According to the principle of destruction the best way to achieve victory in war is to disarm the enemy by destroying his forces in battle. However, irregular warfare is commonly assumed to operate through processes that make the principle of destruction irrelevant. An analysis of the writings and military experiences of T.E. Lawrence, Mao Tse-tung and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, three of the 20th century's most influential theorists of irregular war, supports the argument that the principle of destruction remains valid in irregular warfare. This conclusion admits of one major exception in conflicts where a sharp asymmetry of interests exists between the belligerent parties, when it is possible for irregulars to achieve victory by exhausting the enemy's political will, rather than by destroying his military forces.

The manual describes the general strategy for the U.S. Marines but it is beneficial for not only every Marine to read but concepts on leadership can be gathered to lead a business to a family. If you want to see what make Marines so effective this book is a good place to start.

Product Description: Since the tragic events of 9/11 and the consequent advent of the Global War on Terrorism, there has been a remarkable surge of interest in counterinsurgency. This anthology presents 27 articles on counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, particularly highlighting and examining the U.S. Marine Corps' roles in conflicts from 1898 through 2007. It also includes an extensive bibliography of works on these conflicts. Continuing discussion and study of these subjects is of critical importance to the ongoing efforts of the United States and its allies in the Global War on Terrorism. The anthology is divided broadly into two halves: the first half presents historical examples of counterinsurgency involving the United States-from the Philippines and the "Banana Wars" up through Vietnam-while the second half addresses the nation's contemporary efforts in this regard. Articles cover the situations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. The selected bibliography addresses a broad range of subjects: on higher-end operational/strategic level of war considerations, on geopolitical context, and on a varied array of related topics-political theory, historical case studies, failed states, cultural studies and analysis, and many others-that all provide context or play a role in conducting a counterinsurgency and achieving success in the realm of irregular warfare. Colonel Stephen S. Evans, USMCR, researched and compiled this work as a field historian with the Marine Corps History Division. He has experience at various operational levels, both joint and multinational, in CONUS and overseas, and has performed duty with all three MEFs, MARFORLANT, MARFOREUR, and U.S. forces in Korea. He has also held a range of positions in administrative and educational roles at Quantico and the Pentagon. Colonel Evans holds a doctorate in history from Temple University and has published two historical monographs.

This report provides study results, research, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations concerning doctrinal implications of Irregular Warfare (IW) as introduced/described in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (2006 QDR) report and the subsequent Quadrennial Defense Review Irregular Warfare (IW) Roadmap. Specifically this study identifies current joint doctrinal treatment of IW and its aspects, to include content of ongoing revision efforts; identifies any joint doctrinal voids concerning IW and proposes courses of action for resolving identified voids; and identifies terminology implications/doctrinal issues related to IW. The study used a systematic approach by gathering pertinent information and then analyzing it in relation to IW. Thorough research and data collection was conducted on IW. Analysis centered on IW terminology and possible doctrinal voids and redundancies within the 10 IW activities (aspects) listed in the IW roadmap and, as a minimum, their associated joint publications (JPs). Conclusions were drawn regarding the doctrinal implications of IW. Finally, recommendations were made regarding the joint doctrinal treatment of IW and courses of action proposed for resolving identified joint doctrinal voids.

The author offers a detailed comparison between the character of irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the principal enduring features of "the American way." He concludes that there is a serious mismatch between that "way" and the kind of behavior that is most effective in countering irregular foes. The author poses the question, Can the American way of war adapt to a strategic threat context dominated by irregular enemies? He suggests that the answer is "perhaps, but only with difficulty."

The first documented, systematic study of a truly revolutionary subject, this 1937 text remains the definitive guide to guerrilla warfare. It concisely explains unorthodox strategies that transform disadvantages into benefits.

Two centuries before the daring exploits of Navy SEALs and Marine Raiders captured the public imagination, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps were already engaged in similarly perilous missions: raiding pirate camps, attacking enemy ships in the dark of night, and striking enemy facilities and resources on shore. Even John Paul Jones, father of the American navy, saw such irregular operations as critical to naval warfare. With Jones’s own experience as a starting point, Benjamin Armstrong sets out to take irregular naval warfare out of the shadow of the blue-water battles that dominate naval history. This book, the first historical study of its kind, makes a compelling case for raiding and irregular naval warfare as key elements in the story of American sea power. Beginning with the Continental Navy, Small Boats and Daring Men traces maritime missions through the wars of the early republic, from the coast of modern-day Libya to the rivers and inlets of the Chesapeake Bay. At the same time, Armstrong examines the era’s conflicts with nonstate enemies and threats to American peacetime interests along Pacific and Caribbean shores. Armstrong brings a uniquely informed perspective to his subject; and his work—with reference to original naval operational reports, sailors’ memoirs and diaries, and officers’ correspondence—is at once an exciting narrative of danger and combat at sea and a thoroughgoing analysis of how these events fit into concepts of American sea power. Offering a critical new look at the naval history of the Early American era, this book also raises fundamental questions for naval strategy in the twenty-first century.