The Political Economy of Noncompliance explains why states fail to comply with international law. Over the last sixty years, states have signed treaties, established international courts and other supranational institutions to achieve the benefits of international cooperation. Nowhere has this been more successful than in the European Union. European integration has produced one of the most intensely legalized regimes in the world. Yet, even in the European Union, noncompliance of states often occurs. This book explores the sources of and reasons for noncompliance, and assesses why noncompliance varies across the Member States and over time by looking at the domestic politics of complying with international law. The author uses examples from the history of economic integration in the EU in three countries and two different policy areas to demonstrate these mechanisms at work. The Political Economy of Noncompliance will be of interest to students and scholars of European Politics, international relations and political economy.

How creditors came to wield unprecedented power over heavily indebted countries—and the dangers this poses to democracy The European debt crisis has rekindled long-standing debates about the power of finance and the fraught relationship between capitalism and democracy in a globalized world. Why Not Default? unravels a striking puzzle at the heart of these debates—why, despite frequent crises and the immense costs of repayment, do so many heavily indebted countries continue to service their international debts? In this compelling and incisive book, Jerome Roos provides a sweeping investigation of the political economy of sovereign debt and international crisis management. He takes readers from the rise of public borrowing in the Italian city-states to the gunboat diplomacy of the imperialist era and the wave of sovereign defaults during the Great Depression. He vividly describes the debt crises of developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s and sheds new light on the recent turmoil inside the Eurozone—including the dramatic capitulation of Greece’s short-lived anti-austerity government to its European creditors in 2015. Drawing on in-depth case studies of contemporary debt crises in Mexico, Argentina, and Greece, Why Not Default? paints a disconcerting picture of the ascendancy of global finance. This important book shows how the profound transformation of the capitalist world economy over the past four decades has endowed private and official creditors with unprecedented structural power over heavily indebted borrowers, enabling them to impose painful austerity measures and enforce uninterrupted debt service during times of crisis—with devastating social consequences and far-reaching implications for democracy.

This book offers systematic comparative analysis of the political economy of pharmaceutical patents in Latin America, and examines the diverse ways that international changes can reconfigure domestic politics.

Territorial political organisation forms the backbone of western liberal democracies. However, political economists are increasingly aware of how this form of government neglects the preferences of citizens, resulting in dramatic conflicts. The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit explores the theoretical possibility of ‘unbundling’ government functions and decentralising territorial governance.

This paper employs unique tax administrative data and operational audit information from a sample of approximately 7,500 self-employed U.S. taxpayers to investigate the effects of operational tax audits on future reporting behavior. Our estimates indicate that audits can have substantial deterrent or counter-deterrent effects. Among those taxpayers who receive an additional tax assessment, reported taxable income is estimated to be 64% higher in the first year after the audit than it would have been in the absence of the audit. In contrast, among those taxpayers who do not receive an additional tax assessment, reported taxable income is estimated to be approximately 15% lower the year after the audit than it would have been had the audit not taken place. Our results suggest that improved targeting of audits towards noncompliant taxpayers would not only yield more direct audit revenue, it would also pay dividends in terms of future tax collections.

The post-war liberal economic order seems to be crumbling, placing the world at an inflection point. China has emerged as a major force, and other emerging economies seek to play a role in shaping world trade and investment law. Might they band together to mount a wholesale challenge to current rules and institutions? Emerging Powers in the International Economic Order argues that resistance from the Global South and the creation of China-led alternative spaces will have some impact, but no robust alternative vision will emerge. Significant legal innovations from the South depart from the mainstream neoliberal model, but these countries are driven by pragmatism and strategic self-interest and not a common ideological orientation, nor do they intend to fully dismantle the current ordering. In this book, Sonia E. Rolland and David M. Trubek predict a more pluralistic world, which is neither the continued hegemony of neoliberalism nor a full blown alternative to it.

This book provides an introduction to the vision of an economic system based completely on the Holy Qur’an—a system defined as a collection of institutions, representing rules of behavior, prescribed by Allah for humans, and the traditions of the Messenger. The authors argue that the main reason for the economic underperformance of Muslim countries and their economies has been non-compliance with the prescribed rules of behavior. Rule non-compliance has been chiefly due to the failure of Muslims to comprehend the Metaframework of the Qur’an and the Archetype Model of the Prophet Mohammad and interpret them in ways compatible with their own generation and time. Askari and Mirakhor believe these rules (institutions), properly adapted to prevailing conditions present what they consider as an ideal economic system.