This book deals with anti-dumping measures (AD) and investigates two questions: First, what country characteristics affect AD use and notably, do domestic political institutions have an effect? Second, (how) is the decision to impose a new AD measure affected by anticipation of trading partners’ potential retaliation? This book applies a strategic perspective to AD to address these questions, presenting a game-theoretic model together with an empirical test. The approach sheds light on the dynamics of interaction between trading partners and allows to capture selection processes which underpin the trade restrictions that can actually be observed. The book provides a fresh look on when and how trading powers apply antidumping measures, how this is shaped by strategic interaction and whether institutions do make a difference to the outcome. In a period in which the international trading system has to cope with numerous stresses such as an increased resort to administered protection largely by big emerging economies, this is a timely and important contribution. Dr. Klaus Günter Deutsch, Managing Director, Research, Economic and Industrial Policy, German Federation of Industries This book successfully integrates two research traditions in international politics – the traditional view that looks at domestic factors of anti-dumping policies and the strategic view that conditions the imposition of anti-dumping measures on the likely, retaliatory behavior of the trading partner. The result is an informative and constructive examination of anti-dumping protection and trade wars in the WTO. Prof. Dr. Thomas Bräuninger, Chair of Political Economy, University of Mannheim, Germany "The Political Economy of Anti-Dumping Protection - A Strategic Analysis" is a major contribution to the important and growing field international political economy. Starting with the “traditional” comparative institutional analysis, which focuses on the implications of democratic and non-democratic regimes for using anti-dumping measures in trade politics, the second part applies a strategic perspective on this type of sanctions uncovering the dynamic interactions between a challenging and challenged countries. For all those interested in understanding the logic of sanctions, the role of institutions, and in how to examine the implications of theoretical models for international political economy this book is a “must read". Prof. Dr. Thomas König, Chair of Political Science II, University of Mannheim, Germany.

Abstract: "Beginning in the late 1980s, Argentina implemented a series of reforms that were revolutionary in speed and scope, including trade liberalization. After the implementation of these policies, a record number of antidumping petitions came forward. Under a situation of high inflation, the government reinforced its fiscal and monetary policies by announcing that it would minimize the use of such measures. The flexible disciplines of the existing domestic antidumping regulations facilitated this objective. Later, when the GATT/WTO-sanctioned trade remedies were implemented, the government made a serious attempt to establish discipline by including liberal regulations and creating special institutional arrangements. A presumption built into the construction of the new mechanisms was that adhering to WTO requirements would strengthen the resistance against protection. This presumption turned out to be false. Changing circumstances, including severe peso overvaluation, had significant effects on the number and outcome of antidumping investigations. Regarding safeguards, the government followed the letter and the spirit of the WTO agreement. In relation to the number of petitions, few measures have been implemented. Rejections were based on a concern for consumer costs and on failure of the industry seeking protection to provide a convincing modernization plan. This, plus the fact that some cases were brought to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, have made safeguards a less attractive instrument for protection-seekers than antidumping. An important positive side of the story is that unlike previous balance of payments adjustments, in spite of the major crisis that followed the recent devaluation, the hard-won liberalization has been maintained."--World Bank web site.

This clear, concise summary of the in-depth analyses presented in The Political Economy of American Trade Policy examines the level, form, and evolution of American trade protection. In case studies of trade barriers imposed during the 1980s to help the steel, semiconductor, automobile, lumber, wheat, and textile and apparel industries, the contributors trace the evolution of efforts to obtain protection, protectionist measures, and their results. A chapter assessing the common themes that emerge from the studies concludes that the focus of current trade law is exclusively on the individual protection-seeking industries, with little regard for indirect effects on using industries or for consumers. Reform could usefully take these effects into account. This volume will interest policymakers, business executives, and anyone interested in trade policy formulation and practice.

Antidumping trade protection is one of the most frequent and ubiquitous trade policies in the global economy. This volume brings together the key reference pieces in the antidumping literature that have critically defined and shaped what we know about this important and unique form of trade protection. An introductory chapter by the editors, both scholars in this area, critically analyzes the literature and discusses its future directions. This is an important reference volume not only for new and established scholars in international economics, but also policymakers and legal intellectuals.

Exploring the political and economic determinants of trade protection, this study provides a wealth of information on key American industries and documents the process of seeking and conferring protection. Eight analytical histories of the automobile, steel, semiconductor, lumber, wheat, and textile and apparel industries demonstrate that trade barriers rarely have unequivocal benefits and may be counterproductive. They show that criteria for awarding protection do not take into account the interests of consumers or other industries and that political influence and an organized lobby are major sources of protection. Based on these findings, a final essay suggests that current policy fails to consider adequately economic efficiency, the public good, and indirect negative effects. This volume will interest scholars in economics, business, and public policy who deal with trade issues.