A contemporary and comprehensive analysis of national and supranational defence governance in an uncertain and increasingly dangerous world. This book will appeal to policymakers, analysts, graduate students and academics interested in defence economics, political economy, public economics and public policy.

This is a timely collection of essays utilizing the political economy approach to military spending, primarily by the United States. The articles deal specifically with the relationships between defense spending and: (a) political-business cycles, public opinion and the US-Soviet relationship; (b) military action - i.e. war; (c) economic performance - the trade deficit, guns versus butter issues and fiscal policy.

This timely and wide-ranging study covers both the economic and the political aspects of defense spending—first by providing a theoretical framework and then by explaining, in a political economy context, the results of decisions to allocate scarce resources to defense. In doing so, the authors provide a comprehensive picture of the interaction between defense spending and the economic and political structure of the United States, complementing their exploration of topical concerns such as SDI with analysis of long-term trends and issues of timeless importance in the defense debate. Because of the politicizing of defense planning and procurement, there have been few significant applications of optimization techniques to high-level defense issues over the past decade. As a result, there has been a rapid decline in the importance of those techniques—historically the focus of books on defense economics. Like its predecessors, this book presents optimization techniques applicable to a wide variety of defense problems, but it also illustrates what happens in actual practice and why defense decisions are often not economically efficient. The authors discuss alternatives for cases when political constraints make efficient solutions unlikely and explore changes in the defense establishment and political structures that would make economically efficient resource allocations a reality.

Leading scholars examine the links between domestic politics, defense spending and the economics of the US defense industry.

This bibliography focuses on books and articles dealing with the interplay of wealth and power in the context of national security policy, emphasising on the economic instruments of statecraft that are used to pursue national security goals and examining the politics of economic cooperation.

Beyond the traditional two-dimensional analyses of defense economics and defense politics lies a rapidly growing field of research: the political economy of defense. As the study of the interface between economics, politics, and defense proliferates, this collective volume sets out to identify the nature of political economy of defense inquiry, surpassing a narrower focus on the economic consequences of military spending. The starting point for this collaborative effort was a series of panel discussions, organized by Andrew L. Ross, in which most of the contributors to this volume participated. The majority of chapters were written expressly for this book and have not been previously published. These analytical and empirical investigations are intended to illustrate the broad, encompassing scope of political economy of defense research and contribute to the development of a research agenda. Andrew L. Ross has brought together a timely and significant array of inquiry into the impact of defense spending on world politics and global economics. This book will be of great interest to political scientists, defense specialists, and economists studying the military-industrial complex.

Looks at how EU political institutions in security and defense have developed through the political economy of interest group intermediation.