This volume analyzes international agreements from a political economy perspective. In four essays, it raises the question of whether domestic institutions help explain if countries join international agreements, and in case they do, what type of international organization they join. The book examines how specific democratic design elements channel and mediate domestic demands directed at politicians, and how under certain circumstances entering international agreements helps politicians navigate these demands to their benefit. The volume also distinguishes between different types of international instruments with a varying expected constraining effect upon member states, and empirically tests if this matters for incentives to join. The volume addresses scholars, students, and practitioners interested in a better understanding of how the shape of domestic institutions affects politicians’ incentives to enter into binding international agreements.

Preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) play an increasingly prominent role in the global political economy, two notable examples being the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement. These agreements foster economic integration among member states by enhancing their access to one another's markets. Yet despite the importance of PTAs to international trade and world politics, until now little attention has been focused on why governments choose to join them and how governments design them. This book offers valuable new insights into the political economy of PTA formation. Many economists have argued that the roots of these agreements lie in the promise they hold for improving the welfare of member states. Others have posited that trade agreements are a response to global political conditions. Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner argue that domestic politics provide a crucial impetus to the decision by governments to enter trade pacts. Drawing on this argument, they explain why democracies are more likely to enter PTAs than nondemocratic regimes, and why as the number of veto players--interest groups with the power to block policy change--increases in a prospective member state, the likelihood of the state entering a trade agreement is reduced. The book provides a novel view of the political foundations of trade agreements.

The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade surveys the literature on the politics of international trade and highlights the most exciting recent scholarly developments. The Handbook is focused on work by political scientists that draws extensively on work in economics, but is distinctive in its applications and attention to political features; that is, it takes politics seriously. The Handbook's framework is organized in part along the traditional lines of domestic society-domestic institutions - international interaction, but elaborates this basic framework to showcase the most important new developments in our understanding of the political economy of trade. Within the field of international political economy, international trade has long been and continues to be one of the most vibrant areas of study. Drawing on models of economic interests and integrating them with political models of institutions and society, political scientists have made great strides in understanding the sources of trade policy preferences and outcomes. The 27 chapters in the Handbook include contributions from prominent scholars around the globe, and from multiple theoretical and methodological traditions. The Handbook considers the development of concepts and policies about international trade; the influence of individuals, firms, and societies; the role of domestic and international institutions; and the interaction of trade and other issues, such as monetary policy, environmental challenges, and human rights. Showcasing both established theories and findings and cutting-edge new research, the Handbook is a valuable reference for scholars of political economy.

Investment treaties are some of the most controversial but least understood instruments of global economic governance. Public interest in international investment arbitration is growing and some developed and developing countries are beginning to revisit their investment treaty policies. The Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime synthesises and advances the growing literature on this subject by integrating legal, economic, and political perspectives. Based on an analysis of the substantive and procedural rights conferred by investment treaties, it asks four basic questions. What are the costs and benefits of investment treaties for investors, states, and other stakeholders? Why did developed and developing countries sign the treaties? Why should private arbitrators be allowed to review public regulations passed by states? And what is the relationship between the investment treaty regime and the broader regime complex that governs international investment? Through a concise, but comprehensive, analysis, this book fills in some of the many "blind spots" of academics from different disciplines, and is the first port of call for lawyers, investors, policy-makers, and stakeholders trying to make sense of these critical instruments governing investor-state relations.

As the popularity of coffee and coffee shops has grown worldwide in recent years, so has another trend—globalization, which has greatly affected growers and distributors. This book analyzes changes in the structure of the coffee commodity chain since World War II. It follows the typical consumer dollar spent on coffee in the developed world and shows how this dollar is divided up among the coffee growers, processors, states, and transnational corporations involved in the chain. By tracing how this division of the coffee dollar has changed over time, Grounds for Agreement demonstrates that the politically regulated world market that prevailed from the 1960s through the 1980s was more fair for coffee growers than is the current, globalized market controlled by the corporations. Talbot explains why fair trade and organic coffees, by themselves, are not adequate to ensure fairness for all coffee growers and he argues that a return to a politically regulated market is the best way to solve the current crisis among coffee growers and producers.

With protectionist sentiment and economic nationalism on the rise, international trade and how it is governed is at the heart of some of the most important contemporary economic and political debates. Comprehensive and clear, this book skilfully outlines and analyses the dynamics of trade in the 21st century. Ken Heydon examines three broad themes: the nature and distribution of the gains from trade, the institutional and governance framework of the international trade system, and the contentious practical issues confronting policy-makers across the world. He considers pressing contemporary debates surrounding issues ranging from agriculture and food security to the links between trade and environment protection, core labour standards and intellectual property rights. He demonstrates the importance of a change of mindset in terms of how we see trade policy: it should not, he argues, be simply a question of international negotiation, but also a key component of sound domestic economic management. In short, we need to put commerce in context. Drawing on the author’s experience as a policy practitioner, trade policy analyst and teacher, the volume is informed by an extensive analysis of the literature and by relevant case studies. It is designed for students and scholars of international political economy and trade policy, trade officials, and the general public.

This book presents a comprehensive view of recent developments in the theory of international trade agreements and political economy, by focusing on research by Raymond Riezman. This pioneering work introduced terms of trade effects and strategic behavior to the theory of international trade agreements. This is complemented by a careful analysis of how politics affects international trade agreements.The book brings together work which focuses on the question of why international trade agreements occur and what forms they take.