Linda Matar examines Syria's failure to promote employment-generating investment prior to the uprising. Tackling the thorny issue of the inapplicability of modern investment theory to a developing country, she situates the analysis of investment in Syria in its historical context and examines the socioeconomic structure and political preconditions that set the course of capital accumulation. Matar argues that the class in charge of development, which oversaw the allocation of resources during the Hafiz and Bashar Assad regimes, precipitated a crisis of capital accumulation. Difficult-to-access data and information compiled from fieldwork reveal how neoliberal reforms failed to build productive capacity and instead enriched a few through short-term speculative and mercantile ventures. Productive investment in Syria prior to the uprising lurched downward, and the key related socio-economic variables followed. These deteriorating conditions contributed to the social explosion in 2011. Exploring the poor quality and quantity of investment, this study probes how the cant of the free market served as a veneer behind which the institutional decisions distorted income distribution in a way that would inevitably lead to collapse.

Syria under Asad has been one of the key regional powers of the Middle East. Though its political development has been a much-debated subject, there has been no comprehensive study in English of the country's political economy and its evolution since 1970 to the present day. Beginning with an account of economic development and of changing development strategies, Perthes discusses the factors which in the late 1980s precipitated a change in direction from the socialist orientation of the earlier Ba'thist years to "infitah" and a larger role for the private sector. He pays particular attention to class structure and class-state relations and examines the nature of the state, the political structure and the mechanisms and dynamics of political decision-making. Addressing the issue of the interplay between economic transformation and political change, Perthes argues that, although a shift in the power structure will not occur under Asad, his regime has created the institutions which will allow a reasonably smooth succession and a creation of a less personalized and more participatory political order.

Five years into the ongoing and tragic conflict, the paper analyzes how Syria’s economy and its people have been affected and outlines the challenges in rebuilding the economy. With extreme limitations on information, the findings of the paper are subject to an extraordinary degree of uncertainty. The key messages are: (1) that the devastating civil war has set the country back decades in terms of economic, social and human development. Syria’s GDP today is less than half of what it was before the war started and it could take two decades or more for Syria to return to its pre-conflict GDP levels; and that (2) while reconstructing damaged physical infrastructure will be a monumental task, rebuilding Syria’s human and social capital will be an even greater and lasting challenge.

This edited collection aims to analytically reconceptualise the Syrian crisis by examining how and why the country has moved from a stable to a war-torn society. It is written by scholars from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds, all of whom make no attempt to speculate on the future trajectory of the conflict, but aim instead to examine the historical background that has laid the objective conditions for Syria’s descent to its current situation. Their work represents an attempt to dissect the multi-layered foundation of the Syrian conflict and to make understanding its complex inner workings accessible to a broader readership. The book is divided into four parts, each of which elaborates on the origins and dynamics of today’s crisis from the perspective of a different discipline. When put together, the four parts provide a holistic picture of Syria’s developmental trajectory from the early twentieth century through to the present day. Themes addressed include Syria’s postcolonial development efforts, its leap into socialism and then into neoliberalism in the late twentieth century, its politics within the resistance front, and finally its food and health security concerns.

Rejecting conventional explanations for Syrian foreign policy, which emphasize the personalities and attitudes of leaders, cultural factors peculiar to Arab societies, or the machinations of the great powers, Fred H. Lawson describes key shifts in Damascus's response to regional adversaries in terms of changes in the intensity of political struggles at home. Periodic eruptions of domestic conflict have inspired Syria's ruling coalition to adopt a wide range of programs designed to buy off domestic rivals and perpetuate the predominance of individual coalition members. These programs have undermined the unity of the Ba'thi regime, increasing the chances that opponents will overturn the established order. Challenges to the Ba'thi regime become most threatening whenever crises of accumulation shake the domestic political economy, Lawson contends. Opposition forces gain strength when the state cannot sustain new investment or when competition increases between public and private enterprises. Political and economic trends inside Syria have determined why Damascus has since 1963 alternately escalated tensions with regional rivals and adopted more accommodating postures. Lawson traces this dynamic through five major episodes: the 1967 war with Israel; limited intervention in Jordan in 1970; the widening conflict in Lebanon in 1976; the defusing of conflict with Iraq in 1982; and the rapprochement with Turkey over Kurdish separatism in 1994. These patterns, Lawson suggests, may be characteristic of nations changing from one domestic economic system to a radically different one, as Syria has in the transition from state socialism to a privatized political economy.

Exploring the recent trajectory of Syria¿s economy, the authors consider the utility of the transition paradigm¿developed to study change in the former communist states¿as an explanatory approach. In the first part of the book, Samer Abboud examines Syria¿s shift to a ¿social market economy,¿ focusing on similarities in and differences between the Syrian and Chinese cases. In the second part, Ferdinand Arslanian compares empirical indicators for Syria with those from the aggregate of transition countries to predict Syria¿s economic performance and the rate of liberalization. A foreword by Raymond Hinnebusch provides context for the study.

State expansion caused the reorganization of social conflict, promoting intense polarization between radicals and conservatives, high levels of popular mobilization, and a shift in the preferences of the Ba'th from an accommodationist to a radically populist strategy for consolidating its system of rule."--BOOK JACKET.