here published, and no others. The book has thus the contours dictated by the availability of scholars at the time of the conference.

The important Buddhist doctrine of the two truths—conventional truths and ultimate truths—is the subject of this book. It examines how the doctrine evolved within early Buddhism from efforts to make sense of contradictions within the collected sayings of the Buddha. The two truths, however, came to refer not primarily to statements or language, but to the realities to which statements or language referred. As such, the doctrine of the two truths became one through which Buddhist philosophers focused their efforts to elaborate an abhidharma, a higher teaching which allowed them to explain how the mind apprehends and misapprehends the world, how it attaches itself to objects that do not exist in and of themselves, thereby creating suffering. In effect, the doctrine then evolved into a distinction between different sorts of objects rather than a distinction between different sorts of statements. The doctrine of the truths understood in this way played a key role in the articulation of the Mahayana by its followers in distinguishing it from what they called Hinayana, especially in defining the central ideas of selflessness and emptiness. Unlike prior books on this topic which concentrate on the doctrine within the context of the Mahayana, Buescher's examines it within the context of the Hinayana. Tibetan Buddhist syntheses of Buddhist doctrine provide a fascinating perspective from which to compare the positions of the major Indian schools. Such works, however, often lack the historical perspective from which to discern the development of these positions.

When someone seeks to understand Buddhism, where should that person start? With the meaning of taking refuge in the three jewels? With the four noble truths? The Dalai Lama, when asked this question, suggested that for many in the West today, understanding the two truths—conventional truth and ultimate truth—is the best place to start. When the Buddha awoke from the dream we still dream, he saw the ultimate reality of things just as they are. There are shifting appearances and conventions, the manners and traditions of the vast and diverse world; and then there is the mystery of the sheer reality of things. And yet we cannot find this reality anywhere else but right here. Each system of Buddhist philosophy has its own way of explaining exactly what these two truths are and how they relate to one another. In exploring these systems, we are looking over the shoulders of Buddhist thinkers as they grapple with a basic question: 'What is real?' This is not an idle intellectual exercise but a matter which cuts to the heart of our practice in life.

A Namgyal Monastery Institute Textbook & Studies in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism Series The persistent problem of Buddhist philosophy has been to find the middle way—an ontology sturdy enough to support a coherent ethical system that does not betray Buddha's original vision of no-self or emptiness (sunyata). Buddhist perspectives on ethics and emptiness center on the distinction between two truths—the conventional and the ultimate. Newland's work lays out the Madhyamika philosophy of two truths as seen through the eyes of Tibetan scholar-yogis of the Gelugpa order. Linking the classical Buddhist philosophy of Nagarjuna with the living tradition of monastic courtyard debate, the authors explain the two truths without resort to mysterious trans-rational paradoxes. Newland exposes their extraordinary efforts to clear away the sense of contradiction between emptiness and conventional reality and thus to build a Madhyamika system that is both ethically salutary and rationally coherent.