This book explores the possibility of philosophical praxis by weaving an ontological thread through four principal thinkers: Heidegger, Schelling, Goethe, and Heraclitus. It argues that a special kind of redemptive power awaits the structural understanding of thought that is beyond semantic formations such as concepts and ideational systems. The author claims that the “power” is negative in nature, trans-personal, and derived directly from the understanding of thought as a structural pulse. The book travels backwards in time, encountering successively Heidegger’s critique of calculative thinking, Schelling’s Mind/Nature relation, Goethe’s Delicate Empiricism, and the aphoristic wisdom of Heraclitus in search of a redemptive power that lies in the self-knowledge of thought. This power is ontological and not historical or developmental; it is the same at all times and all points of history. The author refers to the praxis as “philosophical bilingualism.”

This lucidly written book examines the social and political significance of the natural sciences through a detailed and original account of science as an interpretive social practice.

This book covers the topics Foucault helped make the core agenda of Western political culture - medicine, prisons, psychiatry, government and sexuality - emphasising Foucault's practical concern with discrimination, coercion and exclusion in human society.

Oriented around the theme of a ‘politics of philosophy’, this book tracks the phases in which Foucault’s genealogy of power, law, and subjectivity was reorganized during the 14 years of his teaching at the College de France, as his focus shifted from sovereignty to governance. This theme, Sandro Chignola argues here, is the key to understanding four features of Foucault’s work over this period. First, it foregrounds its immediate political character. Second, it demonstrates that Foucault’s "Greek trip" also aims at a politics of the subject that is able to face the processes of the governmentalization of power. Third, it makes clear that the idea of the "government of the self" is – drawing on an ethics of intellectual responsibility that is Weberian in origin – an answer to the processes that, within neoliberal governance, produce the subject as an individual (as a consumer, a market agent, an entrepreneur, and so on). Fourth, the theme of a ‘politics of philosophy’ implies that Foucault’s research was never simply scholarly or neutral; but rather was characterized by a specific political position. Against recent interpretations that risk turning Foucault into a scholar, here then Foucault is re-presented as a key figure for jurisprudential and political-philosophical research.

Judith Butler's new book considers the way in which psychic life is generated by the social operation of power, and how that social operation of power is concealed and fortified by the psyche that it produces. It combines social theory, philosophy, and psychoanalysis in novel ways, and offers a more sustained analysis of the theory of subject formation implicit in her previous books.

Love and evil are real – they are substances of force fields which contain us as constituent parts. Of all the powers of life they are the two most pregnant with meaning, hence the most generative of what is specifically human. Love and evil stand in the closest relationship to each other: evil is both what destroys love and what forces more love out of us; it is, as Augustine astutely grasped, privative (requiring something to negate) but it is also born out of misdirected love. Breaking with naïve realist and post-modern dogmas about the nature of the real, this book provides the basis for a philosophy of generative action as it draws upon examples from philosophy, literature, religion and popular culture. While this book has a sympathetic ear for ancient and traditional narratives about the meaning of life, it offers a philosophy appropriate for our times and our crises. It is particularly directed at readers who are seeking for new ways to think about our world and self-making, and who are as dissatisfied with post-Nietzschean and post-Marxian 20th century social theory as they are by more traditional philosophical and naturalistic accounts of human being.