This book analyzes why some dictators find it in their self-interest to curb corruption.

Reveals how meaningful corruption control by authoritarian regimes is surprisingly common and follows a different playbook than democratic anti-corruption reform.

Although much of the world still lives today, as always, under dictatorship, the behaviour of these regimes and of their leaders often appears irrational and mysterious. In The Political Economy of Dictatorship, Ronald Wintrobe uses rational choice theory to model dictatorships: their strategies for accumulating power, the constraints on their behavior, and why they are often more popular than is commonly accepted. The book explores both the politics and the economics of dictatorships, and the interaction between them. The questions addressed include: What determines the repressiveness of a regime? Can political authoritarianism be 'good' for the economy? After the fall, who should be held responsible for crimes against human rights? The book contains many applications, including chapters on Nazi Germany, Soviet Communism, South Africa under apartheid, the ancient Roman Empire and Pinochet's Chile. It also provides a guide to the policies which should be followed by the democracies towards dictatorships.

Political corruption is one of the central issues facing modern states, be they dictatorships or democracies.

This paper argues that corruption patterns are endogenous to political structures. Thus, corruption can be systemic and planned rather than decentralized and coincidental. In an economic system without law or property rights, a kleptocratic state may arise as a predatory hierarchy from a state of pure anarchy. A dictator minimizes the probability of a palace revolution by creating a system of patronage and loyalty through corrupt bureaucracy. Competitive corruption patterns are associated with anarchy and weak dictators, while strong dictators implement a system of monopolistic corruption. Efforts at public sector reform may meet resistance in countries featuring such systemic corruption.

Dictators and Dictatorships is a qualitative enquiry into the politics of authoritarian regimes. It argues that political outcomes in dictatorships are largely a product of leader-elite relations. Differences in the internal structure of dictatorships affect the dynamics of this relationship. This book shows how dictatorships differ from one another and the implications of these differences for political outcomes. In particular, it examines political processes in personalist, military, single-party, monarchic, and hybrid regimes. The aim of the book is to provide a clear definition of what dictatorship means, how authoritarian politics works, and what the political consequences of dictatorship are. It discusses how authoritarianism influences a range of political outcomes, such as economic performance, international conflict, and leader and regime durability. Numerous case studies from around the world support the theory and research presented to foster a better understanding of the inner workings of authoritarian regimes. By combining theory with concrete political situations, the book will appeal to undergraduate students in comparative politics, international relations, authoritarian politics, and democratization.

The contributors to this book analyze the various forms of corruption in Western European countries, in Russia and in Japan, and assess its impact on the political and administrative system, on political parties and on standards in public life.