Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), known as the founder of the phenomenological movement, was one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. A prolific scholar, he explored an enormous landscape of philosophical subjects, including philosophy of math, logic, theory of meaning, theory of consciousness and intentionality, and ontology in addition to phenomenology. This deeply insightful book traces the development of Husserl's thought from his earliest investigations in philosophy--informed by his work as a mathematician--to his publication of Ideas in 1913. Jitendra N. Mohanty, an internationally renowned Husserl scholar, presents a masterful study that illuminates Husserl's central concerns and provides a definitive assessment of the first phases of the philosopher's career.

In this fresh translation of five lectures delivered in 1907 at the University of Göttingen, Edmund Husserl lays out the philosophical problem of knowledge, indicates the requirements for its solution, and for the first time introduces the phenomenological method of reduction. For those interested in the genesis and development of Husserl's phenomenology, this text affords a unique glimpse into the epistemological motivation of his work, his concept of intentionality, and the formation of central phenomenological concepts that will later go by the names of `transcendental consciousness', the `noema', and the like. As a teaching text, The Idea of Phenomenology is ideal: it is brief, it is unencumbered by the technical terminology of Husserl's later work, it bears a clear connection to the problem of knowledge as formulated in the Cartesian tradition, and it is accompanied by a translator's introduction that clearly spells out the structure, argument, and movement of the text.

These nine essays present Ricoeur's interpretation of the most important of Husserl's writings, with emphasis on his philosophy of consciousness rather than his work in logic."

This is the first English translation of Husserliana XXIII, the volume in the critical edition of Edmund Husserl's works that gathers together a rich array of posthumous texts on representational consciousness. The lectures and sketches comprising this work make available the most profound and comprehensive Husserlian account of image consciousness. They explore phantasy in depth, and furnish nuanced accounts of perception and memory.

The present volume containing the dissertation of Dorion Cairns is the first part of a comprehensive edition of the philosophical papers of one of the foremost disseminators and interpreters of Husserlian phenomenology in North-America. Based on his intimate knowledge of Husserl’s published writings and unpublished manuscripts and on the many conversations and discussions he had with Husserl and Fink during his stay in Freiburg i. Br. in 1931-1932 Cairns’s dissertation is a comprehensive exposition of the methodological foundations and the concrete phenomenological analyses of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.The lucidity and precision of Cairns’s presentation is remarkable and demonstrates the secure grasp he had of Husserl’s philosophical intentions and phenomenological distinctions. Starting from the phenomenological reduction and Husserl’s Idea of Philosophy, Cairns proceeds with a detailed analysis of intentionality and the intentional structures of consciousness. In its scope and in the depth and nuance of its understanding, Cairns’s dissertation belongs beside the writings on Husserl by Levinas and Fink from the same period.

the Logische Untersuchungen,l phenomenology has been conceived as a substratum of empirical psychology, as a sphere comprising "imma nental" descriptions of psychical mental processes, a sphere compris ing descriptions that - so the immanence in question is understood - are strictly confined within the bounds of internal experience. It 2 would seem that my protest against this conception has been oflittle avail; and the added explanations, which sharply pinpointed at least some chief points of difference, either have not been understood or have been heedlessly pushed aside. Thus the replies directed against my criticism of psychological method are also quite negative because they miss the straightforward sense of my presentation. My criticism of psychological method did not at all deny the value of modern psychology, did not at all disparage the experimental work done by eminent men. Rather it laid bare certain, in the literal sense, radical defects of method upon the removal of which, in my opinion, must depend an elevation of psychology to a higher scientific level and an extraordinary amplification ofits field of work. Later an occasion will be found to say a few words about the unnecessary defences of psychology against my supposed "attacks.