Lay participation in the criminal justice process in the form of a jury is a celebrated phenomenon throughout the common law jurisdictions. While not claiming credit for its origin, England, as the latent cradle of the modern jury, disseminated this mode

Reason Curve, Jury Competence, and the English Criminal Justice System, a cross-jurisdictional and cross-disciplinary book, seeks to stimulate discussion and extend the debate in the area of criminal trials in light of the absence of an articulated explanation for a verdict. The book traces the history and development of the jury, from the Carolingian kings, its advancement in the English Courts following papal intervention, the impact of the Magna Carta, to its general use, current curtailment in England and Wales, and re-emergence in Continental Europe. Central to the book's submission is the dictum that the jurors' franchise to deliver a cryptic verdict is 'a matter between them and their conscience.' In light of human and civil rights movements, the book advances arguments that a cryptic verdict may offend the principle of fair trials in criminal justice. This is amplified by the presence of a developing and significant body of law that demands that decisions by public officers be accompanied by articulated pronouncements regarding the basis for their decision. While the book does not contend with the sanctity of jury deliberations and recognizes the difficulties associated with reason articulation by lay assessors, it argues that the jury continuum provides a fertile ground not only for articulating a verdict in light of human experiences, but also for generating the reason curve, which provides legitimacy for that verdict. Furthermore, the reason curve argues that it is entirely possible for the jury to articulate its reasons provided the Criminal Justice System makes provisions not just to expect an explained verdict from the jury, but also provides it with the necessary facilities needed for compliance. Exploring research and sources in the fields of law and psychology in Europe, the USA, and other jurisdictions around the world, this book is written for an international audience as a catalyst for the student of legal jurisprudence who has interests in the concepts of reason, accountability, transparency, and human rights in the criminal justice system. It is also written for the cognitive and behavioral psychologist with an interest in lay decision-making in criminal trials. In the large legal jurisdictions of the USA and Canada, the right to a jury trial is enshrined in state articles. As such, there is less tinkering with the institution. In England and Wales where Parliament is supreme and the constitution is unwritten, no such right exists. Consequently, the government enjoys tremendous leeway in tinkering with the 'right to jury trial.' Whether or not the institution can evolve to deliver a 21st Century approach is a matter for full debate, research, and the march of time.

This book discusses the under-researched relationship between sentencing and the legitimacy of punishment. It argues that there is an increasing gap between what is perceived as legitimate punishment and the sentencing decisions of the criminal courts. Drawing on a wide variety of empirical research evidence, the book explores how sentencing could be developed within a more socially-inclusive framework for the delivery of trial justice. In the international context, such developments are directly relevant to the future role of the International Criminal Court, especially its ability to deliver more coherent and inclusive trial outcomes that contribute to social reconstruction. Similarly, in the national context, these issues have a vital role to play in helping to re-position trial justice as a credible cornerstone of criminal justice governance where social diversity persists. In so doing the book should help policy-makers in appreciating the likely implications for criminal trials of ‘mainstreaming’ restorative forms of justice. Sentencing and the Legitimacy of Trial Justice firmly ties the issue of legitimacy to the relevant context for delivering ‘justice’. It suggests a need to develop the tools and methods for achieving this and offers some novel solutions to this complex problem. This book will be a valuable resource for graduate students, academics, practitioners and policy makers in the field of criminal justice as well as scholars interested in socio-legal and cross-disciplinary approaches to the analysis of criminal process and sentencing and the development of theory and comparative methodology in this area.

Examines the causes for mass incarceration of Americans and calls for the reform of the bail system. Traces the history of bail, how it has come to be an oppressive tool of the courts, and makes recommendations for reforming the bail system and alleviating the mass incarceration problem.

The system of jury trial has survived, intact, for 750 years. In the light of contemporary opposition to jury trial for serious offences, this book explains the nature and scope today of jury trial, with its minor exceptions. It chronicles the origins and development of jury trial in the Anglo-Saxon world, seeking to explain and explore the principles that lie at the heart of the mode of criminal trial. It observes the distinction between the professional judge and the amateur juror or lay participant, and the value of such a mixed tribunal. Part of the book is devoted to the leading European jurisdictions, underlining their abandonment of trial by jury and its replacement with the mixed tribunal in pursuance of a political will to inject a lay element into the trial process. Democracy is not an essential element in the criminal trial. The book takes a look at the appellate system in crime, from the Criminal Appeals Act 1907 to the present day, and urges the reform of the appellate court, finding the trial decision unsatisfactory as well as unsafe. Other important issues are touched upon – judicial ethics and court-craft; perverse jury verdicts (the nullification of jury verdicts); the speciality of fraud offences, and the selection of models for various crimes, as well as suggested reforms of the waiver of a jury trial or the ability of the defendant to choose the mode of trial. The section ends with a discussion of the restricted exceptions to jury trial, where the experience of 30 years of judge-alone trials in Northern Ireland – the Diplock Courts – is discussed. Finally, the book proffers its proposal for a major change in direction – involvement of the defendant in the choice of mode of trial, and the intervention (where necessary) of the expert, not merely as a witness but as an assessor to the judiciary or as a supplemental decision-maker.

Most contemporary criminal justice systems adopt a 'binary' system of verdicts. In a binary system, there is a single evidential threshold, or standard of proof. If the standard is met, the verdict is 'guilty', the defendant is convicted, and punishment is permitted. If the standard is not met, the verdict is 'not guilty', the defendant is acquitted, and punishment is forbidden. There is no middle ground between the verdict of 'not guilty' and that of 'guilty'. An intermediate verdict represents such middle ground, intermediate between acquittal and conviction both in terms of the strength of the incriminating evidence that is needed to warrant the verdict and in terms of the severity of the consequences that the verdict may produce for the defendant. Justice In-Between is a study of intermediate criminal verdicts and advances a novel justification of such controversial devices, with the aim to produce a consensus amongst scholars subscribing to different theories of punishment. Indeed, the book shows that one cannot investigate the choice of the standard of proof nor, importantly, that of the verdict system, in isolation from the question of the justification for punishing. Justice In-Between studies historical and extant examples of intermediate criminal verdicts and engages with the debates that have accompanied them, including the popular argument that intermediate criminal verdicts are incompatible with the presumption of innocence. In doing so, the book offers an original account of the meaning and of the justification of the presumption. Relying on decision theory, Justice In-Between makes a case for intermediate criminal verdicts and shows that such decision-theoretic case is viable under any of the main theories of punishment.

First published in 1976, this book examines the practical workings of the English criminal court system, focusing on the defendant’s experiences of the system and the decisions he takes as he passes through it. Indeed, the defendant in a criminal case is in a unique position to experience the whole criminal process, from the first approaches of the investigating policeman to conviction, sentence and possible appeal. Defendants in the Criminal Process is based upon the close observation of criminal cases and on interviews with defendants. The authors raise several issues and questions to be addressed by those involved in the administration of justice, whether as court administrators, judges, magistrates or lawyers. They also discuss issues of special importance for academics and others concerned with the explanation of the court process.