This is a book about strategy and war fighting. It contains 11 essays which examine topics such as military operations against a well-armed rogue state, the potential of parallel warfare strategy for different kinds of states, the revolutionary potential of information warfare, the lethal possibilities of biological warfare and the elements of an ongoing revolution in military affairs. The purpose of the book is to focus attention on the operational problems, enemy strategies and threat that will confront U.S. national security decision makers in the twenty-first century.

Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.

This important new book deals with the changing nature of war in the post-Cold War era and the emergence of new forms of warfare in which warlords, mercenaries and terrorists play an increasingly important role. In the modern era, warfare came to play a crucial role in the formation of states, whereas the new wars emerging at the beginning of the 21st century have mostly gone together with the failure or collapse of states. The author draws out the key shifts involved in this process: from symmetrical conflicts between states to asymmetrical global relationships of force; from national armies to increasingly private or commercial bands of warlords, child soldiers and mercenaries; from pitched battles to protracted conflicts in which there is often little fighting and most of the violence is directed against civilians. Changes in weapons technology have combined with complex economic factors to make the prospect of endlessly simmering wars a real danger in the years to come. Against this background, the author outlines the rise of a novel form of international terrorism, conceived more as a political method of communication than as an element in a military strategy. The resulting challenges faced by Western governments, and the costs and benefits associated with any response, are taken up in a concluding section that contrasts the characteristic European and American approaches and examines the implications for the future of international law. This book will be of important to students of political science, international relations, war and peace studies, conflict studies and peace studies. It will also appeal to the general reader with an interest in this topical subject.

The primary thrust of the monograph is to explain the linkage of contemporary criminal street gangs (that is, the gang phenomenon or third generation gangs) to insurgency in terms f the instability it wreaks upon government and the concomitant challenge to state sovereignty. Although there are differences between gangs and insurgents regarding motives and modes of operations, this linkage infers that gang phenomena are mutated forms of urban insurgency. In these terms, these "new" nonstate actors must eventually seize political power in order to guarantee the freedom of action and the commercial environment they want. The common denominator that clearly links the gang phenomenon to insurgency is that the third generation gangs' and insurgents' ultimate objective is to depose or control the governments of targeted countries. As a consequence, the "Duck Analogy" applies. Third generation gangs look like ducks, walk like ducks, and act like ducks - a peculiar breed, but ducks nevertheless! This monograph concludes with recommendations for the United States and other countries to focus security and assistance responses at the strategic level. The intent is to help leaders achieve strategic clarity and operate more effectively in the complex politically dominated, contemporary global security arena.

Throughout history, military practitioners, philosophers, and historians have struggled to comprehend the complexities of warfare.1 Most of these efforts produced long, complicated treatises that did not lend themselves to rapid or easy understanding.2 This, in turn, spurred efforts to condense the "lessons" of war into a short list of aphorisms that practitioners of the military art could use to guide the conduct of warfare.3 The culmination of these labors, from the perspective of the U.S. Armed Forces, may be found in what are called the principles of war.4 (See Appendix A.) Currently contained in Joint and Service doctrines, "the principles of war guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of US military doctrine."5 But, how solid is that foundation? While the principles have been thoroughly scrutinized at the tactical and operational levels of warfare, the study of their applicability at the strategic level has been less exhaustive.6 Moreover, the principles of war were derived predominantly from the study of Napoleonic and Industrial Age warfare.7 Whether or how these principles apply at the strategic level of war under the conditions of rapid technological change that many are calling the "Information Age" and its military offspring, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), is an open-ended question.8 Because war at the strategic level is an intellectual process9 and the development and implementation of strategy is a creative activity, some form of intellectual framework is required to shape the strategist's thought processes. The principles of war provide such a structure. At the same time, because theory and creativity have limits, they offer a guide to understanding those restrictions. A good strategist-possessed of a comprehensive understanding of the principles-will be able, therefore, to expand creatively upon them, and will also be able to determine if one or more of them can or must be disregarded.10 Finally, a thorough grasp of the intent behind each principle 2 allows the crafting of strategies that reflect the best possible balance among the principles for a particular strategic challenge.11 Once thoroughly understood, the principles of war also may be used as a decisionmaking aid during formulation, planning, and execution of strategy. They can be used to assess current strategic plans, or as an analytic tool to shape new strategies and plans as they are developed. Further, they can be used to examine past strategic activities to derive insights from success or failure, and to extract the pertinent "lessons" that can be applied to future endeavors. It is, of course, always easier to use the principles in retrospect to critique plans and activities than to incorporate them when creating strategies--but those who can do the latter will be hailed as geniuses by future historians. In fact, the principles of war are important exactly because, short of war, it is difficult to identify potential "Napoleons" in our midst. A proper focus on the linkages and tensions among the principles can avoid the stultifying, dogmatic, pro forma use of "checklists" which inevitably creates vulnerabilities to be exploited by a more imaginative opponent. At the same time, innovative application of the principles in simulations and war games can provide a useful education for future generals and strategists, who may be called upon to practice their craft with little or no notice. They are aids, too, in the life-long development of patterns of thought found in the true strategist.