American Military History provides the United States Army-in particular, its young officers, NCOs, and cadets-with a comprehensive but brief account of its past. The Center of Military History first published this work in 1956 as a textbook for senior ROTC courses. Since then it has gone through a number of updates and revisions, but the primary intent has remained the same. Support for military history education has always been a principal mission of the Center, and this new edition of an invaluable history furthers that purpose. The history of an active organization tends to expand rapidly as the organization grows larger and more complex. The period since the Vietnam War, at which point the most recent edition ended, has been a significant one for the Army, a busy period of expanding roles and missions and of fundamental organizational changes. In particular, the explosion of missions and deployments since 11 September 2001 has necessitated the creation of additional, open-ended chapters in the story of the U.S. Army in action. This first volume covers the Army's history from its birth in 1775 to the eve of World War I. By 1917, the United States was already a world power. The Army had sent large expeditionary forces beyond the American hemisphere, and at the beginning of the new century Secretary of War Elihu Root had proposed changes and reforms that within a generation would shape the Army of the future. But world war-global war-was still to come. The second volume of this new edition will take up that story and extend it into the twenty-first century and the early years of the war on terrorism and includes an analysis of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq up to January 2009.

Richard Drake has skillfully woven together the various strands of the Appalachian experience into a sweeping whole. Touching upon folk traditions, health care, the environment, higher education, the role of blacks and women, and much more, Drake offers a compelling social history of a unique American region. The Appalachian region, extending from Alabama in the South up to the Allegheny highlands of Pennsylvania, has historically been characterized by its largely rural populations, rich natural resources that have fueled industry in other parts of the country, and the strong and wild, undeveloped land. The rugged geography of the region allowed Native American societies, especially the Cherokee, to flourish. Early white settlers tended to favor a self-sufficient approach to farming, contrary to the land grabbing and plantation building going on elsewhere in the South. The growth of a market economy and competition from other agricultural areas of the country sparked an economic decline of the region's rural population at least as early as 1830. The Civil War and the sometimes hostile legislation of Reconstruction made life even more difficult for rural Appalachians. Recent history of the region is marked by the corporate exploitation of resources. Regional oil, gas, and coal had attracted some industry even before the Civil War, but the postwar years saw an immense expansion of American industry, nearly all of which relied heavily on Appalachian fossil fuels, particularly coal. What was initially a boon to the region eventually brought financial disaster to many mountain people as unsafe working conditions and strip mining ravaged the land and its inhabitants. A History of Appalachia also examines pockets of urbanization in Appalachia. Chemical, textile, and other industries have encouraged the development of urban areas. At the same time, radio, television, and the internet provide residents direct links to cultures from all over the world. The author looks at the process of urbanization as it belies commonly held notions about the region's rural character.

On December 26, 2004, a massive tsunami triggered by an underwater earthquake pummeled the coasts of Thailand, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and other countries along the Indian Ocean. With casualties as far away as Africa, the aftermath was overwhelming: ships could be spotted miles inland; cars floated in the ocean; legions of the unidentified deadÑan estimated 225,000Ñwere buried in mass graves; relief organizations struggled to reach rural areas and provide adequate aid for survivors. Shortly after this disaster, researchers from around the world traveled to the regionÕs most devastated areas, observing and documenting the tsunamiÕs impact. The Indian Ocean Tsunami: The Global Response to a Natural Disaster offers the first analysis of the response and recovery effort. Editors Pradyumna P. Karan and S. Subbiah, employing an interdisciplinary approach, have assembled an international team of top geographers, geologists, anthropologists, and political scientists to study the environmental, economic, and political effects of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The volume includes chapters that address the tsunamiÕs geo-environmental impact on coastal ecosystems and groundwater systems. Other chapters offer sociocultural perspectives on religious power relations in South India and suggest ways to improve government agenciesÕ response systems for natural disasters. A clear and definitive analysis of the second deadliest natural disaster on record, The Indian Ocean Tsunami will be of interest to environmentalists and political scientists alike, as well as to planners and administrators of disaster-preparedness programs.

The women in SNCC acquired new skills, experienced personal growth, sustained one another, and even had fun in the midst of serious struggle. Readers are privy to their analyses of the Movement---its tactics, strategies, and underlying philosophies. The contributors revisit central debates of the struggle including the role of nonviolence and self-defense, the role of white people in a black-led movement, and the role of women within the Movement and the society at large. --

William E. DePuy was likely the most important figure in the recovery of the United States Army from its collapse after the defeat in Vietnam. That is a rather large claim, and it suggests a precedence over a number of other distinguished officers, both his contemporaries and successors. But it is a claim that can be justified by the test of the “null hypothesis:” Could the Army that conducted the Gulf War be imagined without the actions of General DePuy and those he instructed and inspired? Clearly, it could not. There are a few officers of the period about whom one can make the same claim. To judge properly the accomplishments of General DePuy and his talented subordinates at the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), one must understand the sense of crises and defeat that pervaded the Army in the 1970s. By 1973, the United States had lost the war in Vietnam. Only the most optimistic or naïve observer held out hope that the Geneva Accords would provide security for the Republic of South Vietnam. The US Army was in a shambles, with discipline destroyed and the chain of command almost nonexistent. The “All Volunteer Army” was borne on a wave of permissiveness that compounded the problems of restoring discipline. Moreover, the army was ten years behind its most likely enemy in equipment development, and it had no warfighting doctrine worthy of the same. With the able assistance of the commander of the Armor Center, General Donn Starry, General DePuy wrenched the Army from self-pity and recrimination about its defeat in Vietnam into a bruising doctrinal debate that focused the Army's intellectual energies on mechanized warfare against a first-class opponent. Critics might argue correctly that that the result was incomplete, but they out not to underestimate how far the Army had to come just to begin the discussion. General DePuy also changed the way Army battalions prepared for war. He made the US Army a doctrinal force for the first time in history. Ably seconded by General Paul Gorman, DePuy led the Army into the age of the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). The intellectual and training initiatives were joined then, with a third concern of General DePuy's TRADOC: the development of a set of equipment requirements, with a concentration of effort on a limited number, ultimately called the “Big Five.” The result was the suite of weapons that overmatched the Iraqis in Operation Desert Storm – Apache attack helicopters, M1 tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, Patriot air defense missiles, and Black Hawk assault helicopters. General DePuy championed the recruitment of a high-quality soldiery, an effort beyond his own significant responsibilities but, even so, one he never ceased to support and forward.

The working paper is divided into two main parts. The first part is a descriptive analysis of the illicit use of biological agents by criminals and terrorists. It draws on a series of case studies documented in the second part. The case studies describe every instance identifiable in open source materials in which a perpetrator used, acquired, or threatened to use a biological agent. While the inventory of cases is clearly incomplete, it provides an empirical basis for addressing a number of important questions relating to both biocrimes and bioterrorism. This material should enable policymakers concerned with bioterrorism to make more informed decisions. In the course of this project, the author has researched over 270 alleged cases involving biological agents. This includes all incidents found in open sources that allegedly occurred during the 20th Century. While the list is certainly not complete, it provides the most comprehensive existing unclassified coverage of instances of illicit use of biological agents.

This 230 page atlas is divided into seven parts. Part I, Missouri's Divided Loyalties, and Part II, Missouri's Five Seasons, provide an overview of Missouri's history from the initial settlement of the Louisiana Purchase Territories through the opening years of the American Civil War. The remaining parts cover the Confederate plan, the Confederate movement into Missouri and the Union reaction, the Confederate retreat and Union pursuit into Kansas, and the final Confederate escape back into Arkansas. The atlas has a standard format with the map to left and the narrative to the right. Each narrative closes with two or more primary source vignettes. These vignettes provide an overview of the events shown on the map and discussed in the narrative from the perspective of persons who participated in the events. In most cases there are two vignettes with the first from a person loyal to the Union and the second from a person who supported the southern cause. A few narratives have two or more vignettes from only the Union side. This was done to emphasize disagreements and struggles among senior leaders to establish a common course of action. Map 25, Decision at the Little Blue River, is a good example and the three vignettes emphasize the disagreement between Maj. Gen. Samuel Curtis and his subordinate, Maj. Gen. James Blunt on where to locate the Union defensive line.