Economists have moved in recent years beyond analyzing the manner in which the macroeconomies of different countries function and prescribing appropriate policies for dealing with domestic and external imbalances. Increasingly, they have sought to understand the complex interaction between political and economic phenomena. This book considers issues of economic reform in a broad range of settings: * developed countries * transition countries * developing countries Using country specific cases such as Uzbekistan, Burma and Haiti, it focuses on those territories which have encountered problems reforming, allowing the reader to gain an accurate understanding of the factors that inhibit the success of economic reform, the different context in which economic reform is attempted, and the different challenges that individual countries face. An international team of contributors including Bo Södersten, Deepak Lal and Ron Findlay have been brought together to analyze these topical issues, making this an informative and thought-provoking book, of interest to those involved in the field of development studies.

By looking at 20 reform efforts in ten OECD countries, this report examines why some reforms are implemented and other languish.

Economists have moved in recent years beyond analyzing the manner in which the macroeconomies of different countries function and prescribing appropriate policies for dealing with domestic and external imbalances. Increasingly, they have sought to understand the complex interaction between political and economic phenomena. This book considers issues of economic reform in a broad range of settings: * developed countries * transition countries * developing countries Using country specific cases such as Uzbekistan, Burma and Haiti, it focuses on those territories which have encountered problems reforming, allowing the reader to gain an accurate understanding of the factors that inhibit the success of economic reform, the different context in which economic reform is attempted, and the different challenges that individual countries face. An international team of contributors including Bo Södersten, Deepak Lal and Ron Findlay have been brought together to analyze these topical issues, making this an informative and thought-provoking book, of interest to those involved in the field of development studies.

This title was first published in 2001.The victory of former lieutenant colonel Hugo Chavez in the Venezuelan presidential elections of 1998 was criticized as a blow against the country's deep-seated democratic tradition. It is claimed that this simplistic argument fails to recognize the extent of democratic deterioration in the country and the limitations imposed by discredited political actors on a meaningful democratic reform process. The book aims to break new ground in providing unseen evidence of electoral fraud and offers a fresh perspective on the nature of democratic development.

For decades, advocates of congressional reforms have repeatedly attempted to clean up the House committee system, which has been called inefficient, outmoded, unaccountable, and even corrupt. Yet these efforts result in little if any change, as members of Congress who are generally satisfied with existing institutions repeatedly obstruct what could fairly be called innocuous reforms. What lies behind the House's resistance to change? Challenging recent explanations of this phenomenon, Scott Adler contends that legislators resist rearranging committee powers and jurisdictions for the same reason they cling to the current House structure—the ambition for reelection. The system's structure works to the members' advantage, helping them obtain funding (and favor) in their districts. Using extensive evidence from three major reform periods—the 1940s, 1970s, and 1990s—Adler shows that the reelection motive is still the most important underlying factor in determining the outcome of committee reforms, and he explains why committee reform in the House has never succeeded and probably never will.

This book examines how a society that is trapped in stagnation might initiate and sustain economic and political development. In this context, progress requires the reform of existing arrangements, along with the complementary evolution of informal institutions. It involves enhancing state capacity, balancing broad avenues for political input, and limiting concentrated private and public power. This juggling act can only be accomplished by resolving collective-action problems (CAPs), which arise when individuals pursue interests that generate undesirable outcomes for society at large. Merging and extending key perspectives on CAPs, inequality, and development, this book constructs a flexible framework to investigate these complex issues. By probing four basic hypotheses related to knowledge production, distribution, power, and innovation, William D. Ferguson offers an analytical foundation for comparing and evaluating approaches to development policy. Navigating the theoretical terrain that lies between simplistic hierarchies of causality and idiosyncratic case studies, this book promises an analytical lens for examining the interactions between inequality and development. Scholars and researchers across economic development and political economy will find it to be a highly useful guide.

Italy is a country of recent decline and long-standing idiosyncratic traits. A rich society served by an advanced manufacturing economy, where the rule of law is weak and political accountability low, it has long been in downward spiral alimented by corruption and clientelism. From this spiral has emerged an equilibrium as consistent as it is inefficient, that raises serious obstacles to economic and democratic development. The Political Economy of Italy's Decline explains the causes of Italy's downward trajectory, and explains how the country can shift to a fairer and more efficient system. Analysing both political economic literature and the history of Italy from 1861 onwards, The Political Economy of Italy's Decline argues that the deeper roots of the decline lie in the political economy of growth. It places emphasis on the country's convergence to the productivity frontier and the evolution of its social order and institutions to illuminate the origins and evolution of the current constraints to growth, using institutional economics and Schumpeterian growth theory to support its findings. It analyses two alternative reactions to the insufficient provision of public goods: an opportunistic one- employing tax evasion, corruption, or clientelism as means to appropriate private Goods- and one based on enforcing political accountability. From the perspective of ordinary citizens and firms such social dilemmas can typically be modelled as coordination games, which have multiple equilibria. Self-interested rationality can thus lead to a spiral, in which several mutually reinforcing vicious circles lead society onto an inefficient equilibrium characterized by low political accountability and weak rule of law. The Political Economy of Italy's Decline follows the gradual setting in of this spiral as it identifys the deeper causes of Italy's decline.