Rent seeking continues to be a topic of much discussion and debate within the political economy. This new study challenges previous assumptions and sets out a new analysis of the dynamics of rent and rent seeking in development, using Vietnam as a case study. This book provides an alternative approach to the study of economic development and illuminates new perspectives in a contemporary context. It argues that not only has there been an incomplete understanding of Vietnam’s industrial development over the last three decades, but that neoclassical economics do not adequately address many of the issues endangering Vietnam’s development. A significant observation of the Vietnamese experience is the analytical view that rents can be developmental and growth enhancing if the configuration of rent management incentivizes industrial upgrade and conditions firm performance. Underlining the need to reexamine how economic actors and the state collaborate through formal and informal institutions, this study fills a gap in the scholarship of the political economy of rent and rent seeking and how rents might be used for developmental purposes.

Since the doi moi reforms in 1986, Vietnam has experienced a dramatic socioeconomic transformation. Lim examines the role of the state and its interaction with market forces in bringing this change about. Taking the motorcycle and banking industries as case studies, this book explores the dynamics between the state and transnational corporations in shaping the manufacturing and service sectors, respectively. Vietnam, as one of Southeast Asia’s quintessential latecomer economies with little prior experience of dealing with transnational corporations, has nevertheless been quite successful in maintaining some control over the impact of foreign direct investment. Yet, the learning outcomes remain highly uneven. In addition, Lim argues that Vietnamese advancement in both industries mirrors only partially the more generalized patterns of state-led development in East Asia’s earlier batch of latecomer economies. Vietnam’s case thus presents practical lessons on how to succeed in crafting and utilizing policy instruments to achieve domestic economic and technological upgrading. This book will be of great interest to scholars of political economy and industrial policy in East Asia, as well as to scholars and policy professionals analyzing approaches to development strategy more broadly.

This book is based upon extensive and repeated fieldwork, close observation and familiarity with institutional detail. It traces Vietnam's early attempts to create in State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) a basis for a military-industrial complex, and the ways in which these attempts failed, which explains the nature of state commercialism through the 1980s and into recent years. Since the 1990 breakout to a market economy, Vietnam has shown outstanding development success, with rapid GDP growth, macroeconomic stability, swift poverty reduction, maintenance of social spending and extensive globalisation. Her SOEs have played a major role, not only in showing that performance gains in 1989-91 could compensate for loss of the large Soviet bloc aid program, but also as major players in the rapid economic change of the 1990s, during which the officially reported state share of GDP remained high. By the middle of the 2000s, however, a rising private sector was, in harness with a large presence of foreign companies, sharply increasing pressures upon SOEs. Against this background, the book concludes with an assessment of the extent to which Vietnam's commercialised SOEs are now no longer seen as an effective compromise, but acting as a major hindrance to Vietnam's development. Historical analysis of the process by which Vietnam's SOEs shifted from central-planning to operation in an increasingly globalised market economy Draws upon regular and repeated fieldwork going back to the late 1970s Uses a wide range of Vietnamese language and other sources

This book is, in essence, about incentives: the incentives for competing societal interest groups to cooperate with each other to benefit from a growing economic pie, rather than fighting over a bigger share of a smaller one. This is the conundrum of economic development. If elite interest groups have both incentive and ability to allocate resources toward themselves, and if such rent seeking causes a decline in economic inefficiency, how can economies ever grow? The book illuminates the mechanisms by which in one of the world’s recent economic success stories— Vietnam’s rapid industrialization and passage into the middle-income category—the interest in cooperating to grow the economy overrode the elites’ instinct to allocate resources through the use of political power. The book shows how the need to provide positive conditions for international investment altered pay-off structures and pushed the all-powerful Communist Party of Vietnam to engage in bargaining with provincial officials; provincial officials with international investors; and finally all coercive elites even with the working classes. It describes the emergence of a harmony of interest among societal groups in which each group benefits from a growing economy, and no one group can monopolize the benefits of growth without hurting itself. The Vietnam case validates Nobel-Prize winning economist Mancur Olson’s proposition that elite predation can only be kept in check when the elite itself suffers from the economic decline it causes at least as much as it gains from the rents it collects.

This book is intended for policy-makers, academics and students of development studies, area studies, political economy, geography and political science. Three of the best global performers in terms of economic growth are authoritarian states led by communist parties. The ‘socialist market economy’ model employed in China, Vietnam and Laos performs better than the economic systems in countries at a similar level of income per capita on a wide range of development indicators, yet market reforms and governance failures have led to highly unequal societies and significant environmental problems. This book presents the first comparative study of development in these three countries. Written by country experts and scholars of development studies, it explores the ongoing quest for market versus state within their model, and the coherence of their development. Chapter 5 is available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer.com.

This clear and accessible text explores Vietnam's successful transition from neo-Stalinist central planning to a market economy—\"Vietnamese style.\" After describing the north Vietnamese system prior to 1975 and its colonial and precolonial antecedents, the authors uncover the mechanisms of that changeover. They contend that the Vietnamese transition was largely bottom-up in character and that it evolved over a long enough period for the country's political economy to adjust. This explains in part the rapid shift to a high-growth, externally oriented development path in the early 1990s, despite the loss of Soviet aid and the lack of significant Western substitutes until 1992-1993. Based upon extensive incountry experience, a wealth of primary materials, and wide comparative knowledge of development issues, the book challenges many preconceived notions, both about Vietnam and about the general nature of transition processes.

"The authors show how development of non-plan trading relations was based on supplies of scarce, aid-subsidised goods which provided the means for local authorities, enterprises and individuals to convert their positions of political and social power into capital. They further highlight the ways in which new, market-oriented trade relations emerged in symbiosis with the planning system and continue to influence the economic structure and institutions today. Economic Transition in Vietnam outlines the many problems currently facing Vietnam, not least how new global forms of integration are affecting future development."--BOOK JACKET.