The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that all contingent facts must have explanation. In this 2006 volume, which was the first on the topic in the English language in nearly half a century, Alexander Pruss examines the substantive philosophical issues raised by the Principle Reason. Discussing various forms of the PSR and selected historical episodes, from Parmenides, Leibnez, and Hume, Pruss defends the claim that every true contingent proposition must have an explanation against major objections, including Hume's imaginability argument and Peter van Inwagen's argument that the PSR entails modal fatalism. Pruss also provides a number of positive arguments for the PSR, based on considerations as different as the metaphysics of existence, counterfactuals and modality, negative explanations, and the everyday applicability of the PSR. Moreover, Pruss shows how the PSR would advance the discussion in a number of disparate fields, including meta-ethics and the philosophy of mathematics.

Kant once famously declared in the Prolegomena that "it was the objection of David Hume that first, many years ago, interrupted my dogmatic slumber." Abraham Anderson here offers an interpretation of this utterance, arguing that Hume roused Kant not (as has often been thought) by challenging the principle that "every event has a cause" which governs experience, but rather by attacking the principle of sufficient reason, the basis of both rationalist metaphysics and the cosmological proof of the existence of God. This suggestion, Anderson proposes, allows us to reconcile Kant's declaration with his later assertion that it was the Antinomy of pure reason - the clash of opposing theses - that first woke him from dogmatic slumber. For the Antinomy suspends the dogmatic principle of sufficient reason; in doing so, Anderson proposes, it is extending Hume's attack on that principle. This reading of Kant also explains why Kant speaks of "the objection of David Hume" after mentioning Hume's attack on metaphysics. The "objection" that Kant has in mind, Anderson argues, is a challenge to metaphysics, rather than to the foundations of empirical knowledge. Consequently, Anderson's analysis issues a new view of Hume himself-as primarily interested, not in the foundations of experience, but in the problem of metaphysics and theology. It thereby positions Kant and Hume as champions of the Enlightenment in its struggle with superstition. Shedding new light on the connection between two of the most influential figures in the history of philosophy, this volume will appeal not only to scholars of Kant, Hume, and early modern philosophy, but to philosophers and students interested in the history of philosophy and metaphysics generally.

The Principle of Reason, the text of an important and influential lecture course that Martin Heidegger gave in 1955–56, takes as its focal point Leibniz's principle: nothing is without reason. Heidegger shows here that the principle of reason is in fact a principle of being. Much of his discussion is aimed at bringing his readers to the "leap of thinking," which enables them to grasp the principle of reason as a principle of being. This text presents Heidegger's most extensive reflection on the notion of history and its essence, the Geschick of being, which is considered on of the most important developments in Heidegger's later thought. One of Heidegger's most artfully composed texts, it also contains important discussions of language, translation, reason, objectivity, and technology as well as remarkable readings of Leibniz, Kant, Aristotle, and Goethe, among others.

This groundbreaking volume investigates the most fundamental question of all: Why is there something rather than nothing? The question is explored from diverse and radical perspectives: religious, naturalistic, platonistic and skeptical. Does science answer the question? Or does theology? Does everything need an explanation? Or can there be brute, inexplicable facts? Could there have been nothing whatsoever? Or is there any being that could not have failed to exist? Is the question meaningful after all? The volume advances cutting-edge debates in metaphysics, philosophy of cosmology and philosophy of religion, and will intrigue and challenge readers interested in any of these subjects.

Common sense tells us all that things just do not pop into existence out of nothing. It takes work and effort to make things happen. Buildings are made by builders, diseases are the result of germs, headaches come from sinus pressure, plane crashes occur when there is some major malfunction, bumps occur in the middle of the night because of the wind blowing a shutter, an alley cat knocking over a trash can, or a burglar attempting a break-in.In other words, all of these assumptions about the world proceed on a principle. But what exactly is this principle? In our unreflective, intuitional, everyday speech, it goes something like "Things do not just happen 'out of the blue,' something has to make them happen!" In ancient and medieval times, the principle about which we are concerned was sometimes implicit, and other times explicit, albeit with various formulations, such as; "Nothing gives what it does not have," "There cannot be more in the effect than what was contained in the cause," "Whatever begins to exist must have a cause," or more frequently, ex nihilo nihil fit - "Out of nothing, nothing comes."In this work, I will propose that the principle of sufficient reason is the grand formulation of these intuitions and scholastic dictums, and thus is the principle that lies behind all of our casual inferences. Leibniz explicitly coined this term, yet he claimed not to discover any new principle, rather only to encapsulate all the implicit formulations used in the history of philosophy. The principle of sufficient reason is commonly formulated as such: "Every being has the sufficient reason for its existence (i.e., the adequate ground or basis in existence) either in itself or in another." Stated negatively, "Out of nothing, nothing comes" (being neither comes from nor can be determined by sheer nothing). The principle of sufficient reason, then, is simply an attempt to conveniently summarize, in one basic formula, the common intuitions of everyday life and what other great philosophers have either presupposed or loosely articulated in these more specialized formulas of the "principle of causality."Leibniz once said that without the principle of sufficient reason, very little in philosophy and science could be demonstrated. In a similar vein, the contemporary Thomistic philosopher, Norris Clarke, has called the principle of sufficient reason the dynamic principle of metaphysics, since it is in virtue of this very principle that enables the mind to pass from one being to another in order to make sense out of it: "All advance in thought to infer the existence of some new being from what we already know depends upon this principle."Using primarily, but not exclusively, the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, the purpose of this book is to argue that there are good reasons for thinking that the principle of sufficient reason is true.

"Schopenhauer's analyses of causation and related concepts . . . rival and probably surpass in their depth and brilliance the more celebrated discussions of David Hume. Where Hume grossly oversimplified these problems and left them riddled with paradoxes, Schopenhauer disentangled them and shed light on what had seemed hopelessly dark." --Richard Taylor, University of Rochester