In recent decades, local governments across America have increasingly turned specialized functions over to autonomous agencies ranging in scope from subdivision-sized water districts to multi-state transit authorities. This book is the first comprehensive examination of the causes and consequences of special-purpose governments in more than 300 metropolitan areas in the United States. It presents new evidence on the economic, political, and social implications of relying on these special districts while offering important findings about their use and significance.

Special purpose jurisdictions, such as school districts, water districts, and transit authorities, constitute the most common form of local government in the United States today. This book offers the first political theory of special purpose jurisdictions and provides extensive empirical analyses of the politics and finances of these often overlooked but increasingly influential governments.

This book examines SEZs from a political economy perspective, both to dissect the incentives of governments, zone developers, and exporters, and to uncover both the hidden costs and untapped potential of zone policies. Costs include misallocated resources, the encouragement of rent-seeking, and distraction of policy-makers from more effective reforms. However, the zones also have several unappreciated benefits. They can change the politics of a country, by generating a transition from a system of rent-seeking to one of liberalized open markets. In revealing the hidden promise of SEZs, this book shows how the SEZ model of development can succeed in the future.

In The Political Economy of Public Sector Governance, Anthony Michael Bertelli introduces core ideas in positive political theory as they apply to public management and policy. Though recent literature that mathematically models relationships between politicians and public managers provides insight into contemporary public administration, the technical way these works present information limits their appeal. This book helps readers understand public-sector governance arrangements and the implications these arrangements have for public management practice and policy outcomes by presenting information in a nontechnical way.

Explores the politics and economics of the Abe government and evaluates major policies, such as Abenomics policy reforms.

The Political Economy of Government Auditing addresses the elusive quest for greater transparency and accountability in the management of public finances in emerging economies; and, more specifically, it examines the contribution of autonomous audit agencies (AAAs) to the fight against corruption and waste. Whilst the role of audit agencies in curbing corruption is increasingly acknowledged, there exists little comparative work on their institutional effectiveness. Addressing the performance of AAAs in emerging economies, Carlos Santiso pursues a political economy perspective that addresses the context in which audit agencies are embedded, and the governance factors that make them work or fail. Here, the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Chile are examined, as they illustrate the three – parliamentary, court and independent – models of AAAs in modern states, and their three distinct trajectories of reform, or lack of reform. Beyond Latin America, considerations on the reform of government auditing in other countries, developed and developing are also taken up as, it is argued, while institutional arrangements for government auditing matter, political factors ultimately determine the effectiveness of AAAs. Reforming AAAs, it is concluded, must consider the trajectory of state building, the role of law in public administration and the quality of governance. An important contribution to the comparative study of governance institutions, and especially those tasked with overseeing the budget and curbing corruption, The Political Economy of Government Auditing will be of interest to scholars and students of comparative politics, development studies, administrative law, and public finance; as well as to development practitioners and policy-makers in developing countries, donor governments and international institutions.

The ideal introductory textbook to the politics of the policymaking process This textbook uses modern political economy to introduce students of political science, government, economics, and public policy to the politics of the policymaking process. The book's distinct political economy approach has two virtues. By developing general principles for thinking about policymaking, it can be applied across a range of issue areas. It also unifies the policy curriculum, offering coherence to standard methods for teaching economics and statistics, and drawing connections between fields. The book begins by exploring the normative foundations of policymaking—political theory, social choice theory, and the Paretian and utilitarian underpinnings of policy analysis. It then introduces game theoretic models of social dilemmas—externalities, coordination problems, and commitment problems—that create opportunities for policy to improve social welfare. Finally, it shows how the political process creates technological and incentive constraints on government that shape policy outcomes. Throughout, concepts and models are illustrated and reinforced with discussions of empirical evidence and case studies. This textbook is essential for all students of public policy and for anyone interested in the most current methods influencing policymaking today. Comprehensive approach to politics and policy suitable for advanced undergraduates and graduate students Models unify policy curriculum through methodological coherence Exercises at the end of every chapter Self-contained appendices cover necessary game theory Extensive discussion of cases and applications