Corporate inversions - reorganizations that result in relocating corporate tax domiciles from the US to a foreign country - are alleged to cost the US Treasury billions of dollars in tax revenue. Contrary to these assertions, we find that that inverting firms pay no less taxes after the inversion than they did before. Moreover, contrary to the common belief, we estimate that the inversions result in US shareholders realizing $81,415.92 million in capital gains and annual increases in dividends of $9,959.37 million. Thus, paradoxically, inversions are likely to increase tax collections by the US Treasury.

Global investment patterns mean that effective taxation of foreign investors is of increasing importance to the economies of lower income countries. It is thus of considerable concern that the historical framework for cross-border income tax arrangements is not always well suited to allow low-income countries (LICs) effectively to generate tax revenues from profits on foreign direct investment (FDI). Several aspects of this framework contribute to the problem. This paper discusses, in particular, the likely effect of a shift by major economies from the system of worldwide corporate taxation toward a territorial system on the volume, distribution, and financing of FDI, focusing on LICs. It then empirically analyzes bilateral outbound FDI data for the UK for 2002–10 to determine whether the move to territoriality made corporations more sensitive to hostcountry statutory tax rates. Supporting evidence for this hypothesis is found for FDI financed from new equity.

This report presents studies and data available regarding the existence and magnitude of base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS), and contains an overview of global developments that have an impact on corporate tax matters.

Introduction -- Capital explosion -- Tax cut revolution -- Flat tax club -- Mobile brains and mobile wealth -- Taxing businesses in the global economy -- The economics of tax competition -- The battle for freedom and competition -- The moral case for tax competition -- Options for U.S. policy.

Describes proposals to to reduce the size of the Federal tax gap by curtaling tax shelters, closing unintended loopholes, addressing other areas of noncompliance with current tax law, and reforming certain areas of tax expenditures.

Migration has become an increasingly important phenomenon for societies, especially given its highly controversial political dimension. The complexity of the migrant integration process and its many varieties present challenges to policymakers who need high-quality information on which to base decisions. Nowhere is this necessity more pressing than in the development of relevant tax rules that meet the basic requirements of efficiency and equity. Moreover, the ascent of the so-called emerging economies coupled with the stagnation of the richest economies of the world implies reform of the current competition-based international tax regime and the adoption of a more cooperative paradigm. This important and timely book, for the first time in such depth, explores such aspects of the problem as the following: - migration for tax reasons, especially corporate "inversions" (change in corporate residence for tax purposes); - tax consequences related to individuals who receive free or subsidized education in one country and profit from it in another; - taxing cross-border retirement income; and - migration-related aspects of tax preferential treatment of the elderly. With particular emphasis on the effects and opportunities created by the changing international tax regime - and with attention to the role of tax treaties and recent court cases - chapters by well known tax experts present evidence on the consequences of migration in all its facets and simulate the effects of several recently enacted and proposed changes in tax law in European countries, the United States, and other jurisdictions. The grounded propositions and recommendations offered in this deeply informed book will allow policymakers to draft tax-residence rules that minimize distortion and promote fairness. The book will also be of interest to tax law practitioners and other tax specialists, migration experts, and academics investigating one of the crucial political issues of our time.

Schemes of residual profit allocation (RPA) tax multinationals by allocating their ‘routine’ profits to countries in which their activities take place and sharing their remaining ‘residual’ profit across countries on some formulaic basis. They have recently and rapidly come to prominence in policy discussions, yet almost nothing is known about their impact on revenue, investment and efficiency. This paper explores these issues, conceptually and empirically. It finds residual profits to be substantial, but concentrated in a relatively few MNEs, headquartered in few countries. The impact on tax revenue of reallocating excess profits under RPA, while adverse for investment hubs, appears beneficial for lower income countries even when the formula allocates by destination-based sales. The impact on investment incentives is ambiguous and specific both to countries and MNE groups; only if the rate of tax on routine profits is low does aggregate efficiency seem likely to increase.