This investigation uses state-mobilized globalization as a framework to understand China's capitalism and emergence as a global power.

Focused on unique features of economic development, this edited volume examines the nature and structure of corporate governance of several key state-owned enterprises in China and public sector units in India in five strategic sectors: oil and natural gas, steel, coal, electricity generation, and banking industries.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) combine economic activities resulting from their position on the market with non-economic functions determined by the state owner. In many of the world’s major economies, SOEs play an important role, and in some, such as China, India, Russia and Brazil, they are outright dominant. At the same time, the existence of SOEs is largely ignored by economic theory and the current figures on SOEs on a global scale available in the literature are questionable in terms of their methodological validity and thus they do not allow for a proper cross-country analysis. This book fills this research gap. It focuses on the scope and importance of SOEs in a broad group of the largest economies, primarily on a variety of quantitative estimates. It contains the results of an extensive and unique empirical study of 37 of the world’s largest economies over the period from 2009 to 2018. The findings showed that the average share of SOEs – measured by operating revenues and total assets – in the group of the largest 100 enterprises (Top 100) of a given country is nearly 30%, while in the Top 20 group it is even slightly higher. The authors present an econometric analysis showing the relationship between the scope of SOEs and the various economic and non-economic characteristics of the studied set of countries. The book also contains an in-depth discussion of selected key issues, such as the functions of SOEs in various types of economies, the role of SOEs in capital markets and the phenomenon of SOEs with foreign capital. This work is addressed to both academic economists, dealing with macroeconomics and economic policy, as well as researchers and analysts from various international organizations and think-tanks.

We document that publicly listed Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less productive and profitable than publicly listed firms in which the state has no ownership stake. In particular, Chinese listed SOEs are more capital intensive and have a lower average product of capital than non-SOEs. These productivity differences increased between 2002 and 2009, and remain sizeable in 2019. Using a heterogeneous firm model of resource misallocation, we find that there are large potential productivity gains from reforms which could equalize the marginal products of listed SOEs and listed non-SOEs.

Politics of the State Grid Corporation of China -- Electricity -- From the ministry to a corporation -- Overseeing SGCC: the contested regimes of central agencies -- State Grid Corporation of China -- SGCC in action: as a policy entrepreneur -- SGCC in action: as technology innovator -- SGCC in action: internationalisation

China's extraordinarily rapid economic growth since 1978, driven by market-oriented reforms, has set world records and continued unabated, despite predictions of an inevitable slowdown. In The State Strikes Back: The End of Economic Reform in China?, renowned China scholar Nicholas R. Lardy argues that China's future growth prospects could be equally bright but are shadowed by the specter of resurgent state dominance, which has begun to diminish the vital role of the market and private firms in China's economy. Lardy's book arrives in timely fashion as a sequel to his pathbreaking Markets over Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China, published by PIIE in 2014. This book mobilizes new data to trace how President Xi Jinping has consistently championed state-owned or controlled enterprises, encouraging local political leaders and financial institutions to prop up ailing, underperforming companies that are a drag on China's potential. As with his previous book, Lardy's perspective departs from conventional wisdom, especially in its contention that China could achieve a high growth rate for the next two decades—if it reverses course and returns to the path of market-oriented reforms.

This book takes a fresh look at Chinese political economy at a key inflection point. Facing a more competitive international environment, Chinese reform has shifted from its earlier focus on economic liberalization and political decentralization to a more tightly organized, centralized form of state socialism. The Party-state's vigorous fiscal reaction to the Global Financial Crisis (2008-2009) left the country with a much improved infrastructure and greater sense of national self-assurance. The more monocratic central leadership has redoubled efforts to fight poverty and pollution, push technological innovation, and at the same time rigorously enforce ideological consensus, political loyalty and anticorruption.This has been occurring in an international context of slowing trade and nationalist pushback against 'globalization', prominently including bilateral Chinese-American polarization. While China has been among the staunchest advocates and beneficiaries of globalization, incipient trade war 'decoupling' has spurred movement toward economic and technological self-reliance. Turning inward however vies with a rival impulse toward more vigorous engagement in the world. This is most consequentially represented by the Belt and Road Initiative, driving massive infrastructure construction through Central Asia and the South and Southeast Asian maritime periphery. Despite slowing growth and a large debt overhang, swift recovery from the Covid-19 epidemic leaves China in a relatively strong economic position.