Throughout history, societies have had to decide whom to 'sacrifice' and whom to help in times of disaster. This volume examines how elite groups attempt to maintain power through the use of particular economic, political, and ideological instruments and how both ruling elites and common people endeavor to create meaningful traditions while enduring hardship.The Political Economy of Hazards and Disasters demonstrates how vulnerability is economically constructed, primary producers adapt their production regimes, how traders and merchants adapt their practices, and how political economic objectives play out in recovery efforts.

Based on extensive ethnographic and historical research conducted in diverse field locations, this volume offers an acute analysis of how actors at local, national, and international levels govern disasters; it examines the political issues at stake that often go unaddressed and demonstrates that victims of disaster do not remain passive.

Economic damage from natural hazards can sometimes be prevented and always mitigated. However, private individuals tend to underinvest in such measures due to problems of collective action, information asymmetry and myopic behavior. Governments, which can in principle correct these market failures, themselves face incentives to underinvest in costly disaster prevention policies and damage mitigation regulations. Yet, disaster damage varies greatly across countries. We argue that rational actors will invest more in trying to prevent and mitigate damage the larger a country's propensity to experience frequent and strong natural hazards. Accordingly, economic loss from an actually occurring disaster will be smaller the larger a country's disaster propensity - holding everything else equal, such as hazard magnitude, the country's total wealth and per capita income. At the same time, damage is not entirely preventable and smaller losses tend to be random. Disaster propensity will therefore have a larger marginal effect on larger predicted damages than on smaller ones. We employ quantile regression analysis in a global sample to test these predictions, focusing on the three disaster types causing the vast majority of damage worldwide: earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones.

When crises occur, citizens, media and policymakers alike expect government to respond and to take a leading role in recovery. Given the scale and scope of crises, whether natural (such as hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes), manmade (such as conflict and economic downturns), or often a combination of the two, governments are often seen as being in the best position to identify the problems, understand the circumstances, and direct action. They are also likely to be the entities that have adequate resources to devote to such large-scale efforts. Yet, governments are not spared from the effects of crises. They are composed of individuals who are impacted by disasters and face many of the same challenges in identifying needs, prioritizing action, and adjusting to changing circumstances. It is by no surprise that governments are also often scrutinized during and after crises. How, then, do we understand the capability of and proper role for governments to respond to crisis and to drive recovery? This edited volume—comprised of chapters by accomplished scholars and seasoned practitioners in disaster and crises studies and management, spanning multiple disciplines including sociology, economics, and public administration—examines the roles, expectations, and capabilities of government responses to crises. It gives an overview of the literature, provides lessons learned from both research and experience on the ground during crises, and puts forth a framework for understanding crisis management and subsequent policy implications. It will be of use to any scholars, students, practitioners or policymakers interested in learning from and better preparing for crises and responding when they do occur.

Since the turn of the millennium, more than one million people have been killed and 2.3 billion others have been directly affected by natural disasters around the world. In cases like the 2010 Haiti earthquake or the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, these disasters have time and time again wrecked large populations and national infrastructures. While recognizing that improved rescue, evacuation, and disease control are crucial to reducing the effects of natural disasters, in the final analysis, poverty remains the main risk factor determining the long-term impact of natural hazards. Furthermore, natural disasters have themselves a tremendous impact on the poorest of the poor, who are often ill-prepared to deal with natural hazards and for whom a hurricane, an earthquake, or a drought can mean a permanent submersion in poverty. The Economic Impacts of Natural Disasters focuses on these concerns for poverty and vulnerability. Written by a collection of esteemed scholars in disaster management and sustainable development, the report provides an overview of the general trends in natural disasters and their effects by focusing on a critical analysis of different methodologies used to assess the economic impact of natural disasters. Economic Impacts presents six national case studies (Bangladesh, Vietnam, India, Nicaragua, Japan and the Netherlands) and shows how household surveys and country-level macroeconomic data can analyze and quantify the economic impact of disasters. The researchers within Economic Impacts have created path-breaking work and have opened new avenues for thinking and debate to push forward the frontiers of knowledge on economics of natural disasters.

One of the primary responsibilities of governments is to shield citizens from life threatening events such as natural disasters. Previous work has demonstrated that voters electorally reward incumbents for the provision of disaster relief but not for investing in disaster prevention, leading incumbents to over-invest in relief spending even though investing in preparedness would yield large efficiency gains. This suggests that natural disasters offer governments a unique opportunity to improve their re-election prospects by providing generous disaster relief. Building on these findings, the present thesis first theorizes about and empirically explores which types of electorally motivated strategies guide the allocation of disaster relief. Using county-level data on natural disasters and relief payments in the context of U.S. presidential elections (1985-2008) the thesis shows that presidents channel relief aid to high-turnout counties in which they enjoy strong electoral support even when controlling for disaster damage. A subsequent analysis then investigates how citizens prefer policy benefits to be distributed among individuals experiencing natural disasters and to what extent presidents' distributive choices align with citizens' preferences. An exploration of data from a novel survey experiment with a representative sample of U.S. citizens suggests that citizens prefer allocations that reflect affectedness and need, but not electoral ties. Despite a notable degree of congruence between preferred and observed spending decisions, citizens' preferences do conflict with presidents' electoral considerations. Finally, the third part studies individual disaster policy preferences and investigates whether providing additional information about the effectiveness and efficiency of preventive measures affects support for preparedness spending. Two novel survey experiments with a representative sample of U.S. citizens indicate that i.