Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.

In this book Neil Fligstein takes issue with prevailing theories of the corporation and proposes a radically new view that has important implications for American competitiveness.

This stimulating book offers an astute analysis of corporate governance from both a historical and a philosophical point of view. Exploring how the modern corporation developed, from Ancient Rome and the Middle Ages up to the present day, Javier Reyes identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the mainstream theory of the firm as put forward by the law and economics school of thought.

This volume explores corporate governance from three perspectives: a traditional economic, a philosophical, and an integrated business ethics perspective. Corporate governance has enjoyed a long tradition in the English-speaking world of management sciences. Following its traditional understanding it is defined as leadership and control of a firm with the aim of securing the long-term survival and viability of that firm. But recent business scandals and financial crises continue to provide ample cause for concern and have all fuelled interest in the ethical aspects. As a result, corporate governance has been criticized by many social groups. Economic sciences have failed to provide a clear definition of the corporate governance concept. Complexity increases if we embed the economic approach of corporate governance in a philosophical context. This book seeks to define the concept by examining its economic, philosophical and business ethics foundations.

Corporate law and governance are at the forefront of regulatory activities worldwide, and subject to increasing public attention in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. Comprehensively referencing the key debates, the Handbook provides a much-needed framework for understanding the aims and methods of legal research in the field.