The Air Mobility Command (AMC) has faced a host of challenges in recent years that compromise its ability to cost-effectively fulfill the dual goals of meeting peacetime demand and maintaining wartime readiness. This report compares the peacetime tempo of air mobility operations during the Cold War with that of the post-Cold War period in efforts to pinpoint the challenges AMC faces as well as to suggest corrective measures that AMC should take to address these challenges.

Although the September 11 terrorist attacks and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) have led the Department of Defense (DoD) leadership to change its terms of reference for sizing and planning its force, these events have not changed the dual objectives of U.S. peacetime air mobility operations: to meet peacetime demand and to maintain wartime readiness. This study compares the peacetime tempo of air mobility operations in the Cold War (the 1980s) with that of the post-Cold War period (the 1990s) and examines the factors and as sociated trends that can affect the Air Mobility Command's (AMC's) ability to meet these dual objectives in a cost-effective manner. Does AMC have the flexibility to generate enough flying hours for pilot training when flying demand is low? Can AMC man flying operations with the number of pilots Congress has authorized? How well does the actual ratio of copilots (CPs) to aircraft commanders (ACs) match what is authorized? Comparing peacetime operations in the 1980s with those of the 1990s, did pilots get less hands-on training during flights in the latter period? Was AMC less able to project airlift demand accurately in the latter than in the former period? Did AMC have to fly more missions with shorter advance notice? Has AMC been successful in using reimbursements from its customers to defray its operating expenses? We will first report our findings on these factors and trends and will then suggest measures to correct the problems we have identified.

Mobility forces dominate air operations in the post?Cold War era, at least statistically. Colonel Lenderman examines this trend and

Includes publications previously listed in the supplements to the Index of selected publications of the Rand Corporation (Oct. 1962-Feb. 1963).

This study applies lessons learned from air mobility’s pivotal role in Field Marshal Sir William Slim’s World War II Burma campaign to contemporary air mobility operations. The author begins by tracing the evolution of air mobility from its pre-World War I roots to the Second World War, noting how its development proceeded despite the lack of coherent, codified doctrine. Next the author assesses Slim’s Burma campaign and how the key elements of organization, training and leadership, apart from air mobility, proved critical to Allied victory. Building upon this, the discussion turns to air mobility’s contributions to Slim’s joint campaign. From this analysis, the author identifies the tenets of air superiority, organization and air mobility normalization as being critical and enduring airpower lessons from the Burma theater. The closing chapters offer a primer on contemporary mobility operations before arguing that modern air mobility practitioners must account for five key essentials: superiority across the air and space domains; proper organization that promotes relationship building at the operational level of war; normalization of the complete air mobility supply chain and its accompanying idea of “air mobility mindedness”; training focused on increased interoperability; and the vital role of leadership.