Lenin's death at the beginning of 1924 coincided with an exhaustive search by the USSR for a modus vivendi with the capitalist world. In laying the foundations of peaceful co-existence, priority was given to the cultivation of relations with Britain. This study examines the British government's various responses to the Soviet overtures. The scope of the work ranges from Labour's de jure recognition of the Soviet Union at the beginning of 1924 to the Conservatives' severance of relations in May 1927. The bulk of the study is set against the background of rapidly deteriorating relations and traces the unsparing measures employed by the Russians to forestall an open breach. Equal attention is paid to the Soviet government's straightforward diplomatic moves and to activities under the auspices of Comintern and the Soviet trade unions which rallied support without regard to frontiers or international protocol. The main aim was to strengthen the security and economic recovery of the Soviet Union, but revolutionary aspirations remain on the agenda.

Lawyer, politician, diplomat and leading architect of the League of Nations; Robert Cecil, 1st Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, was one of Britain's most significant statesmen of the twentieth century. His views on international diplomacy cover the most important aspects of British, European and American foreign policy concerns of the century, including the origins and consequences of the two world wars, the disarmament movement, the origins and early course of the Cold War and the first steps towards European integration. His experience of the First World War and the huge loss of life it entailed provoked Cecil to spend his life championing the ethos behind and work of the League of Nations: a role for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1937. Yet despite his prominence in the international peace movement, Cecil has never been the focus of an academic biography. Cecil has perhaps been judged unfairly due to his association with the League of Nations, which has since been generally regarded as a failure. However, recent academic research has highlighted the contribution of the League to the creation of many of the institutions and precepts that have, since the Second World War, become accepted parts of the international system, not least the United Nations. In particular, Cecil and his work on arms control lay the basis for understanding this new area of international activity, which would bear fruit during the Cold War and after. Through an evaluation of Cecil's political career, the book also assesses his reputation as an idealist and the extent to which he had a coherent philosophy of international relations. This book suggests that in reality Cecil was a Realpolitiker pragmatist whose attitudes evolved during two key periods: the interwar period and the Cold War. It also proposes that where a coherent philosophy was in evidence, it owed as much to the moral and political code of the Cecil family as to his own experiences in politics. Cecil's social and familial world is therefore considered alongside his more public life.

This book analyses the principal aspects of the relations between Soviet Russia (USSR) and Britain in the crucial phase of their formation, namely the period from 1917 to 1924. Using previously unavailable and largely unknown archival records and memoirs published by statesmen, diplomats and military commanders directly involved in the events, Evgeny Sergeev not only reconstructs the dynamics of the interaction between Moscow and London, but also strips its key episodes of common myths and stereotypes. The most debatable issues, to which this study draws its primary attention, include Britain's role in the Entente armed intervention against the Bolshevik regime as well as a series of reciprocate attempts to avoid political controversies, and London's contribution to humanitarian aid and the economic recovery of post-revolutionary Russia. Special consideration is also given to the impact of British diplomacy on the recognition of the USSR by other great powers like France, Italy, and Japan in the mid-1920s.

A major re-interpretation of international relations in the period from 1919 to 1939. Avoiding such simplistic explanations as appeasement and British decline, Keith Neilson demonstrates that the underlying cause of the Second World War was the intellectual failure to find an effective means of maintaining the new world order created in 1919. With secret diplomacy, alliances and the balance of power seen as having caused the First World War, the makers of British policy after 1919 were forced to rely on such instruments of liberal internationalism as arms control, the League of Nations and global public opinion to preserve peace. Using Britain's relations with Soviet Russia as a focus for a re-examination of Britain's dealings with Germany and Japan, this book shows that these tools were inadequate to deal with the physical and ideological threats posed by Bolshevism, fascism, Nazism and Japanese militarism.