Despite the role of shadow banking in the building up of the 2008 international financial crisis, the massive size of this sector, its cross-border nature, and the risks it entails for financial stability, the post-crisis regulation of shadow banking has remained rather feeble. Why? The Perils of International Regime Complexity in Shadow Banking identifies a 'game of shadows', which unfolded recursively concerning the definition, monitoring, and regulation of shadow banking internationally. Thus, states, regulators, and private actors tended to cast light away from various parts of the shadow banking system - shadow banking was (re)fined over time, its measurement was narrowed down, lessening the (perceived) need for regulation. The playing out of such a game was facilitated by the international architecture for shadow banking governance, which is a 'regime complex' characterized by the presence of multiple institutions and elemental regimes governing a set of related issues. Indeed, shadow banking is a quintessential case for demonstrating the perils of international regime complexity, which magnifies problems that are endemic in governing global finance - namely, interstate competition, disagreement between technocratic bodies, and the power of the financial industry - while splintering solutions, due to the fragmentation of regulatory authority. Empirically, this book examines various elemental regimes concerning different aspects of shadow banking, namely: international standards for defining, measuring, and monitoring global shadow banking; international standards for shadow banking entities, including money market funds, hedge funds, and investment funds; international standards for shadow banking activities, such as securitization, securities lending, and repos; international standards for bank capital exposures to shadow banking.

In a recently released New York Fed staff report, we present a forward-looking monitoring program to identify and track time-varying sources of systemic risk.

The U.S., the U.K., and more recently, the E.U., have proposed policy measures directly targeting complexity and business structures of banks. Unlike other, price-based reforms (e.g., Basel 3 and G-SIFI surcharges), these proposals have been developed unilaterally with material differences in scope, design and implementation schedules. This may exacerbate cross-border regulatory arbitrage and put a further burden on consolidated supervision and cross-border resolution. This paper provides an analysis of the potential implications of implementing different structural policy measures. It proposes a pragmatic and coordinated approach to development of these policies to reduce risk of regulatory arbitrage and minimize unintended consequences. In doing so, it also aims to identify a set of common policy measures that countries could adopt to re-scope bank business models and corporate structures.

There is much confusion about what shadow banking is. Some equate it with securitization, others with non-traditional bank activities, and yet others with non-bank lending. Regardless, most think of shadow banking as activities that can create systemic risk. This paper proposes to describe shadow banking as “all financial activities, except traditional banking, which require a private or public backstop to operate”. Backstops can come in the form of franchise value of a bank or insurance company, or in the form of a government guarantee. The need for a backstop is in our view a crucial feature of shadow banking, which distinguishes it from the “usual” intermediated capital market activities, such as custodians, hedge funds, leasing companies, etc.

Variants of nonbank credit intermediation differ greatly. We provide a conceptual framework to help distinguish various characteristics—structural features, economic motivations, and risk implications—associated with different forms of nonbank credit intermediation. Anchored by this framework, we take stock of the evolution of shadow banking and the extent of its transformation into market-based finance since the global financial crisis. In light of the substantial regulatory and supervisory responses of recent years, we highlight key areas of progress while drawing attention to elements where work still needs to be done. Case studies of policy challenges arising in different jurisdictions are also discussed. While many of the amplification forces that were at play during the global financial crisis have diminished, the post-crisis reform agenda is not yet complete, and policy makers must remain attentive to new challenges looming on the horizon.

Neoliberal economic theories are powerful because their domestic translators make them go local, hybridizing global scripts with local ideas. This does not mean that all local translations shape policy, however. External constraints and translators' access to cohesive policy institutions filter what kind of neoliberal hybrids become policy reality. By comparing the moderate neoliberalism that prevails in Spain with the more radical one that shapes policy thinking in Romania, Ruling Ideas explains why neoliberal hybrids take the forms that they do and how they survive crises. Cornel Ban contributes to the literature by showing that these different varieties of neoliberalism depend on what competing ideas are available locally, on the networks of actors who serve as the local advocates of neoliberalism, and on their vulnerability to external coercion. Ruling Ideas covers an extended historical period, starting with the Franco period in Spain and the Ceausescu period in Romania, discusses the economic integration of these countries into the EU, and continues through Europe's Great Recession and the European debt crisis. The broad historical coverage enables a careful analysis of how neoliberalism rules in times of stability and crisis and under different political systems.

We identify current challenges for creating stable, yet efficient financial systems using lessons from recent and past crises. Reforms need to start from three tenets: adopting a system-wide perspective explicitly aimed at addressing market failures; understanding and incorporating into regulations agents’ incentives so as to align them better with societies’ goals; and acknowledging that risks of crises will always remain, in part due to (unknown) unknowns – be they tipping points, fault lines, or spillovers. Corresponding to these three tenets, specific areas for further reforms are identified. Policy makers need to resist, however, fine-tuning regulations: a “do not harm” approach is often preferable. And as risks will remain, crisis management needs to be made an integral part of system design, not relegated to improvisation after the fact.